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A Note on Terminology 
The traditional assumption that language and 
literature can and do mirror or reflect reality was often associated 
with the Aristotelian termmimesis. Later claims about the limita­
tions of language and literature have, among other things, led to a 
substitution of representation for mimesis. Since I am fully aware 
of the problematic nature of language and literature, I use repre­
sentation consistently in my discourse, but I retain mimesis both 
in quotations from others and in references that are meant to 
evoke the traditional belief in imitation. A similar procedure 
characterizes my use oiself and subject. The traditional humanist 
conception of an autonomous, introspective self has often been 
contested, leading to a replacement oi self by subject.1 The view I 
suggest incorporates the interrogation of the traditional one, and 
I use subject rather than self except in quotations or when refer­
ring to the concept in its humanist acceptation. I also use self in 
the chapter on Beloved, because in that novel the term recurs in 
dramatizing the painful aspirations of subjects to become selves. 
XI 

Introduction 
In this book I have two main concerns. Concep­
tually, I attempt to reinstate representation and rehumanize sub-
jectivity—not by returning to traditional humanist perspectives, 
but by integrating the contemporary destabilization of these con­
cepts and going beyond that destabilization by viewing narration 
as access. Historically, I trace a parallel movement—from conflict 
to dismantling to a tentative rehabilitation—in the Anglo-Ameri-
can novel of our century. The relation I establish between the two 
concerns is not an application of a theoretical hypothesis to 
works of literature or a corroboration of the hypothesis by them, 
nor is it only an analogy between conceptual and novelistic 
grapplings with the same issues. Rather, I endeavor to theorize 
through literature, to use the novels as, in some sense, the source 
of theory. After all, "the poets were there before us," as Freud re­
marked. However, it goes without saying that a reading of the 
novels with certain emphases in mind presupposes at least an im­
plicit conceptual framework. The circularity this creates can be 
seen as a fruitful dialogue or interaction between literature and 
theory, a beneficent spiral rather than a vicious circle. 
Throughout the history of philosophy, linguistics, psychoanal­
ysis, and literary theory, the terms representation and subjectivity 
I 
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(or their earlier versions, mimesis and selfY have given rise to op­
posed views, each of which presented itself as excluding the other. 
Deconstruction has tried to dismantle the principle of binary op­
position, but its perception of the mutual generation of opposites 
is firmly rooted in the same kind of dichotomous thinking.2 Theo­
ries of ideology inspired by Althusser and Foucault offer a way 
out of the dichotomy only at the cost of assumptions severing any 
relation to reality and self and rendering meaningless the very 
question of the possibility or impossibility of representation and 
subjectivity. My own suggestion of a way out is an attempt to 
shift the ground of the discussion, to understand the concepts 
within a different analytical framework. 
Most disagreements about representation and subjectivity are 
based on postulating one of two relations between words and 
things: reference (involving a truth-claim of sorts)3 or specularity 
(mirroring, reflection, correspondence, similarity, verisimilitude). 
According to one polar view, language and literature can reflect, 
convey, render, or refer to reality, and utterances do emanate 
from a preexistent self, while according to the opposite view no 
such connection to reality and self can be reached through lan­
guage and literature. The approach I suggest replaces these two 
relations by a third, which I call "access," whose different conno­
tations allow mutually modifying insights from divergent posi­
tions. Access, as I see it, is no longer a relation between words and 
things, but between different systems of signification, or different 
signifying processes. In this, my view resembles the theories of 
ideology mentioned above. Where it differs from them is in its 
claim for more than misrepresentation or discursive, ideological 
constructs. The approach I propose recognizes the problematic 
status of the concepts of representation and subjectivity, and yet 
attempts to save them from being both dismantled and totally en­
gulfed in discursive practices. I suggest that narration is the main 
mode of access in literature (and perhaps life). On the one hand, it 
destabilizes representation and subjectivity; on the other, it opens 
a way to a modified and qualified rehabilitation. 
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Although representation and subjectivity can nourish many 
studies separately, and have often done so, I have decided to treat 
them together because they are two facets of the view of being as 
presence. Presence, the cornerstone of what has come to be called 
"logocentrism," designates both a world preceding expression 
and an "I" present to itself (see Derrida 1972,193; 1976,12). No 
wonder, then, that the same theoreticians who conceive of reality 
as preexisting language also see the "I" as resisting radical doubt, 
while theoreticians who question the existence of reality outside 
discourse also dismantle the autonomy of the individual. Expres­
sive realism is the term Catherine Belsey uses to emphasize the af­
finity between representation and subjectivity in various trends of 
thinking. "Expressive realism," according to her, is "the theory 
that literature reflects thereality of experience as it is perceived by 
one (especially gifted) individual, who expresses it in a discourse 
which enables other individuals to recognize it as true" (1980, 7; 
Belsey's emphases). Belsey traces the transformations of this view 
from Aristotelian mimesis through the Renaissance, the eigh­
teenth century, and Romanticism before proceeding to its under­
mining in what she calls the post-Saussurean perspective. The 
individual Belsey is concerned with is the author, but her descrip­
tion can be generalized to narrators and characters. 
I conduct my exploration principally through an analysis of 
several twentieth-century novels that represent a theoretical 
avant-garde, a kind of laboratory where the problematics of rep­
resentation and subjectivity is enacted, dramatized, and lived out, 
explicitly or implicitly, structurally and thematically. Literature 
has its own ways of "thinking" about conceptual problems, and 
theory can only benefit from integrating these alternative modes 
of knowing. Novelists manifest attitudes toward representation 
and subjectivity not by truth-claims or direct statements about 
correspondence to reality but by dramatizing relations among 
voices or positions. 
I have chosen to analyze Faulkner's Absalom, Absalom! 
(1936), Nabokov's The Real Life of Sebastian Knight (1941), 
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Brooke-Rose's Thru (1975), Beckett's Company (1980), and 
Morrison's Beloved (1987)—all twentieth-century texts, because 
the issues I wish to examine have become particularly pressing in 
our period. The five novels share an interrogation of the problems 
of representation and subjectivity, though some put more empha­
sis on the former, others on the latter. They also dramatize these 
issues through an attempt to reproduce a personal and/or com­
munal history. Narration plays a crucial role in the affinity that 
emerges between the problematics of reconstructing the past and 
retrieving memory and the problematics of representation and 
subjectivity. 
The interaction between literary texts and conceptual prob­
lems outlines a twentieth-century movement from ambivalence 
about representation and subjectivity {Absalom, Absalom! and 
The Real Life of Sebastian Knight), to their negation or engulf­
ment in discursive practices (Thru; partly in Company), to an at­
tempt at regaining the lost possibilities (partly in Company; 
mainly in Beloved). The mapping of the moments punctuated by 
these novels is not new. What is new, I believe, and integral to the 
approach I advocate, is the analysis of the ways in which chang­
ing attitudes to representation and subjectivity are enacted by 
specific strategies of storytelling. In the novels I analyze, the prob­
lem of representation is dramatized mainly through a manipula­
tion of narrative levels: their multiplication, analogies among 
them, and transgressions of the boundaries marking their sepa­
rateness. The problem of subjectivity takes the form of unde­
cidability concerning the narrator's identity and structural 
position vis-a-vis the events narrated. An explanation, of some 
technical terms I use is given in the appendix. 
The movement that emerges from my exploration of the novels 
is generally analogous to the transition from modernism to 
postmodernism to a countertendency within postmodernism. 
One must, however, remember that such transitions are never 
clear-cut; there is always a certain degree of overlap between 
 5 Introduction
trends. Modernism foregrounds epistemological problems, 
whereas postmodernism puts in doubt not only our capacity to 
know but also the ontological status of the world that is the object 
of knowledge (McHale 1987, 9-10). Many of the insights and 
techniques of both modernism and postmodernism have been in­
corporated by the countertendency I detect, but in it they have 
been used to re-engage with reality (hence also with representa­
tion) and rehumanize subjectivity. Though in no way exclusive to 
ethnic and feminist writing, reinstating inclinations are particu­
larly strong in these literatures, which are motivated by the desire 
to rescue a history from the oblivion to which the majority group 
has consigned it and give a voice to those silenced by the system. 
From this perspective Absalom, Absalom! and The Real Life of 
Sebastian Knight can be seen as border texts between modernism 
and postmodernism, Thru as clearly postmodernist, Company as 
having one foot in mainstream postmodernism and one in the 
countertendency within it, and Beloved as a leading countertext 
within postmodernism. What is interesting, however, is not the 
labeling of the novels but the many parallels between the histori­
cal moments they stage, the larger literary movements, the con­
ceptual trajectory of literary theory, and the shape of this 
exploration of theoretical issues through literature. Around these, 
encompassing them and rendering their affinity intelligible, are 
the contours of the cultural landscapes of our period. 

I

Narration, Representation, 
Subjectivity 
Once upon a time (or so some present-day theo­
rists would like to believe), language was conceived of as imitat­
ing or mirroring reality. Whether anchored in interpretations of 
Aristotle's concept of mimesis or not,1 such views assume a direct 
relation between words and things, between the verbal and the 
nonverbal domain. Words stand for something else; they become 
a transparent channel to an extralinguistic outside, which is taken 
to exist before its verbalization. An awareness of the nontrans­
parency of language and of its problematic relation to the world 
has often led to the replacement oimimesis by representation and 
of reality by reality-models, schemata, or any number of related 
terms. While denying language the capacity to imitate a nonlin­
guistic reality, many traditional views of representation still con­
ceive of language and literature as articulations, reproductions of 
a prior presence.2 No wonder, then, that representation in this 
sense is often conflated with mimesis, as in Auerbach's seminal 
study (1953) or in the widespread use of the adjectives mimetic 
and nonmimetic in debates about representation. Traces of the 
tradition can be detected even within narratology, which has 
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often aligned itself with a nonhumanist ideology. The logical pri­
ority of reality (or, in more cautious formulations, fictional real­
ity) underlies formalist and structuralist conceptions of fabula 
and histoire, whether these are explicitly seen as preceding the 
sjuzet or recit, or as abstracted and reconstructed from it. Simi­
larly, if one defines narration as a verbal act "consisting of some­
one telling someone else that something happened" (Smith 1980, 
232), one grants the events a logical priority over their telling.3 
The difference between the notion of mimesis and traditional 
concepts of representation hinges on the nature of the relation be­
tween language and reality (imitation versus reference, corre­
spondence, adequation, standing for). Neither the existence of 
some relation nor the antecedence of reality is questioned. But the 
radicalization of the critique in post-Saussurean linguistics, in the 
philosophies of Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Derrida, and their ad­
herents, and in Lacanian psychoanalysis has given rise to the di­
chotomy that I will here simplify as the possibility versus the 
impossibility of representation. Grave doubts have been cast on 
the capacity of language to reach—let alone represent—the 
world. The presumption of the existence of a reality prior to the 
act of representation has also come under fire. Some see the world 
as "always already textualized by an arche-writing or system of 
differentiation," and as "a mirage of language," to be excluded 
from linguistic and literary discussion (Scholes 1980, 206). In­
stead of a thing-in-itself, reality is now considered an absence, 
and language replaces, rather than reflecting or even conveying, 
this absent reality. 
Let me linger a little on the case of psychoanalysis, because 
narration is of paramount importance in it, and the development 
of my own view must therefore take careful account of the desta­
bilization of representation from this perspective. Psychoanalysis 
believes that the traumatic experiences that influence a person's 
whole life tend to be repressed, that is, made absent to conscious­
ness. These "absent" events, experiences that are not remem­
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bered, get repeated and acted out in the person's life and in the 
process of transference (see, e.g., Freud 1958). Since, as far as 
consciousness goes, the repressed is an absence for the analysand, 
its repetition becomes in a sense the first presence, the first "per­
formance" of the absence. Going beyond the notion of the re­
pressed experiences as an absence to consciousness, Lacan claims 
that they are also absent in the sense of never having occurred in 
the person's life. According to Lacan, "It is less out of anything 
real.. . than precisely out oiwhat never was, that what repeats it­
self springs" (translated in Johnson 1978,504). If Freud is right in 
maintaining that most infantile repressions have to do with the 
Oedipus complex, the castration complex, and their ramifica­
tions, then these would seem to represent events that have not oc­
curred. A male child, the argument goes, has not been castrated 
by his father for his desire to sleep with his mother; he has only in­
terpreted the absence of a penis in the female as a castration 
which threatens him. Barbara Johnson's conclusion is that 
Psychoanalysis is in fact itself the primal scene it is seeking: it 
is the first occurrence of what has been repeating itself in the 
patient without ever having occurred. Psychoanalysis is not 
itself the interpretation of repetition; it is the repetition of a 
trauma of interpretation called "castration" or "parental 
coitus" or "the Oedipus complex" or even "sexuality"—the 
traumatic deferred interpretation not of an event but as an 
event which never took place as such. The "primal scene" is 
not a scene but an interpretative infelicity whose result was to 
situate the interpreter in an intolerable position. And psycho­
analysis is the reconstruction of that interpretative infelicity 
not as its interpretation, but as its first and last act. Psycho­
analysis has content only insofar as it repeats the dis-content 
of what never took place. (1978,499; Johnson's emphases) 
One may wish to take issue with these views both as interpreta­
tions of Freud's theories and in themselves, for example, by que­
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rying the equivalence they establish between absence to con­
sciousness (epistemological absence) and absence tout court (on­
tological absence). True, the repressed is absent to consciousness, 
but—at least in Freud—it is present in the unconscious. No less 
problematic is the radical form of absence discussed by Lacan and 
Johnson. Most male children have not been castrated by their fa­
thers, nor have they slept with their mothers (although we know 
now that incest is much more widespread than was thought in the 
past), but if, as psychoanalysis claims, they have fantasized such a 
scenario, hasn't there been a psychic event? And can one really 
speak of absence except metaphorically? Moreover, the psychic 
event, which Johnson would call an interpretation, is often 
(though not always) based on an actual event—the child's over­
hearing the "cries and whispers" of his or her parents while mak­
ing love. My purpose here is not to argue with the centrality of 
absence in Lacanian psychoanalysis but rather to anticipate a re­
lationship that will be useful in developing my own approach 
later. 
Just as the critique of mimesis has led to the alternative notion 
of representation, so has the interrogation of representation given 
rise to new alternatives. But while substituting representation for 
mimesis was a modification, the alternatives to representation, 
particularly creation, play, textuality, intertextuality, and meta-
textuality, present themselves as counterconcepts. 
If the literary situation, like its psychoanalytic counterpart, is a 
performative repetition of an absence, then representation gives 
way to presentation, reproduction to production, and re-creation 
to creation. Spariosu relates such views to the "romantic ideology 
which privileged the subject as constituting rather than 'imitat­
ing' or 'reflecting' the object" (1982, 53). He also relates it to the 
Einsteinian revolution in physics, where the claim is no longer "to 
disclose a certain (objective) reality, but rather to invent it" (ibid., 
33). Whereas Descartes, speaking of the properties of triangles, 
stated, "No one can say that I have invented or imagined them," 
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mathematicians today say precisely this. In The Evolution of 
Physics, Einstein talks constantly about the "important inven­
tion" of the electromagnetic field and all the other realities "cre­
ated by modern physics," and he rejoices in the new concepts 
because they have enabled us "to create a more subtle reality" 
(quoted in Spariosu 1982, 33). Similarly, for Feyerabend, "Facts 
do not create the theory, but theory creates its own facts" (ibid.). 
From this perspective, language and literature are seen as a cre­
ation rather than a re-creation of reality. Creation in this sense is 
closely related to the concept of play, which has become a catch­
word since Derrida, but which is equally central to the recent 
theorizing of a non-deconstructionist like Wolfgang Iser. In "The 
Play of the Text," Iser says: "The following essay is an attempt to 
raise play above representation as an umbrella concept to cover 
all the ongoing operations of the textual process. It has two heu­
ristic advantages: (1) play does not have to concern itself with 
what it might stand for, and (2) play does not have to picture any­
thing outside itself. It allows author-text-reader to be conceived 
as a dynamic interrelationship that moves toward a final result" 
(1989,250). The connection between play, creation, and absence 
becomes clear later in the essay: "The play-movement takes place 
when the schema ceases to function as a form of accommodation, 
and instead of taking its shape from the object to be imitated, now 
imposes a shape on what is absent" (1989,254-55). 
The concept of play, especially in its variant as the "free play of 
signifiers," does not always lead to a view of literature as creat­
ing, rather than re-creating, a reality. Indeed, reality, whether re­
created or created, is often completely excluded from nonrepre­
sentational approaches, and what literature is said to produce is 
pure textuality. If, within the representational framework, writ­
ing and narrating are seen as transitive verbs (they tell some­
thing), according to the opposite view both become intransitive 
verbs: They tell, or even better, they merely unfold (Barthes 
1972). 
12 Chapter I 
Like textuality, intertextuality is frequently opposed to repre­
sentation. Whereas representation is based on a reference from 
words to things, intertextuality is a reference from words to 
words, or rather from texts to texts. The concept of "text" is of­
ten expanded to designate the whole world. The world, as a net­
work of signs, becomes a text (or series of texts); intertextuality 
replaces representation. 
As an alternative to representation, metatextuality can be 
added to textuality and intertextuality. The despair that arises 
from confronting the incapacity of language to "reach" the world 
is sometimes counteracted by a search for a metalinguistic place 
from which to speak of the limitations of language and literature 
(Thiher 1984, 117). This results in metatexts, self-conscious or 
self-referential literature, works that interrogate or dramatize 
their own difficulties in representing reality. Such works often 
function as a kind of metacommentary on theory or philosophy, 
discourses that more commonly enjoy a metastatus in relation to 
literature. 
An inalienable essence, uniqueness (or individuality), unity, and 
stability (or continuity)—these are the most common attributes of 
the self in its traditional conceptions, and they have all been chal­
lenged by novelists and theoreticians in our century. Frequently, 
the self is seen as a contingency of roles and functions (Mead 
1934). The notion of individuality or uniqueness gives place to 
that of an anonymous, prehuman stratum underlying all singular 
variations (Lawrence 1914; Sarraute 1956). Unity has been re­
placed by "the divided self" (Laing 1960), "the split subject" 
(Lacan 1966), "a group acting together" (Cixous 1974). And sta­
bility gives way to flux (Woolf 1925). "The researches of psycho­
analysis, of linguistics, of anthropology," writes Foucault, "have 
'decentered' the subject in relation to the laws of its desire, the 
forms of its language, the rules of its actions, or the play of its 
mythical and imaginative discourse" (1969, 22). The verb 
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decenter, it is worth noting, is used here, as in many contempo­
rary writings, in two different, though perhaps related, senses. 
One has to do with the absence or loss of an inner center holding 
together the different aspects of the individual. The other con­
cerns the replacement of the anthropocentric view by an outlook 
that puts impersonal systems rather than people in the center. To 
use Culler's description, "The self is dissolved as its various func­
tions are ascribed to impersonal systems which operate through 
it" (1981,33).4 
A corollary of both senses of decentering is observable in the 
language used by Foucault, namely the substitution of the term 
subject for self. Like the grammatical subject, the human subject 
is reduced in this theory to a structural position in a system gov­
erned by differences. Similarly, in Lacan's linguistically based 
psychoanalysis, subject refers to the individual when s/he is in­
serted into the symbolic order, i.e., the order of language, law, so­
cial systems, "the name of the father"—systems of differences in 
which the subject undergoes an alienation from him/herself and is 
subjected to signifying chains. 
As is well known, the dissolution of the self has had devastat­
ing consequences for the status of characters in narrative fiction 
as well as for the author's mode of existence (or nonexistence) 
within the text. Since I foreground narration, my focus is on the 
relations between the teller and his/her utterances. Reformulated 
from this limited perspective, the traditional view holds that ut­
terances presuppose, or constitute, a stance from which they are 
conducted, and that this stance is attributable to a voice emanat­
ing from a self. The more recent views, on the other hand, con­
tend that the public system of language, its rule-governed 
character, the play of rhetorical devices and intertextual refer­
ences, and the presence of aporias and internal splits are signs of a 
disconnection between language and an individual voice and self 
(see Harrison 1991, 188-218). The speaker is considered "a 
storehouse of his culture's linguistic system, of its codes, 
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syntagms, and potential paradigmatic options" (Thiher 1984, 
128). Voice becomes a position within the linguistic system, and 
the knowable self a linguistic construct (a subject). Heidegger's 
famous statement "Die Sprache spricht! nicht der Mensch" is by 
now almost a truism, reverberating in Wittgenstein's tenet that 
play is not defined by people but rather defines them, as well as by 
the deconstructionist idea that we are spoken by language, and 
Barthes's declaration: "Le discours, ou mieux encore, le langage 
parle,c'esttout" (1970,48). 
In narratology proper, the divergence of opinion focuses 
mainly on the narrator's mode of existence. Classically, the narra­
tor corresponded to a fictional person whose psychological 
makeup and moral values could be reconstructed from the text, 
even when the narrator is omniscient, a voice external to the nar­
rated events (see, e.g., Booth 1961; Ewen 1974). In structuralist 
narratology, on the other hand, the narrator is often treated as a 
narrative instance, and if the term voice is used (Genette 1972; 
Rimmon-Kenan 1983), it is taken in a quasi-grammatical sense, 
restricted to the narrator's structural position with regard to the 
narrated world. This is consistent with the narratological 
depersonification of the traditionally personlike agents in narra­
tive fiction, namely, the exclusion of the author and the implied 
author and the reduction of characters to the sum total of their ac­
tions. In deconstruction, the very notion of a narrator becomes 
superfluous. The text is performed by language, not by a specific 
person, voice, or even instance. 
The conflicting views concerning both representation and subjec­
tivity are refined yet duplicated by the largely deconstructionist 
insights that differences exist not only between positions but also 
within them, and that opposites, being each other's polar condi­
tion of possibility, generate each other in perpetual oscillation. In 
the process of deconstructing the possibility of representation as 
well as of literal meaning, de Man inserts a significant caveat: "It 
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would be quite foolish to assume that one can lightheartedly 
move away from the constraint of referential meaning" (1979, 
201). In typical zigzag fashion, however, he follows this with a 
claim that in Rousseau's Second Discourse, referential language 
"becomes an aberrant trope that conceals the radical figurality of 
language behind the illusion that it can properly mean" (ibid., 
202). At the far end of de Man's deconstruction of the self there is 
a recuperation of this very notion, but the retrieval uncannily in­
cludes its own negation: 
In all these instances, rhetoric functions as a key to the discov­
ery of the self, and it functions with such ease that one may 
well begin to wonder whether the lock indeed shapes the key 
or whether it is not the other way round, that a lock (and a 
secret room or box behind it) had to be invented in order to 
give a function to the key. For what could be more distressing 
than a bunch of highly refined keys just lying around without 
any corresponding locks worthy of being opened? Perhaps 
there are none, and perhaps the most refined key of all, the key 
of keys, is the one that gives access to the Pandora's box in 
which this darkest secret is kept hidden. This would imply the 
existence of at least one lock worthy of being raped, the Self as 
the relentless undoer of selfhood, (ibid., 173) 
What such complications show, I believe (and the insight goes 
beyond the specific concepts of representation and subjectivity) is 
that any two propositions, considered as totalities in a binary op­
position, inevitably generate each other, become a necessary 
other for each other. "The pressure toward meaning and the pres­
sure toward its undoing can never cancel each other out" (de Man 
1979,161), and even the most powerful critiques of logocentrism 
cannot escape the logocentric premises they undermine. Pren­
dergast describes this interdependence in terms of the liar's para­
dox: "It places logical constraints upon the attack on mimesis and 
representational discourse generally, in that any such attack is 
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obliged, as a condition of its intelligibility, to adopt the very cat­
egories of the object it attacks." This predicament can easily 
be seen in Derrida's work: "Derrida's own deconstruction of the 
set of terms which support the mimetic project (truth, reference, 
etc.) is—self-confessedly—impossible without recourse to these 
terms" (Prendergast 1986,18). 
Within the deconstructionist framework, any (hypothetical) 
impulse to transcend dichotomies would automatically engender 
the undercutting recognition that dichotomies cannot be tran­
scended, and this new pair of opposites would start a further 
movement of oscillation, and so on and on in ever-increasing self-
consciousness. Such a movement comes to a halt (or perhaps 
never begins) in theories of ideology inspired by Althusser and 
Foucault. Here the question whether representation is or is not 
possible is literally im-pertinent, because representation is, from 
the start, dissociated from reality. In these views, which permeate 
some versions of semiotics, feminism, New Historicism, and Brit­
ish cultural materialism, representation is related not to reality 
but to discursive practices. The practices are ideological con­
structs, and the term ideology designates "not the system of the 
real relations which govern the existence of individuals, but the 
imaginary relation of those individuals to the real relations in 
which they 'live'" (Althusser 1971, 165). Ideology, in this sense, 
functions as unproclaimed fiction, wool over one's eyes, in the 
service of the powers that be. As a discursive, ideological con­
struct, representation becomes re-presentation, that is, presenting 
again and again: "Ideology is always repeated, always re-pre-
sented, always already 'known' from previous discourses, images 
and myths. Ideology re-presents not the real, nor a distorted re­
flection of the real, but the 'obvious.' What it suppresses is its own 
construction in signifying practice" (Belsey 1980, 148 n. 10). 
Within this conceptual framework, subjectivity is a type of repre­
sentation, linguistically and discursively constructed, informed by 
ideology, and having no unmediated relation to an experience of 
self and others. 
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Given a conception of representation as that which is con­
structed in and by discourse (or by some other signifying system), 
having no connection to the world, the whole question of the ca­
pacity or incapacity of language and literature to represent reality 
becomes irrelevant. This does not mean, however, as some 
deconstructionist writing holds, that representation is impossible. 
On the contrary, representation is everywhere, but its meaning is 
completely changed. Such studies regularly shift from the singular 
to the plural, from "representation" to "representations."5 This 
move is motivated partly by an insistence on the plurality of coex­
isting discourses and partly by the use of representation to desig­
nate not the act or process of representing but its products, 
represented objects. These theories of ideology collapse not only 
the possible/impossible dichotomy but also the presumed contrast 
between representation and its counterconcepts. An example: 
Earlier in this chapter, the view of language and literature as con­
structing (creating) reality was presented as opposed to its view as 
reconstructing (representing) it. Here they are treated as quasi-
synonymous. Below is part of a statement from a semiotic femi­
nist study influenced by these new directions, where the 
quasi-synonymity is implied by the parallelism of the appositive 
clauses: "If we then want to bring our bodies and our pleasures 
closer, where we might see what they are like; better still, where 
we might represent them from another perspective, construct 
them with another standard of measurement, or understand them 
within other terms of analysis" (de Lauretis 1987, 38; emphases 
mine). Representation becomes paradoxically contained within 
the view that questioned it, a form of construction, rather than its 
binary opposite. I have no desire to ignore the destabilization of 
representation or its alignment with construction. On the con­
trary, I wish to integrate these views in my rethinking. But I feel 
uncomfortable with the complete divorce between representation 
and reality, between subjectivity and selves. 
Nor is my discomfort idiosyncratic. Quite a few moral philoso­
phers today return to the notion of self (e.g., Taylor 1989; 
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Harrison 1991) and reinject human agency into theories that had 
emphasized the dominance of social systems and ideological con-
structs.6 Moreover, realignments with reality and selves are often 
mediated by the notion of narrative. Alisdair Maclntyre thus 
speaks about "the narrative unity of life" (1981); Paul Ricoeur in­
vokes the "narrative identity which constitutes us" (1991). 
Ricoeur's view is most relevant here because it uses narrative to 
reflect about both representation and subjectivity, and it explic­
itly relates to narratological models like Genette's. 
Rejecting the neat opposition between stories and reality, as it 
expresses itself, for example, in the dictum, "Stories are recounted 
and not lived; life is lived and not recounted," Ricoeur insists on a 
multiplicity of arguments, which "compel us to grant to experi­
ence as such a virtual narrativity" (1991,29). To him, lived expe­
rience is a chain of stories that demand to be told, and—like 
reality—the subject also emerges from potential stories in which 
he or she is entangled. The advantage of the concept of narrative 
identity, according to Ricoeur, is that it replaces the view of iden­
tity as sameness (idem) by that of identity as self (ipse), giving 
room for change, development, dynamism. 
These are attractive views, and so is their development in 
Ricoeur's Time and Narrative (1985). But Ricoeur foregrounds 
narrative, the product, whereas I emphasize narration, the pro­
cess of production. This characterization of Ricoeur's endeavor 
may sound inaccurate, since he takes narratology to task for ne­
glecting narration and confining analysis only to its traces in the 
accomplished narrative: "Narratology, however, strives to record 
only the marks of narration found in the text" (1985, 82). Closer 
scrutiny, however, reveals that Ricoeur's concern with narration 
(or narrating) is limited to its temporality. In criticizing Genette, 
he says: "Postponing any discussion of the time of narration is 
not without its drawbacks" (85), and later: "These pages [of 
Genette's] are at the very least premature, when we consider that 
the study of the time of narration is postponed" (86). But narra­
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tion, as I see it, is an ongoing process, constantly open to what 
T. S. Eliot calls "visions and revisions," offering a glance toward 
the concepts under consideration rather than freezing them as 
stable, secure products. Another advantage of my emphasis on 
narration is the hierarchy it both establishes and disrupts between 
narrative levels. 
Enter narration, and it enters as a mode of access. By narration, I 
mean the act or process of telling—whether by an external narrat­
ing voice, by an internal character-narrator, or by a character 
within the narrative who tells a story within the overall story. Be­
hind all these is the author's act of narration, which (as I argue in 
the conclusion) calls for a reexploration in a separate study. Here 
I will consider the author only when his/her role is foregrounded 
by the text under consideration. I use the term access here because 
its connotations are double-edged. This term's duality epitomizes 
an argument that both incorporates the problematization of rep­
resentation and subjectivity and reestablishes them in spite of 
doubt. In playing with the various connotations of access, I am 
consciously engaged in a game not very different from the one 
practiced by Shreve and Quentin in Absalom, Absalom! By let­
ting metaphor, analogy, and mise en abyme function as argu­
ments, I wish to emphasize my position about literature's way of 
"knowing" and the advantages of theorizing through literature. 
This said, "let me play a while now" (Absalom, Absalom! 
280). On the one hand, access means "approach," "passage," 
"channel," "doorway," implying the presence of some further 
space. By analogy, this suggests that narration opens or consti­
tutes a direct approach to reality and subjectivity. On the other 
hand, "Access" has also become the brand name of one kind of 
credit card. A credit card is granted purchasing power because— 
on the basis of trust inscribed in institutionalized conventions—it 
represents a promise of money (even if the money is not available 
in the user's bank account at that moment). Money, of course, is a 
20 Chapter I 
sign system, a representation, and a credit card is thus a represen­
tation of a representation. The operative relation here is not be­
tween signs and things but between two sign systems. In fact, the 
situation is even more complex. Money does not directly repre­
sent the object to be purchased; it signifies what economists call 
"value." Value is measured in relation to other values, leading to 
a layering of differential systems. These systems give access to 
things in the world on the basis of an act of substitution that again 
involves a convention-governed trust or faith. 
Like the use of a credit card, the act of narration does not rep­
resent the world directly. Rather, it represents modes of represen­
tation, possibilities of doubt and credence, in the worlds the 
characters inhabit. These may be filtered through a variety of nar­
rators and points of view or through other forms of what Bakhtin 
(1981) calls "polyphony" and "heteroglossia." From the point of 
view of ideological theories, narration can be seen as putting in 
motion an interaction between discursive practices, but—as in the 
credit card analogy—I believe that the interaction issues in a ges­
ture of substitution offering indirect access to a "world." The 
whole process, and in particular the final leap, requires—like the 
operation of "Access"—trust or faith governed by convention. 
The idea of access (without the credit card association) has be­
come accessible to me through both Jameson and Iser, although 
Jameson talks about historiography and Iser (like myself) about 
fiction,7 Jameson emphasizes the "represented reality," while Iser 
deals with the "representing appearance," and their positions on 
the issues in question are far from similar. Resisting the 
deconstructionist dismantling of reality in historiography, 
Jameson says: 
What Althusser's own insistence on history as an absent cause 
makes clear, but what is missing from the formula as it is ca­
nonically worded, is that he does not at all draw the fashion­
able conclusion that because history is a text, the "referent" 
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does not exist. We would therefore propose the following 
revised formulation: that history is not a text, not a narrative, 
master or otherwise, but that, as an absent cause, it is inacces­
sible to us except in textual form, and that approach to it and 
to the Real itself necessarily passes through its prior textual­
ization, its narrativization in the political unconscious. (1980, 
35) 
True, Jameson speaks about "narrativization" (presumably 
meaning organization as a narrative), not about "narration" (the 
act or process of telling), but his narrativization, like my narra­
tion, is seen as the only access to what is otherwise inaccessible. 
The status of history in Jameson's theory is complex. It is an "ab­
sent cause," yet by no means a nonexistent referent; it is "the 
Real," but the Real in a Lacanian sense, hence also "the Impos­
sible." Jameson both affirms and undercuts reality in this para­
doxical statement; he problematizes and insists on representation. 
Iser's stance, on the other hand, is explicitly antirepresenta­
tional, although on close scrutiny his "mode of access" may invite 
a reading against the grain. Every appearance, says Iser, "is a 
faked mode of access to what cannot become present" (1993, 
300), and "staging prevents the inaccessible from being occupied. 
It does give form to the inaccessible but it preserves the status of 
the latter by revealing itself as a simulacrum" (ibid., 301). "Faked 
or unfaked" is a matter of truth-value; access and giving form be­
long to the operative realm. By putting the emphasis on mode of 
access rather than on faked, Iser's statement can be read as (or 
turned into?) an affirmation oisome contact in spite of the prob­
lematic nature of the mode and the inaccessibility of the object. 
So much for representation. How does the Access analogy op­
erate for subjectivity? A credit card is operative in a given system 
only on the basis of a number specific to its owner. The number, 
itself a sign, does not express the essence of its owner; it only rep­
resents the subject by differentiating him/her from other subjects. 
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Like the personal number on a credit card, the narrating subject is 
at least "something that might make a mark on something," to 
use Absalom, Absalom! again (127). In addition, a circularity 
governs both "Access" and narration. Just as a credit card simul­
taneously assumes a user and inscribes him/her as a personal 
number, so narration both presupposes a narrator and creates 
him/her in the process of telling. 
An approach through narration also grants the narrating sub­
ject access to agency within (or in spite of) the ideological con­
structs to which he or she is subjected. Since, as Bakhtin and 
others have shown, there are several competing discourses at any 
given time, one form of (fairly limited) freedom is the ability to 
choose a specific discourse in which to take up a position.8 It is 
not my purpose here to offer a list of the possibly infinite ways in 
which narrators can position themselves within discourses. Some 
will come up in the textual analyses that follow (chapters 2 
through 6 below). For the sake of clarity, however, let me draw 
again on Absalom, Absalom!—the novel from which all the brief 
examples in this section are taken—to illustrate one type of self-
positioning. Here the character-narrators invest their discourse 
with certain generic characteristics informed by their chosen atti­
tude toward the events threatening to imprison them. Rosa's nar­
rative is imbued with a Gothic spirit, Mr. Compson's with the 
spirit of Greek tragedy, Quentin narrates a chivalric romance, 
and Shreve ironically spins a tall tale. Of course, the generic char­
acteristics are also discursive constructs, inscribing subjects 
within themselves, but in these instances the inscriptions are self-
willed, a mark of the narrating subject. Going beyond such a 
mark of the narrating subject, Bakhtin grants him/her "an inter­
nally persuasive discourse," achieved by interweaving "others' 
words" and "one's own word" (1981, 342-46). "One's own 
word" is, of course, not ideology-free, but it does permit "play 
with its borders" and "spontaneously creative stylizing variants" 
(343)—a certain degree of freedom.9 
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From a different perspective, the very structure of the relation 
between the act of narration and the narrated events potentially 
frees the narrating subject from complete unconscious entrap­
ment in discursive practices. According to Althusser, the subject 
believes him/herself to be outside ideology, although in fact s/he is 
totally in it. I suggest that this need not apply to the narrating sub­
ject because of the doubleness of his/her position.10 The classical 
model, as it has come to us from Genette (1972), conceives of the 
act or process responsible for producing the narrative as being, by 
definition, on a higher logical level than the story it narrates. By 
the same token, narration within a narrative is above the events it 
tells, this being the governing principle of Genette's distinction 
between narrative levels (see the appendix for explanation). The 
same applies to so-called first-person narratives, where the narra­
tor as a speaking subject is at a higher level than his/her (usually 
younger) version as a protagonist. This logical position of narra­
tion as against a narrated "reality" allows it to maintain a certain 
freedom from the network of illusions in which—according to 
ideological theories—it is enmeshed qua discursive practice. The 
narrator in the classical model is positioned not only in the hierar­
chy of levels but also in a lateral relation of participation, the dif­
ference here being between inside and outside (a narrator who is 
or is not part of the narrated events). The very possibility of being 
outside, of telling the story of another, creates a certain distance; 
but even when the narrator is part of the narrated "reality," per­
haps even its protagonist, complete unconscious entrapment may 
be inhibited by the split in the hierarchy between protagonist and 
narrator. 
That there can be a stance above or outside ideological con­
structs is precisely what theories of ideology question, along with 
the narratological model that makes room for it. Am I not, then, 
involved in a circular argument? Yes and no. The hierarchy of lev­
els and lateral relations that, to my mind, secures a certain degree 
of distance or freedom on the part of the narrating subject is seen 
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by various ideological theorists as a subordination of other voices 
to the narrator's "higher authority" (Seltzer 1984; Bender 1987; 
Miller 1988). My own position is the reverse: There would be no 
narrative levels and no lateral relations without a proliferation of 
different versions and disparate understandings of the events, of­
ten complicating those of the overall narrator. Each voice has a 
certain degree of freedom in relation to the events it narrates, and 
ideology in the novel (I agree with Bakhtin) cannot totalize and 
unify all subject-positions. The novels discussed below also 
problematize the classical model in different degrees through a 
multiplication of narrative levels and a creation of analogies and 
metalepses among them, as well as by an undecidability concern­
ing the identity of the narrator and his/her position with regard to 
the narrated objects.11 However, the novels also suggest (in vary­
ing degrees) a return to representation and subjectivity through a 
different use of the same destabilizing strategies. Thus, for ex­
ample, the construction of the subject sometimes depends on a de­
tour via the other (which involves blurring the inside/outside 
distinction), and the multiplication of narrative levels (hence also 
of narrators) can become a way of taking charge of one's own 
subjectivity as well as of gaining a convoluted and indirect access 
to a "reality." This doubleness explains why my exploration of 
representation and subjectivity through five transitional twenti-
eth-century novels has come to focus on narrative levels and the 
identity of the narrator. 
For an exploration by means of literature, however, the discus­
sion has remained abstract for too long. Let me now move toward 
concreteness by surveying the ways in which the novels "theo­
rize" representation and subjectivity through strategies of narra­
tion. Faulkner's Absalom, Absalom! and Nabokov's The Real 
Life of Sebastian Knight are, in different ways, under the sign of 
conflict. In Absalom, Absalom! the belief in representation is jux­
taposed with the playfulness of creation. The narrators' reliabil­
ity, as well as the status of narration as a reconstruction of (past) 
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reality, is undermined by the multiplication of narrative levels, 
the absence or slanting of first-hand narration, each narrator's 
telling mainly what he or she has heard from others, and the con­
tradictions among the narrators. All these obstacles to reliability 
in the classical sense become assets when one conceives of narra­
tion as invention or imaginative creation. This conception ripples 
inward to the level of the events and outward to the reading pro­
cess, and in all cases creation is seen not only as a manifestation of 
free play but also as an exercise of power. 
The problematic status of subjectivity is dramatized in this 
novel by two main features of narration. Whereas the direct par­
ticipants in the drama (with the exception of Rosa) do not nar­
rate, those who do narrate did not participate in the events. As a 
result, the subjectivity of the non-narrating characters is, to a 
large extent, a construction by others: You are what others say 
about you. Conversely, the narrating characters become subjects 
by telling about others, or rather "living," enacting the objects 
of their narration: You are what you say (performatively) about 
others. Further complications arise from difficulties in attributing 
utterances to speakers, caused by a frequent ambiguity or indeter­
minacy of the speaker, a superimposition of voices, and a uni­
formity of style. I will discuss narratological, thematic, and 
deconstructive "solutions," the first two seen as enhancing the 
connection between narration and originating subject, the last as 
challenging it. 
In Nabokov's The Real Life of Sebastian Knight, the problem 
of representation is filtered through the attempt to reconstruct a 
"real life" of an individual. I therefore start my analysis by focus­
ing on the destabilization of the roles of narrating subject and 
narrated object. Is the novel a biography, V telling Sebastian's 
story? Or is it an autobiography, Sebastian telling his own story, 
using V as a persona? Further complications arise from the auto­
biography hypothesis, for the novel might also be V's (intended or 
unintended) narration of his own life-story through Sebastian. By 
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blocking the choice between these alternatives, the novel suggests 
both the alienation of the subject through the other and the con­
stitution of the other through the narrating subject. 
Like Absalom, Absalom!, The Real Life of Sebastian Knight 
oscillates between affirming the possibility of representation and 
dismantling it by showing how reality recedes before layers of 
narration and by putting in doubt the reliability of all the narra­
tors. The act of telling, which is unable to reach reality, becomes a 
struggle over the power to shape it by shaping the narrative. The 
conflict between representation and creation acquires an addi­
tional dimension in The Real Life of Sebastian Knight, as creation 
takes the self-reflexive form of the writing of fiction. Analogies 
and metalepses between narrative levels manifest the inter­
changeability between reality and fiction. The analogies between 
Sebastian's novels and Sebastian's life reinforce the representa­
tional view of narration, the novels being conceived as rendering 
the life. On the other hand, the analogies and metalepses between 
Sebastian's novels and V's quest reveal the former as dictating 
the latter, and by implication fiction as creating reality. By 
foregrounding the fictionality of reality and the reality of fiction, 
as well as destabilizing not only the concept of representation but 
also that of reality, The Real Life of Sebastian Knight becomes a 
more radical questioning of representation than Absalom, Absal­
om! though it too does not abandon representation completely. 
Whereas Absalom, Absalom! and The Real Life of Sebastian 
Knight are conflicted (in different degrees) about representation 
and subjectivity, Brooke-Rose's Thru comes very close to a total 
deconstruction of both. More extreme than any analogies and 
metalepses is the book's reversibility of the hierarchy usually as­
sumed to exist among narrative levels. Like Escher's famous 
Drawing Hands, Thru playfully frustrates any attempt to distin­
guish between narrating subject and narrated object, container 
and contained, outside and inside, higher and lower narrative lev­
els. It plunges the reader into a universe of paradox, infinite re­
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gress, and tight loop, collapsing the presumed separation between 
reality and narration and subverting the very notion of represen­
tation. The subverted notion gives way to creation, play, 
textuality, intertextuality, and metatextuality. However, since 
Thru sees the whole world as a text, the textuality of literature be­
comes a dramatization of the textuality of the world, so that the 
novel has an unexpected representational dimension. Representa­
tion of a more traditional type is also present in Thru, especially 
where love and sex, gender inequality, illness, and various ide­
ologies are concerned. Yet these themes tend to undergo a 
deconstruction soon after being scenically rendered. They are also 
often revealed as constructs within "delirious discourses," social 
cliches through which subjects "live" their own experiences. 
Intertwined with the dismantling of representation is the disso­
lution of the traditional self. By turning narrating subjects into 
narrated (or invented) objects, reversing narrative levels 
depersonifies narrators, and they become texts, stories, even fic­
tions. The confusion of voices, the quick and often unmarked 
transition from one narrator to another, and the abundant use of 
intertextuality all contribute to the effacement of any link be­
tween narration and an autonomous self. The narrator as an 
originating self dies in the act or process of narration, even as the 
process gives birth to a speaking subject who is a signifier in the 
symbolic order, endowed by ideological discourse with the illu­
sory status of a self. 
Beckett's Company has many affinities with Thru, but it also 
offers a tentative access to the dismantled concepts on a different 
plane. As in Thru, representation is subverted by a reversibility of 
the hierarchy between narrators and objects of narration. Yet 
while Thru prevents narration from being associated with any 
originating consciousness, Company finally does come to rest 
within the mind of the one on his back in the dark. This devising 
mind becomes the object of representation, and—from this point 
of view—the reversibility of narrative levels enacts different 
28 Chapter I 
positions of the mind in relation to itself: The mind talks to itself 
about itself, occasionally perceives itself as if from the outside, 
and often imagines—or even invents—its own activity. 
Equally double-edged is the treatment of the subject. One can 
see the splitting of narration into sections in the second person 
and sections in the third, as well as the explicit avoidance of the 
first person, as a dramatization of the dissolution of the tradi­
tional self. The severing of the present from the past, the focus on 
separate parts of the body rather than the whole, and the frag­
mentation of the text parallel the self's dissolution. These symp­
toms may also indicate the self-alienation that language 
necessitates. The limitations of language are often considered re­
sponsible for the reduction of the traditional self to a subject (or 
better, several subjects) in Company. But what is a reduction 
from one perspective becomes a celebration of plurality and free­
dom from another—the freedom of a plural subject from rigidify­
ing conceptualizations in both language and philosophy. And 
the other side of fragmentation is reduplication, an emergence of 
otherness, which is a necessary condition for both company and 
narration. 
Morrison's Beloved is no less obsessed with narratives and 
narration than the four novels discussed above, nor is it oblivious 
to the problems of representation and subjectivity. Nevertheless, 
it becomes—even more strongly than Company—a complex re­
habilitation of these concepts through narration. The conditions 
necessary for acceding to what the novel calls "a self" emerge 
from a comparison between the multilayered telling of Denver's 
birth, rendered as memories of stories, and the primary narration 
of Beloved's second coming, or rebirth. In Denver's case, the lay­
ering of focalization and narration is necessary: only through 
memory and storytelling is birth transformed into a claim of own­
ership and an access to self. Beloved's rebirth, however, is not ren­
dered through her memories (as focalizer) or her retrospective 
telling (as narrator), since these would have constituted her 
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"self," which is precisely what Beloved does not have. Objective 
correlatives of this lack are Beloved's physical fragmentation and 
her incapacity to dissociate herself from Sethe. The multiplication 
of narrative levels, which in the earlier texts enacted a doubt 
about the possibility of reaching reality and constituting a self, 
operates in Beloved as an access to both. 
Similarly, ambiguity, the Fantastic, and magical realism— 
techniques often used for nonrepresentational, self-reflexive pur-
poses—are subordinate in Beloved to the attempt (and the 
difficulty) of making believable the unbelievable horrors of sla­
very, of trying to represent an unbearable reality. The ambiguity 
of Beloved's mode of existence (natural/supernatural) enacts the 
tension inherent in such an enterprise as well as the double-edged 
response to trauma. 
Culminating in a glimpse of retrieval, the path sketched in the 
preceding overview is fairly optimistic. Nevertheless, I do not 
wish to project the "glance beyond doubt" back onto texts where 
conflicts or skepticism predominate, for that would be an anach­
ronism unworthy of both the literary texts and the historico-theo-
retical trajectory I am trying to trace. Maintaining a delicate 
balance between the overall approach—derived mainly from 
within the novels—and the intricacies of narration in each text is 
one of the challenges of the specific analyses that follow. 
William Faulkner, 
Absalom, Absalom t 
"Something is always missing" 
In the process of telling the Sutpen saga to his 
son, Quentin, Mr. Compson pauses to meditate on the limitations 
of his narration: 
It's just incredible. It just does not explain. Or perhaps that's 
it: they don't explain and we are not supposed to know. We 
have a few old mouth-to-mouth tales; we exhume from old 
trunks and boxes and drawers letters without salutation or 
signature, in which men and women who once lived and 
breathed are now merely initials or nicknames out of some 
now incomprehensible affection which sound to us like San­
skrit or Chocktaw; we see dimly people, the people in whose 
living blood and seed we ourselves lay dormant and waiting, 
in this shadowy attenuation of time possessing now heroic 
proportions, performing their acts of simple passion and 
simple violence impervious to time and inexplicable—Yes, 
Judith, Bon, Henry, Sutpen: all of them. They are there, yet 
something is missing; they are like a chemical formula ex­
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humed along with the letters from that forgotten chest, care­
fully, the paper old and faded, almost indecipherable, yet 
meaningful, familiar in shape and sense, the name and pres­
ence of volatile and sentient forces; you bring them together in 
the proportions called for, but nothing happens; you re-read, 
tedious and intent, poring, making sure that you have forgot­
ten nothing, made no miscalculation; you bring them together 
again and again nothing happens: just the words, the symbols, 
the shapes themselves, shadowy inscrutable and serene, 
against the turgid background of a horrible and bloody 
mischancing of human affairs. (100-101)] 
Narration, conceived by Mr. Compson as a reconstruction of past 
events, is frustrated by the intractability of facts. The pieces of in­
formation fail to form a complete puzzle, the fragments do not 
cohere: "You bring them together in the proportions called for 
but nothing happens." The letters—both Bon's literal letter to 
Judith and "letter" as a metaphor for "the disappearance of natu­
ral presence" (Derrida 1976,159), both epistles and characters of 
the alphabet—are faded, illegible, as if written in a dead lan­
guage. Moreover, they are "without salutation or signature," ef­
facing the signs of human existence on the part of both addresser 
and addressee. What remains is "just the words, the symbols, the 
shapes themselves, shadowy inscrutable and serene"—the mate­
riality of the letter, the pure textuality of the text, one might be 
tempted to say today. And yet Mr. Compson is not quite a 
present-day deconstructionist. True, he can neither make sense of 
reality nor reach the people who populated it, since something is 
always missing. Nevertheless, reality, for him, is a presence, no 
matter how dim the human perception of it may be: The writing is 
"almost indecipherable, yet meaningful"; behind the words, there 
was a "background of horrible and bloody mischancing of hu­
man affairs" and there were "men and women who once lived 
and breathed." What exasperates Mr. Compson is the inaccessi­
bility of reality, not its absence. 
32 Chapter 2 
Compare this with the following characterization of the 
Quentin-Shreve collaboration, and you glimpse in a nutshell the 
novel's conflicting views of the relation between narration, repre­
sentation, and subjectivity: "the two of them creating between 
them, out of the rag-tag and bob-ends of old tales and talking, 
people who perhaps had never existed at all anywhere, who, 
shadows, were shadows not of flesh and blood which had lived 
and died but shadows in turn of what were (to one of them at 
least, to Shreve) shades too, quiet as the visible murmur of their 
vaporizing breath" (303). Unlike Mr. Compson, Quentin and 
Shreve do not attempt to reconstruct reality; they create it. And 
instead of frustration with the evasiveness of facts, they delight 
in their absence, for it gives them the freedom to invent: "Let 
me play a while now" (280), says Shreve to Quentin. Appro­
priately, what they create is not shadows of "flesh and blood," 
but shadows of shades; not "men and women who once lived 
and breathed," but "people who perhaps had never existed at all 
anywhere." 
These are explicit formulations of the conflicting positions that 
inform the structure, the narrative strategies, and many of the 
thematic concerns of Absalom, Absalom! The novel is a classic 
case of the Chinese-box structure. Its outermost level is narrated 
by an extradiegetic narrator who "reproduces" a series of narra­
tive situations in which four intradiegetic narrators try their 
hands at telling the elusive story. Chapter 1 is predominantly 
Rosa's narration, chapters 2 through 4 predominantly Mr. 
Compson's, and chapter 5 Rosa's again.2 Quentin remains the 
narratee in all these chapters. In the next three chapters the func­
tion of narrator alternates between Shreve and Quentin, and the 
function of narratee alternates accordingly. Chapter 6 is predomi­
nantly Shreve's narration, chapter 7 Quentin's, and chapter 8 
Shreve's once more. The last chapter is told by the extradie­
getic narrator through a predominant focalization on Quentin's 
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What do the various intradiegetic narrators relate? Most of the 
time they narrate what was previously told to them. Rosa tells 
partly what she herself experienced, partly what she heard from 
the townspeople ("she heard just what the town heard" [78]) and, 
indirectly and indistinctly, behind closed doors, from her father, 
her aunt, and her sister Ellen (e.g., 25, 27). Like her, Mr. 
Compson sometimes relies on rumors spread by the inhabitants 
of Jefferson ("That was all that the town was to know about him 
for a month" [32]; "and so the tale came through the negroes" 
[79]), sometimes reports what Ellen said ("it was Ellen who told 
this, with shrieks of amusement, more than once" [71]), and 
sometimes defers to Rosa's authority ("It (the wedding) was in 
the same Methodist church where he saw Ellen for the first time, 
according to Miss Rosa" [48]). But his main source of informa­
tion is his father, General Compson, who in turn heard at least 
part of the story from Sutpen ("I have this from something your 
grandfather let drop one day and which he doubtless had from 
Sutpen himself in the same accidental fashion" [49]). 
The number of intermediaries is even larger in the composite 
Quentin-Shreve narration, for Quentin tells Shreve partly what 
he heard from Rosa and partly what he heard from his father, 
who heard from General Compson, who heard from Sutpen. 
Shreve, in turn, has no other source of information than Quentin 
and repeats to Quentin what he has heard from him, which—we 
remember—is what Quentin heard from his father, Mr. Compson 
from his father, and General Compson from Sutpen. Signs that 
Shreve merely repeats to Quentin what the latter has told him 
abound in the text, for example: "'How was it?' Shreve said. 
'You told me; how was it? you and your father shooting quail, the 
gray day after it had rained all night and the ditch the horses 
couldn't cross so you and your father got down and gave the reins 
to—what was his name? the nigger on the mule? Luster—Luster 
to lead them around the ditch'" (187). Or, acknowledging not 
only Quentin as source but also Quentin's own sources, Shreve 
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says, "so your father said," "didn't your father say?" (320); "And 
yet this old gal, this aunt Rosa, told you that someone was hiding 
out there and you said it was Clytie or Jim Bond and she said No 
and so you went out there... and there was?" (216).4 
What is the effect of the chain of narrators on the status of their 
narration? In classical Boothian terms, one could say that it cre­
ates a distance between the teller and the tale and casts a doubt on 
the reliability of the narrators, who often report what they do not 
know, sometimes also what their informants do not know. Rosa, 
for example, narrates with extreme vividness of concrete detail 
the scene of Sutpen fighting with his negroes in the presence of his 
own children. She even "reproduces" a dialogue between Ellen 
and Sutpen, thereby conferring an air of referentiality on the 
whole scene, and then adds, "But I was not there. I was not there 
to see the two Sutpen faces this time—once on Judith and once on 
the negro girl beside her—looking down through the loft" (30). In 
connection with the climactic murder scene, she says, "I heard an 
echo, but not the shot; I saw a closed door but did not enter it" 
(150).5 Although she is often barred from direct contact with 
events, she insistently refuses to let "blank door[s]" (27) interfere 
with her "omnivorous and unrational hearing sense" (145): 
"Though even I could not have heard through the door at all, I 
could have repeated the conversation for them" (25).6 How reli­
able is a piece of information gleaned from behind closed doors 
by a child of four? And how trustworthy is a reverberation of an 
echo? Rosa's other source of information, the townspeople, is no 
less problematic, since their attempts to accost Sutpen and "give 
him the opportunity to tell them who he was and where he came 
from and what he was up to" (34) invariably fail, and they too 
are reduced to "suspecting" (ibid.), "believing" (79), relying on 
"the cabin-to-cabin whispering of the negroes to spread the 
news" (106). 
Aside from the climactic meeting with Henry, in which, as far 
as we can tell from the text, all that happens is a brief exchange of 
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questions and answers repeating and mirroring each other, 
Quentin's knowledge is always indirect, wholly derived from his 
father and Rosa. Even more problematic is Shreve's narration, 
since he is further removed from the events, and when he tells 
things that Quentin has presumably never told him, we wonder 
where he got his information: "In fact, Quentin did not even tell 
Shreve what his father had said about the visit. Perhaps Quentin 
himself had not been listening when Mr. Compson related it that 
evening at home" (336).7 
If Mr. Compson seems closer to the truth than the other narra­
tors, we must remember that he too was absent from the events he 
narrates and that the reliability of his father's account is often 
hedged with doubt, because sometimes even General Compson 
has to rely on fallible sources: " . .  . not your grandfather. He 
knew only what the town, the county, knew" (209). And even 
when he relies on Sutpen, the one storyteller who is not separated 
from experience by screens of other narrations, firm control over 
the facts is undermined, this time by Sutpen's failure of memory: 
"He didn't remember if it was weeks or months or a year they 
travelled" (224); "he did not remember just where nor when nor 
how his father had got it" (ibid.); "So he knew neither where he 
had come from nor where he was nor why" (227); nor did he re­
member "within a year on either side just how old he was" (ibid.). 
He may even have been in the dark about an important aspect of 
the crucial scene that gave birth to his design: "He didn't remem­
ber (or did not say) what the message was" (229). One begins to 
understand Shreve's amused impatience with Sutpen as a source 
of information: "You [Quentin] said he didn't remember how he 
got to Haiti, and then he didn't remember how he got into the 
house with the niggers surrounding it. Now you are going to tell 
me he didn't even remember getting married?" (225). 
The possibility of unreliable knowledge on the part of the vari­
ous narrators—inferred from their nonparticipation in the events 
they narrate, their reliance on other sources often removed from 
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the experience narrated, and the failure of memory of the only 
source directly involved in the events—problematizes the status 
of narration as a representation or reconstruction of reality. This 
is aggravated by the four narrators' contradictions about some of 
the basic occurrences. The principal contradictions are between 
Shreve and Quentin, on the one hand, and Rosa and Mr. Comp-
son, on the other. Whereas Mr. Compson elaborates on Henry's 
puritan shock at seeing the octoroon (108-18), Shreve and 
Quentin believe that both she and her child "would have been to 
Henry only something else about Bon to be, not envied but aped if 
that had been possible" (336). Shreve also argues with Mr. 
Compson's account of Bon's reasons for replacing Judith's pic­
ture with the octoroon's: "And your old man wouldn't know 
about that too: why the black son of a bitch should have taken her 
picture out and put the octoroon's picture in, so he invented a rea­
son for it" (358-59). The reason Shreve invents, on the other 
hand, shows Bon in a rather noble light: "It will be the only way I 
have to say to her, / was no good; do not grieve for me" (359). 
Shreve contests Mr. Compson's account even of such a simple 
matter as which of the two friends was injured in the war: 
Because your old man was wrong here, too! He said it was Bon 
who was wounded, but it wasn't. Because who told him? Who 
told Sutpen or your grandfather either, which of them it was 
who was hit? Sutpen didn't know because he wasn't there, and 
your grandfather wasn't there either because that was where 
he was hit too, where he lost his arm. So who told them? Not 
Henry, because his father never saw Henry but that one time 
and maybe they never had time to talk about wounds... and 
not Bon because Sutpen never saw Bon at all because he was 
dead—it was not Bon, it was Henry. (344) 
Shreve thus discredits the reliability of the others, but what is his 
own source of authority? Surely he was not there either, so how 
does he know?8 
 37 Wil l iam Faulkner, Absalom, Absalom!
Even about the central issue of the novel do the narrators dis­
agree. According to Rosa, Judith's marriage to Bon was forbid­
den "without rhyme or reason or shadow of excuse" (18); 
according to Mr. Compson, the reason for the interdiction and 
later for Henry's murder of Bon is Bon's impending bigamy (90); 
but Quentin and Shreve see the obstacle first in the threat of incest 
(293,295-96) and later in miscegenation (355,356). 
With Quentin and Shreve, the novel explicitly replaces a view 
of narration as representation by a conception of narration as 
creation. To use Peter Brooks's formulation, "We have passed be­
yond any narrative reporting, to narrative invention . . . narrat­
ing, having failed to construct from the evidence a plot that would 
make sense of the story, turns to inventing it" (1984, 303). 
Whereas the narrators' absence from the events they narrate is an 
obstacle to reliability when narration is seen as reporting or repre­
sentation, it becomes an asset when narration is conceived of as 
invention or imaginative creation: "And he, Quentin, could see 
that too, though he had not been there—the ambulance with Miss 
Coldfield between the driver and the second man . . .  " (374-75); 
or even stronger: "If I had been there," Quentin thinks, "/ could 
not have seen it this plain" (190). Indeed, when the characters are 
remote from the "facts," they become less reliable in the classical 
sense and more creative. And, as the novel suggests, they come 
closer to "the might have been that is more true than truth" (143). 
The criterion for validity in this view is not a correspondence to 
facts, but a narrative or artistic plausibility: "Does that suit you?" 
Shreve asks Quentin at one point while embroidering the Judith-
Bon relationship (322). Narration becomes a game: "Let me play 
a while now," we remember Shreve saying to his roommate 
(280). That this view is endorsed by the extradiegetic narrator is 
clear from such comments as: "four of them who sat in that draw­
ing room [of Bon's mother] of baroque and fusty magnificence 
which Shreve had invented and which was probably true enough" 
(335); or "the slight dowdy woman with untidy gray-streaked 
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raven hair . . . which Shreve and Quentin had likewise invented 
and which was likewise probably true enough" (ibid.). 
As if impelled by the uncanny logic of repetition, the readers 
reenact the experience of the narrators and, like them, replace re­
production by production. Faced with several different motives 
for the interdiction of the marriage between Judith and Bon, most 
critics opt for miscegenation. In order to explain how Quentin 
could know about this, however, they get involved in speculation. 
Lind, for example, suggests that Quentin's knowledge must have 
come from General Compson, who must have imparted to his 
grandson what he had withheld from Mr. Compson (1973,281-
82). Cleanth Brooks claims that Quentin may have heard the se­
cret from Henry in their climactic meeting (1963, 316). Both 
critics rely on the following conversation between Quentin and 
Shreve: 
"He [Mr. Compson] didn't know it then. Grandfather 
didn't tell him all of it either, like Sutpen never told grandfa­
ther quite all of it." 
"Then who did tell him?" 
"I did The day after we—after that night when we " 
(266) 
The dialogue does indeed say that General Compson did not tell 
his son everything, but it does not say that he told Quentin, and 
since there is no conversation between the two in the entire novel, 
one can only invent it. Similarly, the climactic conversation be­
tween Henry and Quentin, as given in the text, consists of three 
questions and answers repeated twice and contains no informa­
tion about either the interdiction or the miscegenation. To suggest 
a disclosure of the secret on Henry's part is to construct a scene 
the novel does not contain. Indeed, Shreve does imaginatively 
construct a scene when he "quotes" Sutpen saying to Henry: "He 
must not marry her, Henry . .  . his mother was part negro" (354­
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55).9 And the critics follow suit, inferring, speculating, and in­
venting scenes, just like the fictional narrators whose limitations 
they analyze.10 
Creation, rather than re-creation, does not only ripple out 
from the narrators to the readers-critics of the narrative but also 
ripples in from the narrators to the characters who are the objects 
of their narration. At the metadiegetic level, Bon is often de­
scribed as a "shadow," a "phantom," "created" by the other 
characters—expressions that echo those referring to the act of 
storytelling on the part of the intradiegetic narrators. Rosa, 
for example, never saw Bon except in "that photograph, that 
shadow, that picture in a young girl's bedroom" (147), and yet 
she loved him, though—she says—"not as women love. . . . Be-
cause even before I saw the photograph I could have recognized, 
nay, described the very face. But I never saw it. I do not even 
know of my own knowledge that Ellen ever saw it, that Judith 
ever loved it, that Henry slew it: so who will dispute me when I 
say, Why did I not invent, create it?" (ibid.). Mr. Compson also 
comments on the quasi-fictional status of Bon in the Sutpen 
household: "Yes, shadowy: a myth, a phantom: something which 
they engendered and created whole themselves; some effluvium 
of Sutpen blood and character, as though as a man he did not ex­
ist at all" (104).n Even Bon's mother, according to Shreve, creates 
him in an image commensurate with her revenge plan: "until he 
got big enough to find out that it wasn't him at all she was wash­
ing and feeding the candy and the fun to but it was a man that 
hadn't even arrived yet, whom she had never seen yet" (306). 
The mother's "creation" of her son as an instrument for her re­
venge is a manipulative exercise of power. No less manipulative is 
the lawyer's financially motivated creation. On the other hand, 
Rosa's invention of Bon is not so crudely manipulative, but she 
does need this phantom as an outlet for her repressed desire.12 
And Henry uses Bon both as a surrogate through whom he can 
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make love to his own sister and as a homosexual love-object. In 
all these instances, the creation involves an attempt to control a 
situation or to dictate a scenario. 
Critics have discerned an analogous power struggle at the level 
of intradiegetic narration. The Quentin-Shreve sections, for ex­
ample, are not only a collaborative creation, but also a struggle 
for control over the narration: "'Wait, I tell you!' Quentin said, 
though still he did not move nor even raise his voice—that voice 
with its tense suffused restrained quality: 'I am telling'" (277); 
and Shreve retaliates a little later: "'No,' Shreve says, 'you wait. 
Let me play a while now'" (280).13 Power also informs the 
reader's creative activity, to judge by such a description as Peter 
Brooks's: "What can this mean if not that the narratees/listeners/ 
readers have taken over complete responsibility for the narrative, 
and that the 'voice of the reader' has evicted all other voices 
from the text . .  . in favour of a direct re-creation, and has set it­
self up, by a supreme act of usurpation, as the sole authority of 
narrative?" (304). 
The power struggle may, I think, take on an additional dimen­
sion with the help of Judith's loom image. Like Mr. Compson's 
meditation, with which I started the chapter, Judith's speech is 
triggered by a letter—in fact, the same literal letter written by 
Bon, but again also "letter" as a metaphor for the erasure of voice 
in writing, and "letter" as an alphabetical character, a mark ef­
faced on a tombstone. Judith starts by explaining her decision to 
give Bon's letter to Quentin's grandmother: "Because you make 
so little impression, you see" (127). This statement modulates 
into a vision of human beings as marionettes, all tied by the same 
strings, yet each trying to move independently. And the mari­
onette image is then conflated with that of figures working at a 
loom: "like five or six people all trying to make a rug on the same 
loom only each one wants to weave his own pattern into the rug" 
(ibid.). This image—which, like Mr. Compson's metaphors, is 
also a mise en abyme of the narrative situation in Absalom, 
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Absalom!—obviously involves a power struggle. Each character, 
each narrator, wants to weave his own pattern into the same rug. 
But, in my opinion, the desire for power is here in the service of 
the desire to leave a mark (an image Judith uses a little later), to 
make room for an individual trace. And note that the "scratch," 
the "mark," does not depend on the content of the letter (the sig­
nified), not even on its being read, only on "passing from one 
hand to another" (ibid.), only—the Lacanian might say—on the 
itinerary of the signifier. It is thus not meaning or representation, 
but the very act of transmission, of telling, that may leave a trace, 
may save the individual from complete de-facement. This tenta­
tive affirmation of an individual mark coincides with Judith's 
only "speech" in the novel, making it a performance of its own 
content and linking the problem of representation with that of 
subjectivity. 
Why is Judith granted a voice only once in the whole novel, 
and even then only at a metadiegetic level, quoted by Mr. 
Compson? Why aren't the other Sutpens used as narrators of 
their own story? Isn't it strange (or at least thought-provoking) 
that all the direct participants in the drama do not narrate,14 
whereas those who narrate do not participate directly? 
Distance from the events often serves in this novel to stimulate 
the imaginative and creative faculties, and since narration—in 
one view in Absalom, Absalom!—is a production rather than a 
reproduction, it makes sense to assign the narrator's role to char­
acters who did not take part in the experiences narrated. Taking 
this line of thinking a step further, one might suggest that ab­
sence, in addition to being a stimulus for the imagination, is also a 
precondition for language, since—from this perspective—lan-
guage not only creates reality but replaces it. Such a view is no 
imposition of poststructuralist ideas on Faulkner's novel but 
emerges naturally from both Absalom, Absalom! and from other 
of Faulkner's works. In As / Lay Dying, Addie—speaking (ap­
propriately) when she is already a corpse—sees language as a 
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substitute for experience, and a poor substitute at that: "[Anse] 
had a word, too. Love, he called it. But I had been used to words 
for a long time. I knew that that word was like the others: just a 
shape to fill a lack" (136). It is a lack, an absence of experience, 
that gives rise to words: "sin and love and fear are just sounds that 
people who never sinned nor loved nor feared have for what they 
never had and cannot have until they forget the words" (133). 
Doesn't it follow, then, that those who did sin, love, and fear 
would have no need to talk about it, whereas those who did not, 
would? 
Opposed to Addie's view of language as a mere frame for ab­
sences is her praise of "voiceless words," i.e., direct, nonverbal 
contact. Similarly, in Absalom, Absalom! when Clyde touches 
Rosa, the physical contact is so overwhelming that it cuts through 
all social and linguistic conventions: "Because there is something 
in the touch of flesh with flesh which abrogates, cuts sharp and 
straight across the devious channels of decorous ordering, which 
enemies as well as lovers know because it makes them both— 
touch and touch of that which is the citadel of the central I-Am's 
private own: not spirit, soul" (139). Rosa here relates touch to the 
notion of an essential self, "the central I Am's private own." 
Without a belief in essences or in selves, Bon also acknowledges 
the overwhelming power of nonverbal communication. He is 
therefore dismayed that the meeting with his father produces "no 
shock, no hot communicated flesh that speech would have been 
too slow even to impede" (320; see also 348). And between Judith 
and Sutpen there is an intimate understanding that dispenses with 
words: "They did not need to talk. They were too much alike. 
They were as two people become now and then, who seem to 
know one another so well or are so much alike that the power, the 
need, to communicate by speech atrophies from disuse and, com­
prehending without need of the medium of ear or intellect, they 
no longer understand one another's actual words" (122).15 
Language becomes superfluous in the presence of physical re­
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ality, language replaces reality, language creates reality—these 
related varieties of a nonrepresentational view of language can all 
explain the split between doing and telling that informs the choice 
of narrators in Absalom, Absalom! Explanations of a different 
order emerge from a psychological, rather than a philosophical, 
orientation. Judith's "loom speech" is an example of this orienta­
tion. If narration is one way of making a mark, then the denial of 
the narrator's role to the Sutpens may be an indication of their 
marionette-like status, of the hopelessness of attempting to disen­
tangle the strings attached to one individual from those fastened 
to the others. 
If "trying to tell" implies some faith in the possibility of com­
munication, the Sutpens' exclusion from the narrator's position 
may reflect their distrust of interpersonal discourse. McPherson 
relates such distrust to Thomas Sutpen's childhood trauma, the 
trauma of not being allowed to deliver a message to the planta­
tion owner. This scene is repeatedly referred to as Sutpen's loss of 
innocence and as the origin of his design. What Sutpen learned in 
this episode, McPherson argues, is "that a teller is inevitably lim­
ited by the other's desire or willingness to listen" (1987,439), and 
since the other was not willing to listen, Sutpen's belief in commu­
nication was shattered. "Disappointed innocence led to an ex­
treme distrust of exchange, a cynicism that must inevitably 
deform the narrative tradition" (ibid., 440). Sutpen then turns to 
the world of action, attempting to make a mark through his 
deeds, his design. As we know, this design causes the exclusion— 
the silencing—of Bon, but also, according to McPherson, the ver­
bal incapacitation of his whole family: "Thus, Thomas Sutpen, 
concerned above all with building and leaving a legacy, guaran­
teed the verbal sterility of his children" (ibid.). His children can 
speak only without speaking: Clyde's face, Henry's absence, Jim 
Bond's howling.16 
In the foregoing hypotheses non-narration is seen as crippling, 
but a different perspective reveals that silence, like narration, can 
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become a tool in a power struggle. Sutpen is again the most 
prominent example. In fact, the success of his design depends on 
people's being in the dark about his origins, his past, his actions: 
"So they would catch him, run him to earth in the lounge between 
the supper table and his locked door to give him the opportunity 
to tell them who he was and where he came from and what he was 
up to, whereupon he would move gradually and steadily until his 
back came in contact with something—a post or a wall—and 
then stand there and tell them nothing whatever as pleasantly and 
courteously as a hotel clerk" (34). 
The exception to Sutpen's reticence is his one narration—sig-
nificantly reported at a meta-metadiegetic level—to General 
Compson. But just as his silence was motivated by a desire to gain 
the upper hand, so his narration serves the need to control, to re­
store his power by discovering the mistake that undermined his 
design. 
Sutpen's habitual silence provokes the narrative faculties of the 
other characters, giving rise to many stories about him. The 
Sutpen myth, and to a large extent even Sutpen's subjectivity, is a 
collection of stories others tell about him. Even when telling his 
own story to General Compson, Sutpen talks as if he were an­
other, almost as if he were inventing a narrative: "Since he was 
not talking about himself. He was telling a story. He was not 
bragging about something he had done; he was just telling a story 
about something a man named Thomas Sutpen had experienced, 
which would still have been the same story if the man had no 
name at all, if it had been told about any man or no man over 
whiskey at night" (247). 
The dissociation between narrating subject and narrated ob­
ject takes two complementary forms in Absalom, Absalom! On 
the one hand, the subjectivity of the non-narrating characters be­
comes a construction by others. You are what others say about 
you. On the other hand, the narrators' access to their own subjec­
tivity is achieved through their narration about others. You are 
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what you say about others. This is so because talking about others 
in this novel is normally not a constative reproduction but a 
performative production, a transference-like repetition that is it­
self a performative act in the present. Whatever degree of subjec­
tivity Quentin and Shreve accede to, they do by "living," 
enacting, the objects of their narration, whom they create in their 
own image and according to their own needs.17 
A disruption of the expected correlation between utterances 
and speakers causes further problematization of the relation be­
tween narration and subjectivity. Although I made a preliminary 
identification of the various narrators in Absalom, Absalom1, ear­
lier, the novel abounds in features of discourse that make it often 
difficult, if not impossible, to attribute utterances to speakers. 
Analysis of one particularly perplexing segment (181-216) may 
shed light on other problematic instances.18 The segment occurs 
at the beginning of the Quentin-Shreve narration, just after 
Shreve's ironic summary of the Sutpen saga and Quentin's laconic 
reply, "Yes" (181). The assent is followed by an internal com­
ment, "He sounds just like father," a comment that bridges the 
transition into Quentin's consciousness, further marked by 
"thought" and "thinking" as well as by the change to italics 
(ibid.). We seem to remain inside Quentin's consciousness for 
three and a half pages, though we are sometimes bewildered by 
the tone, which is more like Shreve's than Quentin's, and by ex­
pressions that are specifically Shreve's (e.g., "the Creditor"). At 
the end of this long stretch, Quentin suddenly speaks aloud, con­
firming the foregoing account: "'Yes,' Quentin said" (185). Since 
it is unlikely—though not impossible—that Quentin would now 
audibly confirm his own silent thinking, the reader tentatively at­
tributes the italicized pages to Shreve, an attribution that coheres 
with the tone and idiom of the problematic sections but clashes 
with the earlier markers of transition into Quentin's thoughts. 
Confused by conflicting clues, the reader may try to reconcile 
them by hypothesizing that the italicized segment renders 
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Quentin's memories of Shreve's narration, preserving the salient 
characteristics of Shreve's style.19 Quentin's assent to his own 
memories still feels strange, but it does mark the sequel (185-87) 
as Shreve's, though this marking becomes indeterminate when on 
page 187 a segment not in italics opens with "How was it?" 
Shreve said. "You told me; how was it." Shreve's parenthetical 
voice then gives way to what seems like the extradiegetic narrator 
telling about Quentin's visit to the graveyard with his father 
(188). But where has Shreve gone ? And how does one account for 
comments like, "It seemed to Quentin that he could actually see 
them: the ragged and starving troops without shoes" (189). One 
way of accounting for such consciousness markers is to see the 
whole segment from page 188 to page 216 as the narrator's ver­
balization of Quentin's thoughts. (In this view, the voice is the 
narrator's; Quentin is the focalizer.) But one is brought up short 
by sentences bearing Mr. Compson's stylistic stamp as well as by 
such statements as "though your grandfather of course did not 
know this" (191), "And your grandfather never knew if it was 
Clytie who watched" (195), "Your grandfather didn't know" 
(200, 201, 202). Now the speaking voice seems to be Mr. 
Compson's. Or are these memories Quentin has of his father's 
narration when he is looking at his father's letter? This possibility 
seems to be supported by the return to Shreve—and the present— 
on page 207, through Quentin's italicized thoughts: "Yes. I have 
heard too much; I have had to listen to too much, too long think­
ing "Yes, Shreve sounds almost exactly like father: that letter." 
The passage continues with Quentin's thoughts, but page 208 
seems to return to Mr. Compson's voice (or Quentin's memory of 
it), and page 210 comes back to Quentin's consciousness with 
"Yes," he thought, "too much too long." Page 211 repeats the 
same idea, adding "because he sounds just like father," which 
seems to lead either into Shreve's speech (without changing the 
italics, however) or into Quentin's memories of Shreve's narra­
tion. Expressions like "your father" (213) and "Shreve said" sug­
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gest that Shreve is actually speaking, as does Quentin's rejoinder 
"Yes," on page 215. Shreve then continues telling Quentin what 
Quentin had previously told him, though now without italics, up 
to the end of chapter 6. 
The effect of complexity is increased when we realize that even 
utterances by an unambiguously specified speaker are colored by 
what Bakhtin calls "the language of the other." Examine, for ex­
ample, the early internal dialogue between "two separate 
Quentins now talking to one another in the long silence of not-
people, in notlanguage, like this": 
It seems that this demon—his name was Sutpen—(Colonel 
Sutpen)—Colonel Sutpen. Who came out of nowhere and 
without warning upon the land with a band of strange niggers 
and built a plantation (Tore violently a plantation, Miss Rosa 
Coldfield says)—tore violently. And married her sister Ellen 
and begot a son and a daughter which (Without gentleness 
begot. Miss Rosa Coldfield says)—without gentleness. Which 
should have been the jewels of his pride and the shield and 
comfort ofhis old age, only—(Only they destroyed him or 
something or he destroyed them or something. And died)— 
and died. Without regret, Miss Rosa Coldfield says—(Save by 
her) Yes, save by her. (And by Quentin Compson). Yes. And 
by Quentin Compson. (9) 
It is easy to see how Quentin's thoughts are infiltrated by Rosa's 
language. This is one of many instances of the superimposition of 
voices in Absalom, Absalom! 
A further complication of the traditionally assumed tie be­
tween narration and an originating self results from the overall 
uniformity of the style, in spite of the specific tone, expressions, 
and linguistic idiosyncracies that characterize each narrator. 
Peter Brooks describes this phenomenon: "Narration here as 
elsewhere in Faulkner seems to call upon both the individual's 
voice and that transindividual voice that speaks through all of 
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Faulkner's characters" (1984,294). Such uniformity is problem­
atic for the view of narration as representation, since "the Mi­
metic Language Game" (to use Moshe Ron's felicitous expression 
[1981, 17-39]) assumes that each narrator (and each character) 
has a characteristic way of speaking, and that one can therefore 
attribute all utterances to particular speakers.20 
Disturbed by the disruption of traditional assumptions, some 
critics attempt a redistribution of utterances to preserve plausibil­
ity. Toker, for example, argues that "what the reader hears is not 
the voices of these speakers but the voice of the omniscient narra­
tor carrying their narrative acts in their stead" (1993, 160).21 
Waggoner (1966) and Irwin (1975), on the other hand, suggest 
that the first five chapters are Quentin's memories when he is 
alone in his Harvard room, roused by his father's announcement 
of Rosa's death to recall conversations with him as well as with 
the old maid. In chapter 6 Shreve enters and together they go over 
the story once more (Waggoner 1966,177).22 
While Toker, Waggoner, and Irwin use narrative strategies to 
rehabilitate a representational reading of Absalom, Absalom! 
others reject representation—and claim that Faulkner does the 
same. Krause (1984,230), for example, sees Absalom, Absalom! 
as advocating the "ceaseless play of signification" (238) rather 
than "the reductions" of referentiality, representation, and clo­
sure. The disconnection between language and individual voice is, 
according to him, an aspect of the same predilection: "Conse­
quently, the reader faces the radical situation described by 
Barthes in S/Z: 'The more indeterminate the origin of the state­
ment, the more plural the text. In modern texts, the voices are so 
treated that any reference is impossible: the discourse, or better, 
the language, speaks: nothing more'" (Krause 1984,235). 
Representation, however, returns if one sees the confusion of 
voices not only as a sign of the novel's textuality but as a render­
ing of the merging or the interchangeability of characters. The 
similarity between Shreve's and Quentin's narration, for ex­
ample, is analogous to the interchangeability of their roles and 
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selves: "They stared—glared—at one another. It was Shreve 
speaking, though save for the slight difference which the interven­
ing degrees of latitude had inculcated in them (differences not in 
tone or pitch but of turn of phrases and usage of words), it might 
have been either of them and was in a sense both: both thinking as 
one, the voice which happened to be speaking the thought only 
the thinking become audible, vocal" (303). From this perspective, 
identification of the voice is immaterial, because it is only the vo­
cal realization of thoughts shared by the two narrators. And the 
thoughts are common to both for two reasons. First, Quentin and 
Shreve have come to represent a universal quality beyond their 
personal existence: "the two who breathed not individuals now 
yet something both more and less than twins, the heart and blood 
of youth" (294). Second, listening is no less creative than telling; 
the narratee thus becomes another narrator: "That was why it did 
not matter to either of them which one did the talking, since it 
was not the talking alone which did it, performed and accom­
plished the overpassing, but some happy marriage of speaking 
and hearing" (316). 
As narrators, Quentin and Shreve are not only interchangeable 
with each other but also with Henry and Bon, the objects of their 
narration. This is emphasized by a series of analogies and 
metalepses between narrative levels. Just as Quentin and Shreve 
interrupt each other with a recurrent "wait, wait," so they at­
tribute the same expression to the people they discuss: "And then 
it was Bon that said, 'Wait'... and Henry said 'Wait. Wait. I must 
have time to get used to it'" (340).23 The boundaries between lev­
els blur when Shreve's description of Henry as "panting and look­
ing, glaring at the sky" is followed by the extradiegetic narrator's 
comment that, in telling this, Shreve is "(glaring at Quentin, pant­
ing himself, as if he had had to supply his shade not only with a 
cue but also with breath to obey it in)" (344). It is as if Shreve and 
Henry are at the same narrative level, and Shreve can supply 
Henry with breath through his own panting. 
The fusion between narrators and objects of narration is not 
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only implicitly suggested by analogies and metalepses. It is also 
explicitly formulated on many occasions: "in the cold room 
where there was now not two of them but four" (294); "not two 
of them there and then either but four of them riding the two 
horses through the iron darkness" (295); "four of them and then 
just two—Charles-Shreve and Quentin-Henry" (334).24 
The network of identifications is further expanded by the in­
clusion of Mr. Compson. Reacting to Shreve's narration, Quentin 
thinks: "He sounds just like father. . . . Just exactly like father if 
father had known as much about it the night before I went out 
there as he did the night after I came back "(181). And Shreve de­
tects the same affinity between Quentin and his father: '"Don't 
say it's just me that sounds like your old man' Shreve said" (261). 
The fusion of voices belonging to different generations may be in­
terpreted as a sign of the helplessness of the individual in the grip 
of temporal repetition. This, Irwin argues, "is the form that the 
fate or doom of a family takes in Faulkner" (1975, 61). Such, in­
deed, is Quentin's understanding of the resemblance: "Yes. 
Maybe we are both Father. Maybe nothing ever happens once and 
is finished Yes, we are both Father. Or maybe Father and I are 
both Shreve, maybe it took Father and me both to make Shreve or 
Shreve and me both to make Father or maybe Thomas Sutpen to 
make all of us" (261-62). This inescapability makes even the first 
narration a repetition of things already known instinctively: "But 
you were not listening, because you knew it all already, had 
learned, absorbed it already without the medium of speech some­
how from having been born and living beside it, with it, as chil­
dren will and do: so that what your father was saying did not tell 
you anything so much as it struck, word by word, the resonant 
strings of remembering" (213). 
From this angle, what Brooks described as "that transindi­
vidual voice that speaks through all of Faulkner's characters," 
and what Toker labeled the voice of the omniscient narrator, is 
the voice of the South, of all the ghosts in the air of the region and 
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in the blood of its inhabitants. Such an engulf ment of the personal 
voice by the collective undermines the very notion of self as a 
unique being: "His [Quentin's] childhood was full of them; his 
very body was an empty hall echoing with sonorous defeated 
names; he was not a being, an entity, he was a commonwealth. 
He was a barracks filled with stubborn back-looking ghosts still 
recovering, even forty-three years afterwards, from the fever 
which had cured the disease" (12). It is against this loss of voice 
that the characters engage in narration, perhaps the only way of 
refusing "at last to be a ghost" (362).25 Although full-fledged, au­
tonomous selves (in the traditional sense) have become impos­
sible in this novel, the character-narrators do at least "make a 
mark" (127), a mark that invites other characters (as well as gen­
erations of critics) to try to decipher, or invent, "what the 
scratches were trying to tell" (ibid.), and in the process gain some 
access to subjectivity. 
This chapter has analyzed conflicting views of representation and 
subjectivity in Absalom, Absalom! by concentrating on the intri­
cacies of narration. As should be clear by now, narration is cen­
tral not only in this novel but also in my attempt to offer a new 
approach to representation and subjectivity. However, at the end 
of the chapter, it may be interesting to shift the focus somewhat 
and relate these concerns to the specific story Absalom, Absalom! 
tells. I realize, of course, that this is a tricky undertaking, given the 
proliferation of narrators and the problems of reliability/creation, 
which make it difficult to abstract any story with any degree of 
certainty. Nevertheless, in spite of its problematic status and 
many inherent contradictions, the Sutpen saga obsesses all the 
narrators and therefore seems to qualify as the novel's hypotheti­
cal story. It is both as the novel's "story" and as the story of his­
tory that the saga deserves our attention here. 
One can draw two analogies between Sutpen's adventures and 
the adventures of narrating (and reading) them.26 The first relates 
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inaccessibilities and exclusions in Sutpen's life to gaps as obstacles 
to the representational endeavor. The second compares Sutpen's 
attempt to fashion a self and a world with the view of narration as 
creation. 
Sutpen's life abounds in exclusions, absences, and obscurities. 
Just such an experience, a barred door and no permission to de­
liver a message to the plantation owner, puts an end to his prover­
bial innocence. To ensure that he never again becomes a victim of 
exclusion, Sutpen develops a design that itself involves a brutal 
exclusion of any possible obstacle, notably his partly black wife 
and their son, Charles Bon. Putting the past behind him, Sutpen 
starts anew in a place where he is very careful to keep his origins 
in total darkness. Here he goes about founding a dynasty, casting 
aside nonwinners like Milly Jones, who bears him a daughter 
when his plan required a son. 
The exclusions, secrets, and absences characterizing Sutpen's 
life are uncannily similar to the gaps that thwart the narrators' re­
constructive efforts. And like the narrators, who initially tried to 
figure out letters and events, readers—especially those with 
Compson-like expectations—find themselves barred from knowl­
edge. The reading process, like narration, becomes a performative 
repetition of the thing it is trying to decipher. Readers take the po­
sition of Sutpen's victims, although only to an extent, for, as we 
remember, Sutpen himself was initially a victim of obstruction. 
By making the readers relive, "perform," both Sutpen's trauma 
and the traumas he inflicts on others, the novel promotes com­
plexity of moral and psychological response. 
The second analogy—arguably the obverse of the first—hinges 
on the role of creation in Sutpen's life, as well as in the Quentin-
Shreve collaboration. Sutpen's design, not unlike that of the 
Quentin-Shreve narration, is an attempt to turn an imaginative 
conception into a reality, to create the world in the shape of his 
desires. It is also an attempt to create himself, a process of self-
fashioning. But Sutpen's creation crumbles, and it crumbles pre­
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cisely because of the return of the repressed, the coming back of 
the excluded Bon. The ensuing Bon-Henry-Judith triangle and its 
tragic consequences end Sutpen's hopes for a dynasty and destroy 
his creation from within. The Quentin-Shreve creation, on the 
other hand, thrives and survives as "the might have been that is 
more true than truth." Perhaps the dialogic character of the 
Quentin-Shreve creation, as opposed to Sutpen's dependence on 
an exclusion of others in fashioning himself, explains their success 
and his failure.27 Access to subjectivity, this would suggest, neces­
sitates an inclusion of the other. 
The analogies discussed so far concern the personal aspect of 
Sutpen's life. But the personal story is intertwined with the history 
of the Civil War and the tragedy of the South. In this respect, too, 
Absalom, Absalom! is under the sign of conflict. The novel pre­
sents history as the origin of all the other predicaments it drama­
tizes. By implication, an understanding of history could provide 
the ultimate explanation, the ultimate something that is other­
wise always missing. But the reconstruction of history is no less 
fraught with difficulties than the reproduction of the story. It too 
is haunted by absences, has to content itself with hypotheses in­
stead of facts, and is inhabited by creation and fictionality. The 
chain of narrators and the multiplicity of narrative levels in 
Absalom, Absalom! both interrogate traditional views of history 
and emphasize its narrativity, even fictionality, in a way that an­
ticipates current approaches. 
Absalom, Absalom! thus effects a rapprochement between his­
tory and story and an analogy between their destabilization and 
the vicissitudes of narration. Whereas the relation between self 
and other, central to the analogy between Sutpen's self-creation 
and the Quentin-Shreve narration, links Absalom, Absalom! with 
The Real Life of Sebastian Knight, the complex concern with his­
tory has an affinity with a later text in this study, namely Beloved. 
Like Absalom, Absalom!, Beloved multiplies narrative levels, 
but—in spite of the integration of destabilization—it does so in 
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order to re-engage with representation and subjectivity and to re­
trieve history via fiction. The similarities and differences between 
these two texts will become apparent in a later chapter. In the 
meantime, I wish to suggest once again that, in the tension it 
stages between the epistemological yearning for reliability and 
verifiability and the ontological game of world-making, 
Absalom, Absalom! is a transitional text between modernism and 
postmodernism. Beloved, on the other hand, is a partial reaction 
against postmodernism from within. But this is a further glance 
beyond doubt, and a subject for a separate discussion. 
Vladimir Nabokov, The Real Life 
of Sebastian Knight 
"The painting of different ways of painting" 
As in Absalom, Absalom!, the exploration of the 
possibilities and limitations of representation in The Real Life of 
Sebastian Knight takes the form of an attempt to reconstruct the 
past and its inevitable discontents. In both novels, the past 
emerges from, or is created by, a kaleidoscope of stories told by 
different narrators and gleaned from various characters. This 
situation, with its unsettling implications for the status of narra­
tion, is foregrounded by the use of mise en abyme. Judith's loom 
image from Absalom, Absalom! is comparable in this respect to 
V's characterization of Sebastian's The Prismatic Bezel. Judith vi­
sualizes "five or six people all trying to make a rug on the same 
loom only each one wants to weave his own pattern into the rug" 
(127). And the image V borrows from painting similarly empha­
sizes the collage principle that, according to him, informs 
Sebastian's novel: "It is as if a painter said: Look, here I'm going 
to show you not the painting of a landscape, but the painting of 
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different ways of painting a certain landscape, and I trust their 
harmonious fusion will disclose the landscape as I intend you to 
s e e i t " ^ ) . 1 
In both cases, the idea of a stable reality is replaced by a multi­
plicity of subjective perceptions. Whether these perceptions ulti­
mately represent reality remains an open question in both 
Absalom, Absalom! and The Real Life of Sebastian Knight, corre­
sponding (at least in part) to whether the subjective versions are 
grasped as unreliable or are invested with the truth of imaginative 
creation. 
The past reconstructed or constructed in these novels is, to a 
large extent, the life history of an individual or group of individu­
als, and the attempt to represent reality is related (more in The 
Real Life of Sebastian Knight than in Absalom, Absalom!) to the 
project of representing a "real life" of a certain individual. But the 
relation between narration and subjectivity is no less problematic 
than that between narration and representation. To begin with, 
does narration render a preexisting, autonomous self, or does it 
constitute a subject in the very act of telling? Moreover, does nar­
ration convey or constitute the subject it tells about (Sutpen, 
Henry, Bon, Sebastian Knight) or the subjectivity of the teller 
(Quentin, Shreve, V), or both? These less than simple questions 
are further complicated by the performative character of narra­
tion in both novels. In talking about Henry and Bon, Quentin and 
Shreve actually live what they narrate/create, repeating the absent 
past in the present of their own lives. Similarly, in searching for 
the real life of his half brother, V's narration causes him to reenact 
that life. Quentin and Shreve "become" Henry and Bon just as V 
"becomes" Sebastian Knight. 
Since The Real Life of Sebastian Knight pursues and interro­
gates the problematic quest of reality mainly through the search 
for the "real life" of its title character, I shall start with the prob­
lem of subjectivity, and only later broaden the exploration to the 
issue of representation. Characters at different narrative levels of 
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The Real Life of Sebastian Knight explicitly state opposed views 
of subjectivity. Lost Property, Sebastian's autobiographical 
novel, presents a traditional image of the self as a unique, inalien­
able inner essence: "I seem to pass with intangible steps across 
ghostly lawns and through dancing halls full of the whine of Ha­
waiian music and down dear drab little streets with pretty names, 
until I come to a certain warm hollow where something very like 
the selfest of my own self sits huddled up in the darkness" (58). 
Nothing sounds more alien to "the selfest of [one's] own self" 
than V's discovery of the possibility of freedom from the strait­
jacket of personality: "Whatever his [Sebastian's] secret was, I 
have learnt one secret too, and namely: that the soul is but a man­
ner of being—not a constant state—that any soul may be yours, if 
you find and follow its undulations. The hereafter may be the full 
ability of consciously living in any chosen soul, in any number of 
souls, all of them unconscious of their interchangeable burden" 
(172). However, these seemingly contradictory views have more 
in common than meets the eye. The self discovered in Lost Prop­
erty is actually a double who sits huddled up in the darkness while 
the "I" walks the streets. This self is thus alienated or displaced 
through the other; from this perspective it is another. Conversely, 
the freedom V envisions is a series of transitory identifications by 
which one gains access to subjectivity through the other. 
The problem of subjectivity, as well as its relation to otherness, 
is enacted through the troubled identities of the narrator and the 
object of his narration. Both V and Sebastian may be conceived of 
as narrators; both may also be considered objects of narration. 
The novel gives rise to these two possibilities, together with sev­
eral subcategories, and renders choice impossible. The coexist­
ence of opposed hypotheses dramatizes a complex attitude to 
subjectivity via narration. 
Let me begin with the sharper incompatibility. Until almost 
the end of the novel, V seems the ostensible narrator. However, 
the climactic identification at the end—"Thus I am Sebastian 
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Knight" (172)—in retrospective conjunction with the casually 
imparted information that Sebastian's intention to write a fic­
tional biography had never materialized ("That was a book 
Sebastian never wrote" [34]) suggest that the "unwritten" text 
may be the novel we read. In other words, The Real Life of 
Sebastian Knight may be Sebastian's autobiography, and V 
merely a persona. Such a twist is perfectly congruent with 
Sebastian's playful cast of mind, and the use of V as a mask for the 
"real" author tallies with Sheldon's statement that Sebastian's 
novels are "but bright masks" (87). Various critics have discussed 
the possibility of a switch from V as narrator of Sebastian's biog­
raphy to Sebastian as author of an autobiography using V as nar­
rator. Dabney Stuart says: "For the narrator, the person whose 
perspective we are left with at the end of the novel is, as we dis­
cover, Sebastian himself" (1968, 313). And Andrew Field asks: 
"Is it possible thatThe Real Life of Sebastian Knight is not a biog­
raphy at all, but a fictional autobiography, another of Knight's 
novels?" (quoted inBruffee 1973,181). 
The clash between V and Sebastian as potential candidates for 
the role of narrator is also a clash between seeing the novel as bi­
ography or as autobiography. The biography/autobiography di­
chotomy, however, is not limited to the ambiguity of the narrator. 
Even if we take V as an uncontested narrator (a decision the novel 
does not authorize), the object of his narration remains an open 
question. The title arouses expectations of a biography, either fic­
tional or real. In accordance with traditional generic conventions, 
we expect the narrator to describe a third person's development. 
The first paragraph, however, already frustrates these expecta­
tions by containing seven first-person and only two third-person 
pronouns, an imbalance that gets aggravated as the text 
progresses. As Charles Nicol puts it, "The more V talks about his 
half brother the less we seem to know about him" (1967, 88). At 
the same time, the more V talks about his half brother, the more 
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we seem to know about V. Is the novel, then, about Sebastian's 
life or about V's quest for Sebastian's life? Is it Sebastian's biogra­
phy or V's autobiography? 
The polarity in this case is less clear-cut than the ambiguity of 
the narrator's identity. Here the two possibilities are not mutually 
exclusive, and the contrast between them may be complicated by 
a discrepancy between intention and execution. V may have in­
tended to write a biography but ended up unwittingly composing 
an autobiography—in which case the execution might be judged 
by the reader as a failure in relation to the intention and/or as the 
triumph of unconscious motivations. V says: "As the reader may 
have noticed, I have tried to put into this book as little of my own 
self as possible" (117). The reader, however, has noticed no such 
thing and is therefore likely to adopt an ironic attitude toward V's 
statements. Beyond the irony, though, s/he may try to understand 
the unconscious reasons underlying the discrepancy between de­
clared intention and execution. Could it be V's narcissism, his 
need to make room for himself in Sebastian's biography, or his 
desire to become a part of Sebastian's life? Support for the second 
hypothesis comes from V's reaction to Goodman's biography of 
Sebastian: "Oddly enough, this second marriage [of Sebastian's 
father] is not mentioned at all in Mr. Goodman's Tragedy of 
Sebastian Knight... so that to readers of Goodman's book I am 
bound to appear non-existent" (6). Consequently, when V as­
sures us that "if I continue to harp on the subject [of Goodman], I 
do so for Sebastian Knight's sake" (52), we may conjecture that it 
is precisely for his own sake that he attacks Goodman; in order to 
rectify his nonexistence in Goodman's biography, he writes an ac­
count easily transformable into autobiography. In a way that re­
calls the various narrators of Absalom, Absalom!, V's struggle for 
control over the narration may also be a struggle for self-asser-
tion. Moreover, V's unconscious motivation may extend beyond 
the biography to the life itself. Various details in the novel suggest 
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that during Sebastian's lifetime, contact between the two half 
brothers was minimal (cf. 14, 15, 26-27, 164), so it is plausible 
that V would unconsciously try to insert himself into Sebastian's 
life in retrospect by writing (or rewriting) the story. More sinister 
is the possibility that V is unconsciously taking revenge on Sebas­
tian for his "constant aloofness" (15) by manipulating his biogra­
phy, now that Sebastian is dead and V controls the narrative. 
So far I have elaborated on the hypothesis that V is the narra­
tor, Sebastian the intended object of narration, but V himself the 
actual, unwitting, object of narration. But the autobiography 
may also have been intended by V, as some critics suggest, in 
which case there is no discrepancy between intention and execu­
tion. "Certainly," says K. A. Bruffee, "this novel is not the fic­
tional biography it claims to be. The title is a ruse. Sebastian 
Knight is not the center of attention at all, although he is, or was, 
the narrator's center of attention . .  . the novel is a fictional auto­
biography. Its subject is V, the narrator" (1973, 181). Various 
conscious reasons may have led V to write his own story through 
Sebastian's, for example, the knowledge (expressed on several oc­
casions) that Sebastian is the more famous of the two and the 
book may therefore gain in interest by purporting to be about 
him, or even an experimental play—on the part of a self-con-
scious narrator—with the borders between biography and auto­
biography. 
Having discussed the alternative narrators and their intended 
or unintended objects of narration, an explicit expansion on the 
contribution of these phenomena to the problematics of subjec­
tivity and narration is now in order. On the face of it, the biogra­
phy hypothesis sees narration as the (re)construction of the 
subjectivity of an other, whereas the autobiography hypothesis 
views it as a (re)construction of one's own subjectivity. The coex­
istence of both hypotheses,2 however, seems to be a performative 
articulation of both the alienation of the subject through the other 
and the constitution of the other through the narrating subject. 
 61 Vladimir Nabokov, The Real Life of Sebastian Knight
Indeed, "the merging of twin images" is explicitly formulated by 
the narrator in the final sentence of the novel: "I am Sebastian, or 
Sebastian is I, or perhaps we both are someone whom neither of 
us knows" (172). To relate this insight back to the foregoing hy­
potheses, if V purports to write Sebastian's biography and ends 
up (unwittingly?) writing his own, narrating the other's life 
makes him discover his own subjectivity. But the quest and the 
telling make him discover that he is another—Sebastian. If the 
novel is Sebastian's autobiography, using V as a persona, then the 
narration explores subjectivity through the other, but also other­
ness through subjectivity, since V as Sebastian's narrating per­
sona is in quest of the real life of Sebastian Knight. . .  . In both 
cases, there emerges an identification of the subject with the 
other, coupled with an alienation or displacement of the subject 
through the other. This is a structure reminiscent of Lacan's de­
scription of the mirror stage, in which the reflection is recognized 
as both identical to and different from the face looking at it, and 
mirror images abound in this novel. 
The novel's title, with which I started the discussion of the rela­
tions between narration and subjectivity, also opens up the ques­
tion of representation. For, in addition to arousing expectations 
of a biography, the novel's title implies the possibility of reaching 
reality and telling about it. Readers familiar with Nabokov's 
work may detect an ironic overtone in this title, which has the 
ring of a cliche characteristic of certain popular genres. V's later 
thoughts give an indirect ironic twist to the title: "Oh, how I 
sometimes yearn for the easy swing of a well-oiled novel! . .  . A 
handy character, a welcome passer-by who had also known my 
hero, but from a different angle. 'And now,' he would say, 'I am 
going to tell you the real story of Sebastian Knight's college 
years'" (44). Doesn't this suggest thatThe Real Life... is possible 
only in well-oiled, facile novels and that reality is much more eva­
nescent than such titles would lead one to believe? 
This double movement, whereby a glimpse of reality is—as 
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Barthes would say—pose et dequ, goes beyond the title to charac­
terize the entire novel. The possibility of an "extraordinary rev­
elation" about reality (164), about "the real life," although 
emerging at various narrative levels, is also suspect or unattain­
able. A sense that "now the puzzle was solved" (150) permeates 
the final scene of Sebastian's The Doubtful Asphodel, leading 
both characters and readers to expect "some absolute truth," 
"the absolute solution" (149,150) from the lips of the dying man. 
But a moment's hesitation on the part of the author proves fatal: 
"The man is dead and we do not know" (151). Similarly, V 
dreams that Sebastian "was calling me and saying something very 
important—and promising to tell me something more important 
still, if only I came to the corner where he sat or lay, trapped by 
the heavy sacks that had fallen across his legs" (159). But the 
"striking disclosure" takes the form of a "garbled sentence" 
(160), which V cannot understand. Under the shock of this 
dream, V travels to the St. Damier hospital, which he reaches only 
after Sebastian's death. Like Sebastian's novel, like V's dream, 
Sebastian's life ends without disclosing the ultimate secret. This 
gap, this absence, motivates V's quest for the real life of his half 
brother and his need to narrate it. 
The impulse to pin down reality, to represent the absence, is 
questioned in the novel in a variety of ways. First, is it desirable to 
represent reality? Sebastian's "real life," like his prose, "was a 
dazzling succession of gaps; and you cannot ape a gap because 
you are bound to fill it in somehow or other—and blot it out in 
the process" (30). Second, is it possible to represent reality? Like 
the narrators in Absalom, Absalom! V has very limited contact 
with the "real life" he is trying to narrate, so he necessarily resorts 
to assembling information from the stories other characters tell 
him (Sebastian's governess, Sheldon, Miss Pratt, Nina Rechnoy-
Lecerf, etc.). As in Absalom, Absalom!, here too the informants 
suffer from limited knowledge, difficulties in remembering the 
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past, distorting emotional involvement, and even downright in­
sincerity. This creates a problem of reliability, which V formu­
lates on behalf of a mysterious Voice in the Mist, the voice of 
conscience asking, "Who is speaking of Sebastian Knight?": "It 
was but the echo of some possible truth, a timely reminder: don't 
be too certain of learning the past from the lips of the present. Be­
ware of the most honest broker. Remember that what you are 
told is really threefold: shaped by the teller, reshaped by the lis­
tener, concealed from both by the dead man of the tale" (44). 
Third, if the "real life" is a piecing together of various stories, is it 
anything more than a narrative, a fiction? And if the various unin­
tended fictions fail to represent reality, what is the status of 
Sebastian's self-declared fictions, his novels? The conflict be­
tween narration as representation and narration as creation, so 
noticeable in Absalom, Absalom!, is enriched in The Real Life of 
Sebastian Knight by the tension between reality and fictionality. 
This tension emerges from analogies between Sebastian's novels 
and Sebastian's life, as well as from those between Sebastian's 
novels and V's quest. The first set of analogies seems to reinforce 
the view of narration as representation (Sebastian's novels are 
molded on his own life), while the second seems to suggest that 
narration creates—rather than re-creates—reality (Sebastian's 
novels determine the form and development of V's quest). 
Let me begin with the first set. A certain passage in Success is 
said to be "strangely connected with Sebastian's inner life at the 
time of the completing of the last chapter" (82), but no details are 
given about the nature of the connection. In the same novel, 
though, William, the protagonist, suffers from his heart and con­
sults a doctor named Coates (ibid.). Sebastian also has a heart dis­
ease; his doctor is called Oates (88). The unrealized meetings in 
Success (81) and the near confrontation between Sebastian and 
Clare by the Charing Cross bookstall (154) are analogous as well. 
In Sebastian's short story The Back of the Moon, the "meek little 
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man" is reminiscent of another "meek little man" who provoked 
a tremendous scene of rage and fury by unwittingly interrupting 
Sebastian in his work (85). 
Lost Property, supposedly an autobiographical novel, is gener­
ally similar to Sebastian's life. Particularly analogous is the situa­
tion in which a man breaks up a happy love affair for the sake of a 
fatal and miserable one, "the damned formula of 'another 
woman'" (93). V considers that the letter written by a character 
in Lost Property on this occasion resembles what Sebastian felt 
about Clare or perhaps even wrote to her, although the twin char­
acter is a faintly absurd one. 
Doubtful Asphodel, composed when Sebastian is mortally ill, 
reenacts the anxiety of a man who fears he will die before reveal­
ing the great truth he has glimpsed. Small details in this novel, for 
example Clare's silver shoes (86,147) and the feeling of regret for 
not giving a penny to an old beggar (90, 148), also parallel 
Sebastian's life. 
Sebastian's novels thus seem to render his life in a representa­
tional mode. But the Voice in the Mist explicitly warns against 
such a simplistic view: "Who is speaking of Sebastian Knight?... 
Who indeed? His best friend and his half brother. A gentle 
scholar, remote from life, and an embarrassed traveller visiting a 
distant land. And where is the third party? Rotting peacefully in 
the cemetery of St. Damier. Laughingly alive in five volumes" 
(44). Sebastian may be more alive in his novels than in his life, and 
the hierarchy implied by the traditional representational view is 
questioned. 
The analogies between Sebastian's novels and V's quest place 
the traditional representational view much more heavily under 
fire, for beyond a suggestion of the supremacy of fiction over the 
writer's own life, they signal the capacity of fiction to mold the re­
ality of another. Sebastian's first novel, The Prismatic Bezel, is, 
among other things, "a rollicking parody of the setting of a detec­
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tive tale" (76) and hence full of "false scents" and delays: "Owing 
to a combination of mishaps (his car runs over an old woman and 
then he takes the wrong train) the detective is very long in arriv­
ing" (77). V's quest is similarly a process of detection (minus the 
parody) with its own false scents, like Mr. Goodman, and its own 
delays, like Mme Lecerf and the various obstacles put in V's path 
to the dying Sebastian: a slow car, a wrong turning, and all the 
rest of the conventional retardatory apparatus. In any self-re-
specting detective novel, the murderer turns out to be the one 
least suspected by the police and the reader. The Prismatic Bezel 
takes this device to a ridiculous extreme. The corpse is that of an 
art dealer called G. Abeson. In the crowd there is a passerby, the 
harmless old Nosebag, who has a passion for collecting snuff­
boxes. When the detective finally arrives and starts cross-ques-
tioning everybody, a policeman suddenly informs him that the 
corpse is gone. Old Nosebag now steps forward, taking off his 
beard, wig, and spectacles, to reveal the face of G. Abeson. The 
most harmless looking among the crowd turns out to be not the 
murderer, as in the conventional detective story, but the mur­
dered. The newly resurrected corpse then goes on to explain: 
"You see... one dislikes being murdered" (79). Abeson's death is 
transcended by his identification with the living Nosebag. A simi­
lar situation, in a serious vein, occurs at the beginning of V's 
quest.3 Sebastian is no more; yet disliking being dead, he is contin­
ued by a death-transcending duplicate in the person of his half 
brother, V: "I am Sebastian Knight."4 In both cases the identifica­
tion is connected with the names of the two parties. "Nosebag" is 
the exact reversal of "G. Abeson," and V's identification with 
Sebastian is implicitly and indirectly hinted at in the doctor's tele­
gram, which spells Sebastian's name in the Russian way— 
"Sei/astian's state hopeless come immediately Starov"—and 
"for some reason unknown" makes V stand for a moment in 
front of the looking glass (160, emphasis mine). In addition, The 
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Prismatic Bezel abounds in situations where strangers discover 
that they are related to each other, just as V's quest leads him to 
discover that Nina Rechnoy and Mme Lecerf are one and the 
same person. 
Success is a novel of quest, with an obvious Percival Q. as the 
researcher and is analogous to V's quest both in its subject and in 
its use of false scents and delays.5 Success also contains a series of 
near meetings between its protagonists, paralleling V's near meet­
ing with the unwitting Clare in the street (65). 
The Back of the Moon contains one of Sebastian's liveliest 
characters, "a meek little man" called Siller, who helps three mis­
erable travelers while waiting for a train (86). He has a bald head, 
a big strong nose, bushy eyebrows, and a constantly moving 
Adam's apple (ibid.). The meek and helpful Mr. Siller becomes 
Mr. Silbermann at the level of V's quest. Like Siller, Silbermann 
helps a miserable traveler (V) on a train, and like Siller, Silber­
mann has "a pink bald head" (104), "a big shiny nose" (ibid.), 
"bushy eyebrows" (103), and an Adam's apple that keeps "roll­
ing up and down" (105). As if to clinch the analogy, Silbermann 
advises V to stop searching for his brother's fatal woman because 
one cannot see "de odder side of de moon" (ibid.), reminding us 
of the story in which his counterpart "makes his bow, with every 
detail of habit and manner" (86). 
In Lost Property, Sebastian's most nearly autobiographical 
novel, the narrator tells the story of a profound experience he had 
while visiting the small hotel at Roquebrune, where his mother 
had died. Later, he adds, he mentioned this experience to a rela­
tive in London only to learn that he had made a dreadful mistake: 
"but it was the other Roquebrune, the one in the Var" (17). The 
experience, nevertheless, was real. V has an analogous "wrong/ 
right" experience when he sits by the bed of a dying man, believ­
ing that it is Sebastian (who is already dead) and feeling, as he had 
never done before, intense affinity with his half brother. This ex­
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perience gradually leads V to the climactic recognition of inter­
changeability and identification. 
So I did not see him after all, or at least I did not see him alive. 
But those few minutes I spent listening to what I thought was 
his breathing changed my life as completely as it would have 
been changed, had Sebastian spoken to me before dying. 
Whatever his secret was, I have learnt one secret too, and 
namely: that the soul is but a manner of being—not a constant 
state—that any soul may be yours, if you find and follow its 
undulations. The hereafter may be the full ability of con­
sciously living in any chosen soul, in any number of souls, all 
of them unconscious of their interchangeable burden. Thus—I 
am Sebastian Knight. (172) 
Sebastian's last novel, The Doubtful Asphodel, yields even 
more analogies with V's quest. The subject of the novel (as we 
have already seen) is a dying man who has a secret, an absolute 
truth, to divulge, and who dies before uttering the word that 
would have changed the lives of all those who could have ben­
efited from the disclosure. In a similar fashion, V tries desperately 
to reach the dying Sebastian in the belief that "he had something 
to tell me, something of boundless importance" (162), but 
Sebastian dies, and it is too late for the extraordinary revelation 
to come from his lips. There is one crucial difference, however, in 
V's experience: He does discover a secret—not from Sebastian's 
mouth but from the silent breathing of the "wrong Sebastian" in 
the wrong room. 
Around the central character in The Doubtful Asphodel there 
are other lives that constitute "but commentaries to the main 
subject": 
We follow the gentle old chess player Schwarz, who sits down 
on a chair in a room in a house, to teach an orphan boy the 
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moves of the knight; we meet the fat Bohemian woman with 
that grey streak showing in the fast colour of her cheaply dyed 
hair; we listen to a pale wretch noisily denouncing the policy 
of oppression to an attentive plainclothes man in an ill-famed 
public house. The lovely tall prima donna steps in her haste 
into a puddle, and her silver shoes are ruined. An old man sobs 
and is soothed by a soft-lipped girl in mourning. Professor 
Nussbaum, a Swiss scientist, shoots his young mistress and 
himself dead in a hotel room at half past three in the morning. 
(147) 
Most of these people are analogous, to the point of identity, 
with minor characters in V's search. Schwarz, the chess player, 
is—with a simple translation of the name—Uncle Black at the 
Rechnoy house, and Rechnoy himself opens the door to V, hold­
ing "a chess-man—a black knight—in his hand" (118).6 This is 
analogous not only to V's quest but also to Sebastian's life: 
Sebastian's name is Knight, and he signed his English poems with 
"a little black chess knight drawn in ink" (15). Later in V's quest, 
it is again chess that helps him remember the name of Sebastian's 
hospital. In the telephone booth "some anonymous artist had be­
gun blacking squares—a chess board, ein Schachbrett, un damier 
(166), hence St. Damier. 
The orphan boy in The Doubtful Asphodel parallels the one 
who opens the door at Helene Grinstein's, and the "soft-lipped 
girl in mourning" (147) is Helene herself (111-12). The "fat Bo­
hemian woman" is Lydia Bohemsky of V's quest, and the "plain­
clothes man" may again be Silbermann (105). There is no obvious 
parallel in V's quest to the man who denounces the policy of op­
pression. The "lovely prima donna" is analogous to Helene von 
Graun, who has "a splendid contralto" (109) and who, like the 
prima donna of the novel, steps into a puddle when she arrives at 
Mme Lecerf's country house. Finally, the episode of Professor 
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Nussbaum and his young mistress is similar to the story the hotel 
manager at Blauberg tells V: "In the hotel round the corner a 
Swiss couple committed suicide in 1929" (102).7 
The similarities between The Doubtful Asphodel and V's quest 
are so close to being identical that the distinctions between the 
levels seem in imminent danger of disappearing. Sebastian's novel 
almost dictates the development of V's quest. It is not only that 
the quest has "that special 'Knightian twist' about it," as V puts 
the idea during his visit to Mme Lecerf (131). The quest is actually 
made to duplicate Sebastian's novel, manifesting the supremacy 
of fiction over reality, except, of course, that the reality is also 
fiction, and the fiction is supposed to yield the "real" life of its 
protagonist. 
Further insight may be gained by locating all these analogies 
within the intricate layering of narrative levels in The Real Life of 
Sebastian Knight.2 The layering itself tells us something about the 
fictionality of reality and the reality of fiction. The extradiegetic 
level is concerned with V's narration and his thoughts about 
methods of composition and difficulties involved in writing a bi­
ography. The diegetic level consists of V's quest for Sebastian's 
real life, while Sebastian's biography—emerging as it does from 
conversations between V and key figures in his half brother's life, 
as well as from V's own memories—becomes a metadiegetic level, 
a story within a story. That the "real life" should be a doubly fic­
tional narrative (the novel we read and, to boot, a metadiegetic 
level in it) may be an initial suggestion of the fictional nature of 
reality. 
There are other metadiegetic levels in addition to Sebastian's 
life, some taking the form of written documents, some essentially 
nonverbal but translated into writing. To begin with, there is V's 
report of Goodman's book, The Tragedy of Sebastian Knight, 
which V demolishes and finally labels The Farce of Mr. Good­
man. Then there are notes, like Sebastian's last letter to his half 
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brother or Dr. Starov's telegram to V. Among the nonverbal 
metadiegeses are V's prophetic dream about his half brother and 
Roy CarswelPs portrait of Sebastian. 
But this is not all. If Sebastian's life is a metadiegetic level, his 
novels—often narrated in detail and "quoted from"—constitute 
a meta-metadiegetic level. And if Sebastian's life is a fiction not to 
be trusted, Sebastian's fictional works seem closer to his "real 
life" than his day-to-day reality, as reconstructed through V's 
conversations with the various informants. But even Sebastian's 
novels do not really yield the truth for, as Sheldon suggests, "His 
novels and stories were but bright masks, sly tempters under the 
pretence of artistic adventure leading him unerringly toward a 
certain imminent goal" (87). All the authors in Nabokov's novel 
wear masks. Goodman wears a black one (48,49,50), which the 
narrator pockets in the hope that "it might come in usefully on 
some other occasion" (50). Sebastian's novels are bright masks, 
and at the end V realizes that "try as I may, I cannot get out of my 
part; Sebastian's mask clings to my face, the likeness will not be 
washed off" (173).9 As in deconstruction, the real face cannot 
be seen, behind every mask there is another mask, and there is 
no way of stopping the interchangeability between reality and 
fiction. 
Within Sebastian's novels there is a further meta-level consist­
ing of letters written by his metadiegetic characters (the love letter 
and the business letter in Lost Property). These are analogous 
both to Sebastian's life and to V's quest. 
The perplexing effect of what Nabokov himself described as a 
"hell of mirrors" (Nabokov 1967, x) is enhanced by the interpen­
etration of the various narrative levels. The diegetic V is not only 
analogous to various elements of the metadiegetic level of 
Sebastian's life, but is also infused into one of them. The descrip­
tion of Sebastian's last meeting with his first love, as rendered by 
Natasha Rosanov, unwittingly uses the narrator's name as part of 
the scenery: "A last change: a V-shaped flight of migrating cranes; 
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their tender moan melting in a turquoise-blue sky high above a 
tawny birch-grove" (114-15). A similar use of the name is made 
in the letter written by the fictional character in Sebastian's Lost 
Property: "Life with you was lovely—and when I say lovely, I 
mean doves and lilies, and velvet and that soft pink V in the 
middle" (93).10 Not only V's initial but also other features of his 
personality are evoked in this letter by association and analogy. 
The brokenhearted lover, for example, knows that he will never­
theless "joke with the chaps in the office" (94), and we know that 
V works in an office. The character in the letter has not been able 
to bring some business to a satisfactory end (ibid.), and V too is 
unsuccessful in clinching some bureaucratic matter (151-52). 
Lost Property also contains another interpenetration of ele­
ments, though these are both at the same level. Of the letters 
found in the air crash, one is addressed to a woman but begins 
"Dear Mr. Mortimer," while another is addressed to a firm of 
traders—and contains a love letter. Not only did the actual letters 
get confused, but the one contains details from the other, for we 
read in the love letter: "I have not been able to clinch the business 
I was supposed to bring 'to a satisfactory close,' as that ass 
Mortimer says" (94). 
V's description of The Doubtful Asphodel treats the book and 
the events narrated in it as if they belonged to the same level: "A 
man is dying, and he is the hero of the tale; . . . The man is the 
book; the book itself is heaving and dying, and drawing up a 
ghostly knee" (147). The intermingling of the book and its narra­
tive reaches a metaphoric climax when the landscape (itself used 
as a comparison) is described in terms of vowels, consonants, and 
sentences: 
The answer to all questions of life and death, 'the absolute 
solution' was written all over the world he [the dying man] 
had known: it was like a traveller realizing that the wild 
country he surveys is not an accidental assembly of natural 
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phenomena, but a page in a book where these mountains and 
forests, and fields, and rivers are disposed in such a way as to 
form a coherent sentence; the vowel of a lake fusing with the 
consonant of a sibilant slope; the windings of a road writing its 
message in a round hand, as clear as that of one's father; trees 
conversing in dumb-show, making sense to one who has learnt 
the gestures of their language (150)11 
Knight's act of narration is also treated as if it were at the same 
level as the events it narrates, so that the author, his narrator, and 
his hero are almost fused: 
And now we shall know what exactly it is; the word will be 
uttered—and you, and I, and everyone in the world will slap 
himself on the forehead: What fools we have been! At this last 
bend of his book the author seems to pause for a minute, as if 
he were pondering whether it were wise to let the truth out. 
He seems to lift his head and to leave the dying man, whose 
thoughts he was following, and to turn away and to think: 
Shall we follow him to the end? Shall we whisper the word 
which will shatter the snug silence of our brains? We shall. 
We have gone too far as it is, and the word is being already 
formed, and will come out. And we turn and bend again over 
a hazy bed, over a grey, floating form—lower and lower 
But that minute of doubt was fatal: the man is dead. (151) 
The author's lifting his head seems to be at the same fictional level 
as the visions of the dying man. It is as if a pause at the level of 
writing actually causes the death at the level of the events.12 
A similar collision occurs in The Real Life of Sebastian Knight 
when its characters are treated as real people who can read the 
novel in which they appear. Thus V says about the Russian lady 
whose diary he studied: "That she will ever read this book seems 
wildly improbable" (5). He wishes that the Blauberg hotel man­
ager would "never read these lines" (101), wonders whether he 
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should "send [Silbermann] this work when it is finished" (110), 
and definitely decides to give Nina a copy (145). From one point 
of view, these references do not transgress the boundaries be­
tween levels, since the book is presented as a biography and the 
characters as real people. But for the real reader, who stands out­
side the "game" of narrative levels (to the extent that such an "en­
tity" is still conceivable by this point), the characters—including 
Sebastian and V—are fictional, and therefore cannot really read 
the book they hold in their hands. 
Behind all these levels, Vladimir Nabokov, the author who in­
vented the novel's other authors, is visibly pulling the strings, sug­
gesting, among other things, that both V and Sebastian may be 
manifestations of himself. V's epiphany, the identification that 
opens the quest and closes the novel, is not only "I am Sebastian, 
or Sebastian is I, " but also "or perhaps we both are someone 
whom neither of us knows" (172). That this someone is probably 
the real author is further intimated by a game of letters: v is both 
the beginning and the end of Vladimir Nabokov, and thes of Seb­
astian is also the first letter of Sirin, the name by which Nabokov 
signed his Russian novels. Moreover, Nabokov playfully made 
Sebastian's life analogous to his own. Both were born in 1899 in 
St. Petersburg, left Russia in 1919, moved to England, and stud­
ied at Cambridge. Like Sebastian's mother, Nabokov's mother 
used to tie her own wedding ring to her husband's with a black 
ribbon, and, like Sebastian, Nabokov's first love ended with the 
bitterness of betrayal. "Sebastian's Russian was better and more 
natural to him than his English" (71), and Nabokov repeatedly 
said the same thing about himself. Sebastian wrote his novels un­
der his mother's maiden name (Knight); Nabokov did the same 
with his Russian novels (Sirin). Many more similarities can be dis­
cerned by perusing Nabokov's autobiographical Speak, Memory, 
but these will suffice as indications of the identification of both 
fictional narrators and objects of narration with the real author. 
Narrative levels in the novel collide, intersect, and mirror each 
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other, shattering the illusion of their separateness and, with it, the 
possibility of distinguishing between fiction and reality. What is 
consequently destabilized is not only the concept of representa­
tion but, more radically, that of reality. "Reality," says Nabokov, 
"is an infinite succession of levels, levels of perception, of false 
bottoms, and hence unquenchable, unattainable" (Smith and 
Nabokov 1962). Compared to Absalom, Absalom! Nabokov's 
The Real Life of Sebastian Knight comes closer to the ontological 
doubt that characterizes postmodernism (see the introduction). 
Nevertheless, a yearning for reality, for representation, some­
times even for an autonomous self also permeates the novel, and 
access to the "real" of the title is both ironically subverted and 
nostalgically sought in this borderline text. 
Christine Brooke-Rose, Thru 
"Whoever you invented invented you too" 
Unlike Absalom, Absalom! and The Real Life of 
Sebastian Knight, which are torn between conflicting views of 
representation and subjectivity, Christine Brooke-Rose's Thru 
explicitly and playfully opts for a postmodernist position. The 
novel denies the possibility of distinguishing between language 
and reality and is skeptical about reality's ontological status: 
"Language is all we have to apprehend reality, if we must use that 
term" (64).* Thru also negates representation ("this being a text 
not an imitation of life" [79], and "You are mad, all of you. 
You're talking about all these people as if they really existed" 
[154]). Instead of a traditional self, it posits an indeterminate 
flux, "forever undefined, never coinciding with himself" (139), 
replacing the humanist concept by the relational notion of sub­
ject, "since subjects are the space of travelling semes the passage 
of a transformed decision" (158). The book consistently discon­
nects utterances from any human source to produce a depersonal­
ized movement "from one disembodied voice to another" (59). 
This logically leads to "the troubled identity of the narrator" 
(13), "the disappeared narrator" (164), "the narrator as Zero" 
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(90). Yet, while denying life to characters, narrators, and authors, 
it gives life to the very process of narration: "Narration is life and 
I am Scheherezade" (133). 
All of these statements seem to have been drawn from a theo­
retical study rather than a novel, but this is precisely the point. 
Self-reflexive and metatextual, Thru uses the reader's (or critic's) 
metalanguage as its own object-language, subverting the distinc­
tion between the two. But in addition to these explicit statements, 
Thru also "performs" the destabilization it talks about. In what 
follows, I will analyze the relations between narration and repre­
sentation as well as between narration and subjectivity as these 
emerge from Thru both constatively and performatively. I will do 
this in the full awareness that since the various statements are 
made by characters in the novel, they are—to a large extent—a 
part of the novel's "performance," the very distinction between 
constative and performative being problematized by this text's 
radical narrative strategies. 
Taking advantage of its pedagogical framework, Thru explic­
itly discusses the Platonic conception of mimesis: "For mimesis 
inevitably produces a double of the thing, the double being noth­
ing a non-being which nevertheless is added to the thing, and 
therefore not totally devoid of value although, however resem­
bling, never absolutely true. C Plato for yourself" (106; cf. also 
143-44). 
The absence-side of this doubling is emphasized in the quasi-
epigrammatic "If mimesis exists non-being is" (14,108) as well as 
by the allusion to both Lacan and Wallace Stevens: "For although 
every discourse presupposes a blind spot it never the less implies 
the absence of things as desire implies the absence of its object" 
(103; cf. also 143). 
The reader acutely experiences the absence of things—or at 
least their undecidability—in a performative repetition, when try­
ing to figure out what happens in Thru. As in Escher's painting of 
two hands, each of which can be seen as drawing the other, so in 
 77 Christine Brooke-Rose, Thru
Thru what seems to be a narrating subject changes places with 
what may be understood as a narrated object, collapsing the hier­
archy of narrative levels and suggesting that there may be no real­
ity apart from its narration. However, before embarking on an 
analysis of the reversibility of levels in this text, a preliminary ca­
veat is in order. Although the symmetrical interchangeability of 
narrator and narrated does indeed exist in Thru, it often disap­
pears into "no narrator at all but a lacuna through which it is pos­
sible to fall into delirious discourse" (54). This is governed by 
"the principle... that you don't follow the principle" (76), giving 
rise to the question repeatedly asked at all levels: "Who speaks?" 
(1,22,35,42,59,89,107, etc.). 
Who, then, speaks in Thru} One could perhaps identify the 
speaker with the Master, borrowed from Diderot's Jacques le 
fataliste and functioning here as a kind of dramatized narrator. 
Although the Master appears only three times in Thru, his con­
versations with his servant and alter ego, Jacques, concerning the 
composition of a text occur around the beginning, middle, and 
end of the novel (16-17, 60-70, 149) and can be understood as 
representing the overall act of narration. The text they compose is 
presumably the one we read, since its main characters, like 
Thru's, are a couple by the names of Larissa Toren and Armel 
Santores. However, Larissa herself is also in the process of com­
posing a text. "But which text?" asks the Master. "It looks might­
ily as if she were producing this one" {66). If both Larissa and the 
Master are said to be writing the text we read, their roles as narra­
tors become interchangeable. Not only does this mean, as the 
Master jokingly puts it to Jacques, "that the narrator I trans­
formed into Larissa am no longer your master but your mistress" 
(ibid.). It also means that the object of the Master's narration is 
transformed into the narrator of the text we read, and possibly 
becomes the inventor of both Jacques and the Master. No wonder 
the Master is bewildered and enraged that "this woman Larissa 
has. .  . usurped my place as narrator" (67). 
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Moreover, in the middle of writing her text, Larissa is inter­
rupted by a visitor called Armel, a friend of her neighbor's, a 
black writer from Timbuctoo whom she does not know. This 
Armel gives her naive criticism of her previous book (61-65). An­
other Armel is Larissa's husband (later ex-husband), and there is 
an early suggestion, rejected later, that he may be black (46). If 
the interrupting Armel is identical with the husband, then the 
scene between him and Larissa is probably a flashback, perhaps 
their first meeting. Occurring where it does, this scene reinforces 
the blurring of fictional levels, since Armel, who formerly ap­
peared as a character in the Master's narrative (like Larissa her­
self), is now promoted to the first degree of fictionality, where he 
converses with "Larissa Toren, author" (64), who may have in­
vented Jacques and the Master (or rather borrowed them from 
Diderot) as dramatized narrators for her text. On the other hand, 
it is also possible that the whole scene between Larissa and Armel 
is part of the Master's text. 
In order to bring the conversation with Armel to a close, 
Larissa "acquire[s] a sudden husband as a last minute escape" 
(67). The Master, who makes that comment, is also convinced 
that "Of course her husband if true would have to be Armel" 
(ibid.). This is confusing, in view of the fact that she tells Armel 
about a husband who—according to the Master—must be Armel. 
So perhaps the two Armels are not the same person: "That's a co­
incidence," the Master explains at this point to the perplexed 
Jacques. "They do happen despite the critics" (67). 
In addition to the dramatized gentleman narrator, Thru is re­
plete with references to "the unomniscient unprivileged unreli­
able narrator" (32), whom the Master may have created to 
narrate the story of Armel, Larissa, and the others, but who may 
also be a narrator above that one, posing the Master and his ser­
vant as narrating agencies for his own narrative. Like the drama­
tized narrator, this disembodied voice is also confusingly equated 
with Larissa, either through analogies or through explicit identifi­
cation. The minutes of a staff meeting state, "Larissa Toren is op­
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posed to all horizontal coordination which, according to her, 
would degenerate into useless chatter" (96); later we hear, "the 
horizontal coordination degenerates, according to the narrator, 
into useless chatter" (147). And Armel accuses Larissa of having 
invented him and withdrawn, "indifferent, paring your finger­
nails" (25-26), a Joycean attribute of authors often applied in 
Thru to the unreliable narrator (cf. 87). Is Larissa then the narra­
tor in whose narrative she appears as a character? She sometimes 
considers this possibility: "Whoever invented it is the absent nar­
rator or you in love with the unreliable narrator who is in love 
with the implied author who is in love with himself and therefore 
absent in the nature of things" (137-38; see also 96-97). 
Whoever the narrator is, one of the objects of his narration is a 
radical university, with students from all over the world, where 
Armel and/or Larissa seem to be teaching.2 This institution of 
learning is said (by whom?) to have been "dreamt up by the unre­
liable narrator of the moment who however will be tactfully 
dropped without scene or motivation" (55). Since that narrator 
often merges into his dramatized counterparts or into Larissa, she 
or they could, by the same token, have invented the radical uni­
versity. But who, in that case, can tactfully drop the unreliable 
narrator without scene or motivation? If he is himself dreamt up 
by the dramatized narrator or by Larissa, one of them can obvi­
ously drop him. But if he is either equivalent to them or is their 
creator, who can dispose of him "from above" ? 
An interesting possibility emerges here, for the academic 
course the narrative most often focuses on is creative writing, 
where a collective text rather uncannily similar to Thru is being 
composed. It is quite possible that the class is the collective au­
thor, inventing and dropping the unreliable disembodied voice as 
well as Larissa and the Master as narrators. "After all it's our 
text, isn't it? for us only," the teacher says (75). But if the class 
composes the text and sets up its narrators, how can it also be 
dreamt up by the very narrators it invents? One of the students is 
disturbingly aware of this double bind: "What are you talking 
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about AH this is the text we are creating it verbally we are the text 
we do not exist either we are a pack of lies dreamt up by the unre­
liable narrator in love with the zeroist author in love with himself 
but absent in the nature of things, an etherised unauthorised 
other" (155). 
Nor do the complications stop here. The creative writing class 
is probably taught by Armel, and Larissa's name in the schedule 
as well as her comments at the staff meetings could be a part of 
the collective composition or of Armel's own novel. But since 
Larissa herself also writes a text (Thru}), whether she teaches at 
the same university or at another, it is quite possible that she 
transforms Armel (and the class) into characters in her novel, or 
even that she transforms herself into Armel. 
Armel and Larissa are both teachers and characters in the col­
lective narrative composed by the creative writing students, mak­
ing the students' conversation at times particularly perplexing: 
You're mad, all of you. You're talking about all these 
people as if they really existed. 
Oh shut up Ali we're having fun inventing. (154) 
As characters in the students' composition, Armel and Larissa do 
not really exist. As teachers they do exist, but—in another turn of 
the screw—even as teachers they exist only as fictional characters 
in Thru. Imagine Armel, the teacher, listening to (and perhaps 
even participating in) the lively exchange among the students 
about him as a character: 
if it weren't for that illiberal and catastrophic chapter in which 
you re-invented him as an ideal husband, articulate and 
crueltobekind, in order to dialogue lunatically with yourself. 
What do you mean? That was real. 
. .  . Already Myra slipped him into the wrong rectangle as a 
black man last term. (150-51) 
Or about his ex-wife, Larissa: 
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So what do you think, should we kill off Larissa? 
She sure asks for it. (150) 
The collective narrative is not exclusively oral. Some of its sec­
tions are submitted by the students as written exercises, but the 
same interchangeability of levels that governs the oral composi­
tion operates here, too. Rather than signaling the nature of such 
segments in advance, Thru first presents them as if they were the 
narration of primary fictional events (possibly told by the absent 
or the dramatized narrator). Only later, when we reach the 
teacher's comments or the class discussion, do we realize that 
these events are a fiction within a fiction, that is, parts of a 
student's composition (45-48, 58-59, 71-73). Armel's com­
ments on these written segments reinforce the reversibility of lev­
els, for they could be said of Thru with equal justification. "The 
narrator could in fact disappear entirely though you've woven 
him in quite well," he writes to one student (48); and to another: 
"Very good. I like the mixture of levels" (73). Such remarks again 
promote the students' compositions to the level of the text in 
which they appear and whose structural principles they share (or 
create). Armel's comments are written by hand, the handwriting 
being that of Christine Brooke-Rose, author of Thru. This not 
only reinforces the analogy between Thru and the collective com­
position within it, but also inserts the biographical author—sup-
posedly outside the interchangeability of narrative levels—into 
the text. The assumption of some inviolate level outside the game 
is completely undermined, and the author is no longer the origin 
of the text but one of its effects. 
Armel and Larissa, we have seen, play two hierarchically in­
compatible yet interchangeable roles: They are both university 
teachers in Thru and characters in a collective narrative com­
posed by Armel's students. If we set aside this ambiguity of levels 
and examine the relations between Armel and Larissa at each 
level separately (though we can never know which is which), we 
soon realize that another form of reversible hierarchy is intro­
82 Chapter 4 
duced—even when the two should be on a par. This form of hier­
archy is realistically motivated both by the kind of people Armel 
and Larissa are said to be (both as primary fictional characters 
and as inventions in the students' narrative) and by their being 
writers who fictionalize each other in their work (again at both 
levels). 
As a person (that is, as a fictional character at one level or an­
other) Armel can relate to Larissa (and vice versa), only by creat­
ing an image of himself—a kind of persona—for her and an image 
of her for himself. In his letter to Larissa, Armel asks: "Have you 
not carefully invented the person you have become?" (26) and— 
at a different narrative level (unless the letter is also part of the 
collective composition)—the students ask the same question: 
"But Larissa? and our Larissa? Has she not carefully invented the 
person she has become?" (151). Armel realizes that he could also 
be said to have created Larissa, an invention she fully recipro­
cates: "And perhaps it was after all I who invented you though 
you would not admit this. Certainly you invented me and with­
drew" (26). The students also see Larissa—now a character in 
their fiction—as creating an image of Armel for herself: "That's 
precisely why one has to reinvent him all the time. I mean that's 
why Larissa had to" (151). This mutual invention, with a few 
more characters added, is tabulated by one of the possible narra­
tors of Thru before any of the characters have been properly 
"presented": 
unless Armel inventing Larissa 
or Larissa " Armel 
» Armel " Veronica 
n Veronica " Armel 
n Armel " Larissa 
n Larissa " Marco (or is it Oscar?) 
" Marco (?) " Larissa 
Larissa " Armel 
(8. The table is then repeated in reverse.) 
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The table is, by its nature, endless: "It follows therefore that if 
Larissa invents Armel inventing Larissa, Armel also invents 
Larissa inventing Armel" (108), and so on ad infinitum. 
Just as they fictionalize each other in their fictional lives, so 
they fictionalize each other in their fictional fictions. In what 
seems like the first tete-a-tete between Armel (future husband or 
stranger-interrupter?) and Larissa, various elements ("the man 
from Porlock," the remark about the white lines formed on the 
black hands, among others) are repeated from the text Larissa 
composes as he enters. It is as if her text anticipates the "reality" 
between Armel and herself, just as—according to the students—it 
does in relation to Stavro, her lover after the separation from 
Armel: "They'd meet for a drink on the castle terrace [Larissa, 
Stavro, and his new girlfriend] and Larissa would say tell me how 
did you two meet closing the manuscript in which she'd be invent­
ing the whole episode before she knew it would turn out that 
way" (153). 
Larissa herself talks to Armel about Stavro both as her lover 
and as a character in a text she is writing: "That's why I trans­
ferred the whole narrative to Rome, the International Theme you 
know, as well as the psychosis" (132). And just as she (re)invents 
both Stavro and Armel in her writing, so she encourages Armel to 
do the same with her: "Write your text and reinvent me in the 
present tense, which is a convention like any other tense Who­
ever you invented invented you too. That surely is the trouble, we 
do not exist" (53). 
Larissa's novels not only transfer her fellow characters to a fur­
ther degree of fictionality; they also parallel the governing struc­
tural principles of Thru, in which they are contained. This is 
particularly evident when Armel (the husband or the other?) criti­
cizes Larissa's book in terms that could apply to Thru, and her an­
swers become an inbuilt defense of Thru, disarming potential 
critics in advance. Two examples clarify this point. Armel won­
ders why the publisher advertises Larissa's book as funny: "Of 
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course it's not funny you are weeping all the time it is one long cry 
of anguish" (62), and she answers: "So, I'm weeping all the time 
and yet I'm merely amusing myself. But isn't the only thing to do 
with a long cry of anguish to amuse oneself? In my country we 
never separate the two. I take it as a compliment. But you seem to 
utter these phrases as reproaches" (63). Like Larissa's novel,Thru 
is a combination of witty self-amusement and a cry of anguish, 
and it is impossible to know whether its author is sad to be glad or 
glad to be sad—she certainly does not separate the two. Another 
aspect Armel attacks is the "fall into language": "Why this flight? 
. .  . What I mean is there are moments when you touch on the very 
essence of things and then brrt! you escape, you run away into 
language" (62). And Larissa answers—for herself and to all crit­
ics of Thru—"You mean that when I touch on the essence of 
things, in that text, it's not by means of language? What is it 
then?" (ibid.), and "Language is all we have to apprehend reality, 
if we must use that term" (64). 
With this parallel between Larissa's text and Thru, we have 
come full circle to the possibility envisaged at the beginning of 
this chapter, namely—in the Master's words—"It looks mightily 
as if she were producing this one and not, as previously appeared, 
Armel, or Armel disguised as narrator or the narrator I disguised 
as Armel, That's not clear" (66).3 It is indeed unclear both be­
cause Larissa may be producing this text but may also be invented 
by its dramatized or undramatized narrator or even by the stu­
dents' collective composition, and because it deprives the reader 
of the possibility of distinguishing between narrating subject and 
narrated object, container and contained, outside and inside, 
higher and lower narrative levels, plunging him/her into a situa­
tion not far from Russell's paradox of "the class of all classes 
which are not members of themselves." The paradox can be illus­
trated by the amusing anecdote about the barber who shaves 
all—but only—only those villagers who cannot shave themselves. 
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Does the barber, then, shave himself? Either answer produces a 
contradiction. If he does shave himself, then he can, so disqualify­
ing him from the class of villagers who cannot shave themselves. 
If, on the other hand, he does not shave himself, then there is one 
person in the village who cannot shave himself and whom the 
barber does not shave—which contradicts the premise contained 
in the first sentence. Russell solved his paradox by the theory of 
logical types, postulating that a class is of a higher type than its 
members and should not be confused with them (Russell and 
Whitehead 1964, 37-66). Thus the barber cannot be used to 
name both the class and one of its members. This solution is simi­
lar to the distinction between metalanguage and object-language, 
designed to prevent similar paradoxes in language. But the hierar­
chy that solves Russell's paradox becomes ambiguously revers­
ible in Thru, blocking all possible resolution. 
The reversibility of hierarchies calls into question the notion of 
representation. Traditional views of literature as representation 
assume, in one way or another, a reality (or a fictional reality) 
that precedes the act of narration of which it is the object (see 
chapter 1). But transforming the narrated object into the narrat­
ing agency, and vice versa, as Thru constantly does, not only 
plunges one into a universe of paradox, infinite regress, and tight 
loop, but also puts in doubt the separation between reality and 
narration and questions the very notion of representation. 
In dismantling representation, Thru displays a wide range of 
alternatives. As should be clear from the preceding analysis of the 
process of mutual invention, representation is replaced by presen­
tation, reproduction by production, and re-creation by creation. 
To clinch the matter, however, let me reiterate a short passage al­
ready quoted, which emphasizes both the status of narration as 
creation and its correlative interrogation of "real existence": 
"What are you talking about Ali this is the text we are creating it 
verbally we are the text we do not exist either we are a pack of lies 
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dreamt up by the unreliable narrator in love with the zeroist au­
thor in love with himself but absent in the nature of things, an 
etherised unauthorised other" (155). 
"We are the text" recalls such similar expressions as "You are 
the sentence I write I am the paragraph" (145), foregrounding 
textuality as another alternative to representation. Textuality is 
reinforced by many explicit declarations, of which I shall quote 
only two: "A text is a text is a text," (57) itself an intertextual 
variation on Gertrude Stein, and "within the grammar of that 
narrative the roles can be interchanged and textasy multiplied" 
(87).4 Textuality is also playfully "performed" by highlighting 
various aspects of "the materiality of the sign." Acrostics (e.g., 6, 
11) and other graphic patterns (e.g., 40, 85) foreground the visual 
aspect; alliterations and sound repetitions (e.g., the proximity of 
'Ruth' and 'Thru' "for mixed reasons of phonemic contiguity" 
[17]) enrich the acoustic qualities; anagrams and palindromes 
play with the linear character of language and simultaneously 
emphasize, on the verbal level, the reversibility of the narrative 
structure. Larissa uses a near anagram to explain her personality, 
"I'm rotten through and through you know, my name is Toren" 
(135).5 A more complex game describes her relationship with 
Armel, as mirrored by their names. The inventor and the inven­
tion of the other, Armel Santores and Larissa Toren are again 
near anagrams whose few extra or missing letters foreshadow 
their incompatibility. Armel's name contains an m and an e, ab­
sent from Larissa's; hers includes an/ not present in his. "Why ask 
what went wrong?" Larissa writes to Armel, "you can make up 
answers such as you didn't find your ME in me or you kept it nor 
did I find my I in you but kept it" (53; see also 69, where the ana­
gram is explicitly explained). What went wrong in a human rela­
tionship is reduced to missing letters in the lovers' names, and the 
play of language reigns supreme. 
Whereas anagrams create a different word by interchanging 
letters, palindromes are even closer to Escher's drawing hands. 
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The hands look identical, being in fact reverse images of each 
other. They interact circularly, so that the right hand can be seen 
as drawing the left and vice versa. Palindromes are similarly two-
directional, producing exactly the same word (or expression) 
when read forwards or backwards. Wishing to crown Larissa's 
fictional life with a banal death, the class is engaged in a language 
game: "What shall we do, kill her off? Eliminate her to Lima or let 
her die in Rome?" and their decision is a perfect palindrome: "But 
she must die in ROMA AMOR spelt backwards of course" (152). 
The two words are reversed mirror images, undermining the or­
der of perception, just as Escher subverted its hierarchy. Appro­
priately, the text exits with a visual mirroring of its title and a 
performative declaration of its self-reflexiveness: 
reflecting nothing but 
T 
E 
X 
(I) 
U i l H T H R  U (164) 
Textuality in Thru is largely a matter of intertextuality, "a text 
which in effect is a dialogue with all preceding texts" (43; see also 
121). My purpose here is to show that intertextuality does indeed 
become an alternative to representation in Thru, not to analyze 
the numerous allusions and quotations in this text, so I limit my 
examples to one string of quotations from literary texts and one 
playful interaction with a seminal theoretical study.6 Any distinc­
tion between the two types is, as I have already suggested, under­
mined in Thru. T. S. Eliot, Shakespeare, E. M. Forster, Dante, and 
Wallace Stevens meet in the following passage, creating through 
their contiguity a story of the failure of communication: "And if 
one settling a pillow by her head should say That is not what I 
meant at all That is not it at all, fill the air with quotations for the 
aisle is full of noises where angels fear to tread nel mezzo del 
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cammin because I do not hope to turn again where the lack of 
imagination had itself to be imagined for a flash of an hour" (44). 
The second example comes from one of the classroom situations 
in Thru. It begins with the teacher reminding the class, "We must 
not confuse the levels of discourse . .  . I am not a function of 
your narrative and we are using a metalanguage" (50). This is fol­
lowed by Jakobson's six functions of language and an appended 
comment: 
There should be placards saying: Danger. You are now en­
tering the Metalinguistic Zone. All access forbidden except 
for Prepared Consumers with special permits from the 
Authorities. 
M-phatically. (51; see also 126) 
The passage above exemplifies not only intertextuality, but 
also metatextuality, since it becomes an indirect comment on 
Thru, especially by way of contrast. In opposition to the teacher's 
warning, Thru does mix the levels of discourse, as well as the lev­
els of narrative, and placards are precisely what it omits. Placards 
would operate like Russell's theory of logical types or a clear de­
marcation between language and metalanguage, but there is no 
such comfort in Thru. In the absence of signposts around its 
metalinguistic zone, this complex text causes many readers to feel 
that they are not Prepared Consumers and therefore have little ac­
cess to it. Larissa and Armel's conversation about language (62­
64), quoted earlier, can also be taken as metatextual commentary 
on Thru, on what Armel sees as a flight into language and Larissa 
as an amused acceptance (even exploitation) of its predominance. 
In addition to comments on itself, Thru is also characterized by 
metatextual statements about writing in general, as well as by a 
broader interrogation of the metalanguage of linguistics, literary 
theory, and psychoanalysis within its own object-language. The 
result is not only a "delirious discourse" (54) on discourse, but 
 89 Christine Brooke-Rose, Thru
also a transformation of the reader into an element of the text. In 
this way the reader loses her or his traditionally secure external 
position. 
Thru, I have argued, is predominantly a text about texts. This 
statement, however, is less one-sided than it may seem, for Thru 
tends to expand the concept of text to make it refer to the whole 
world. It thus speaks of "a text like the world or the human body" 
(14-15; see also 55,106-7) as well as "a text like love" (82; see 
also 143). If all the world is a text, then the textuality of literature 
reflects or dramatizes the textuality of the world, and a nonrep­
resentational text like Thru acquires an unexpected representa­
tional dimension. 
One can detect representation of a more straightforward type 
in Thru, especially when the subject is the frustrating and castrat­
ing aspect of love and sex, the double standard and other gender 
inequalities, illness involving the removal of rotten organs (an­
other form of castration, perhaps), radical universities, or rac-
ism.7 The representational effect of many scenic renderings of 
these themes is subsequently deconstructed by being revealed as a 
section from a character's novel, a part of the collective composi­
tion, and so on (see, e.g., 45-48). But since the deconstruction is 
retrospective, a residue of the "realism" of the scene inevitably re­
mains. Some readers may conceive of such glimpses of reality as 
no more than the bribes of traditional narrative. Others may see 
them as "touching on the very essence of things" (62), from which 
the "fall into language" is actually a fear-motivated flight. Still 
others may contend that, far from being nonrepresentational, the 
play with language in Thru is an attempt to represent the cliched 
nature, the inescapable intertextuality, of all expressions of love, 
racism, and revolutionary ideas. All these are perhaps no more 
than ideological constructs, discursive practices that govern our 
existence even though (or because?) they are no more than mysti­
fications masquerading as truths. I point out the possibility of 
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such interpretations in order to reflect on the persistence of repre­
sentation in some form even in a highly nonrepresentational text. 
May not this persistence support a view of representation as an 
effect of the access function of narration in both postmodernist 
and earlier types of narrative? If such a rehabilitation seems to go 
against the grain of this text, Thru indirectly legitimizes it by say­
ing, "Everything exists even the discourse you do not choose" 
(153). 
As for the status of subjectivity in narration, one of the meta-
textual passages in Thru puts the problem in a nutshell: "which is 
why modern novels can be so disorientating despite the fact that 
through this chaotic freedom in the network of possibilities we fill 
the air with noises, twiddle along the timetable from left to right 
and back, from one disembodied voice to another. . . . Go forth 
and multiply the voices until you reach the undeicidable even in 
some psychoasthmatic amateur castrate who cannot therefore 
sing the part" (59). Thru links narrators with indeterminacy and 
dissociates voices from any originating self. 
Responsible for this dissolution of the traditional link between 
narration and "self" are various features discussed in the previous 
section from a different perspective. By turning narrating subjects 
into narrated (or invented) objects, the reversibility of narrative 
levels depersonifies narrators, making them into texts, stories, 
even fictions. And by creating a "confusion of voices" (116) and a 
quick, often unmarked, transition from one "tale-bearer" to an­
other, the novel seems to answer its recurrent question "who 
speaks?" in the manner of Barthes: "The discourse, or better, the 
language, speaks, nothing more" (1974, 41 ).8 Finally, the abun­
dant use of intertextuality also contributes to the effacement of 
the source of utterances, since the voice of the individual is swal­
lowed up in the collective system of cultural discourse. 
With a (parodic?) overtone of Marxist slogans and a playful al­
lusion to Lewis Carroll, Thru executes the narrator: "There's no 
more private property in writing, the author is dead, the spokes­
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man, the porte-parole, the tale-bearer, off with his head" (29). 
But although the narrator is executed, the act of narration itself is 
alive and kicking. In class, the teacher develops the hypothesis 
that in Homer's period, the community assumes both roles, emit­
ting and receiving a discourse it addresses to itself: "Indeed, the 
community is the discourse" (28). The background lecture ends 
with an inscription on the board, accompanied by an explana­
tion, and both are applicable in Thru far beyond Homer: 
n a r r a t i o  n 
you see not narrator for the reasons just given. (28) 
Not only does narration supersede the dead narrator; it is also en­
dowed with a life of its own: "Narration is life and I am 
Scheherezade" (133). The recurrent Scheherezade motif, how­
ever, suggests that some form of life may spill back from the act of 
narration to its agent: "Better known and more significant is 
Scheherezade, whose very life is to narrate and whose narration 
gives her life, with every new character in the same situation, not 
a character but a tale-bearer, whose life also depends on his nar­
ration generated by the surplus value left over from the previous 
tale and itself generating the next" (40). As long as she can tell she 
can live, and so she spends her life narrating. 
But how does narration's life-giving capacity tally with the 
"off with his head" attitude? I suggest that this seeming contra­
diction is precisely the drama Thru enacts: the narrator dies as an 
originating self only to give birth to the narrator as a speaking 
subject, but the newborn subject is a creature of paper, a signifier 
in the symbolic order. Something similar is Lacanically stated in 
Thru in relation to characters and authors: "In this way the con­
struction of a character has to pass through a death, necessary to 
the structuring of the subject as subject of utterance, and for his 
insertion into the circuit of signifiers, I mean the narration. It is 
therefore the recipient, you Jacques, or anyone, the other, who 
transforms the subject into author, making him pass through this 
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zero-stage, this negation, this exclusion which is the author" (69). 
Authors, characters, and narrators are all subject(ed) to narra­
tion, or—more broadly—to language. They are dead as selves but 
alive as subjects. Yet the death of the narrator is "only a manner 
of speaking since the text has somehow come into existence" 
(32). And so there must be some originator who is not only an ef­
fect of the text or a signifier in the symbolic order (although, as 
Thru also remarks, "In some languages things do themselves"). 
Even a deconstruction may not be possible without a deconstruc­
tor, and the subversion of the traditional self in Thru is as para­
doxical as de Man's quoted allegory of the key (chapter 1). His 
final sentence can serve equally well as my conclusion: "This 
would imply the existence of at least one lock worthy of being 
raped, the Self as the relentless undoer of selfhood" (de Man 
1979,172). 
Samuel Beckett, Company 
"Devised deviser devising it all for company" 
Company seems to me Janus-faced, and in the 
sequence of texts explored here it also faces both ways. On the 
one hand, its affinities with Thru are striking. Like Thru, it sub­
verts representation by a reversibility of the hierarchy between 
narrators and objects of narration, and the sentence that sums up 
this reversibility in Thru—"Whoever you invented invented you 
too"—has a close parallel in Company: "Devised deviser devising 
it all for company" (46).1 Similarly, the "disembodied voices" of 
Thru seem to find an echo in Company's pronominal enactment 
of a Not-I: "The first personal singular and a fortiori plural pro­
noun had never any place in your vocabulary" (61). On the other 
hand, as opposed to Thru, where the narration may not be associ­
ated with any originating consciousness, Company finally does 
come to rest in the mind of the one who is also the many, and the 
text becomes a dramatization not only of the act of narration but 
also of a mind narrating or devising. From this quasi-represen-
tational perspective, the reversibility of narrative levels enacts 
different manifestations of the same creative mind, different posi­
tions of the mind in relation to itself: the mind talking to itself 
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about itself, occasionally perceiving itself as if from the outside, 
often imagining—even inventing—its own activity. 
Thus perceived, the text becomes a fictional autobiography of 
a "fabling" subject who "speak[s] of himself as of another." This 
feature (like the others just mentioned) is double. It points in the 
direction of a split, dissociated, fragmented subject, showing 
signs of the alienation dictated by language, even as it suggests a 
celebration of plurality and a realization that access to one's own 
story may require a detour via another. 
Janus-like, one face of Company looks toward Thru, toward 
postmodernism, with its game of reversible levels and disembod­
ied voices, while the other is turned toward novels like Beloved 
where—in a kind of countermovement—the same strategies are 
used for a tentative retrieval of representation and rehumaniza­
tion of subjectivity. This doubleness is at least partly enacted by a 
rupture between the linear unfolding of the text and the various 
retrospective insights it yields. 
The text opens with what sounds like a typical statement made 
by an extradiegetic narrator: "A voice comes to one in the dark," 
but this is immediately complicated by the following single-word 
exhortation: "Imagine." Is "Imagine" a quotation of the voice's 
appeal to the "one," or is it addressed to the reader by the 
extradiegetic narrator?2 This ambiguity establishes from the start 
a parallel between the position of the one and the reader—two lis­
teners, perhaps also (as it later transpires) two creators (or devis­
ers). The distinction between the narrator's and the voice's 
language becomes a matter of pronouns. The narrator speaks 
about the one on his back in the third person: "This he can tell by 
the pressure on his hind parts" (7). The voice speaks to him in the 
second person: "You are on your back in the dark" (ibid.). An un­
comfortable feeling of a split is created, but everything still con­
forms to the rules of grammar and verisimilitude. 
The trouble begins on the next page, where "he" no longer 
seems to be the one on his back in the dark but another: "Use of 
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the second person marks the voice. That of the third that of the 
cankerous other" (8). Perhaps the "he" used by the extradiegetic 
narrator refers to someone else, not to the subject in the dark, a 
"cankerous other" who in turn conjures up the voice that ad­
dresses the "one" as "you." In both cases, however, the extradie­
getic narrator remains at the top of the pyramid of narrative 
instances. Not for long, though. The activity of devising (by 
whom?) is soon introduced, giving rise to a dizzying recursive 
logic that culminates in the possibility of reversing the pyramid: 
"In another dark or in the same another devising it all for com­
pany. . .  . Why in another dark or in the same? And whose voice 
asking this? Who asks, Whose voice asking this? And answers, 
His soever who devises it all Who asks in the end, Who asks? 
. .  . The unthinkable last of all. Unnamable. Last person. I. Quick 
leave him" (22,24). So perhaps instead of an extradiegetic narra­
tor who devises a subject on his back in the dark and a voice ad­
dressing him as "you," or alternatively an extradiegetic narrator 
who devises "one" and a "cankerous other," who in turn devises 
a voice that addresses the subject as "you," perhaps "one" is the 
deviser of all the others. According to this hypothesis, the whole 
narrative may be invented and told by the "one"—who, apart 
from the fleeting moment quoted above, consistently avoids the 
first person—and it is he who devises the extradiegetic narrator, 
the voice, and the cankerous other. Self-reflexivity renders the 
confusing situation even more confusing, and this is true for all 
hypotheses concerning the deviser's identity: "Deviser of the 
voice and of the hearer and of himself" (26). Whoever the deviser 
is, he is now said to devise not only the others but also himself. 
As the text progresses, more narrative instances are intro­
duced, but these can be fairly readily assimilated to those we are 
already acquainted with. Thus "hearer" (26,31, etc.) is taken as a 
synonym for the one on his back in the dark, since he constantly 
listens to the voice. "Creature" (26) refers to the same "one," and 
by implication the "creator," who may be "in the same dark as 
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his creature or in another" (ibid.), is identical with the "he" or the 
"cankerous other" (see also 51-52). The introduction of the de­
vised deviser, however, destabilizes these smooth equations: "De­
vised deviser devising it all for company" (46). If there is a devised 
deviser, there must also be a devising deviser, but who is who, and 
how can we know? A plausible hypothesis would be that the de­
vising deviser is the extradiegetic narrator (some would prefer to 
say Beckett). He invents the devised deviser, about whom he 
speaks in the third person, and who is identical with the canker­
ous other and the creator. This creator in turn devises the creature 
who is also the hearer and the one on his back in the dark, who is 
addressed in the second person by a voice that the creator also in­
vents. With an additional turn of the screw, the creator devises 
not only the others but also himself—all for company. Plausible 
indeed, except that earlier suggestions prevent this hypothesis 
from becoming definitive, and future developments, beginning 
with the gradual fusion of creator and creature and ending with 
the concluding lines, completely reverse it. 
Analogies between the creator and the creature begin to sug­
gest themselves with the image of the beeline. The creature's walk 
is described in the "you" mode as follows: "You take the course 
you always take which is a beeline for the gap or ragged point in 
the quickset that forms the western fringe" (35-36; see also 38). 
This image is later transferred to the creator's crawl, described in 
the "he" mode: "So he crawls the mute count In what he wills 
a beeline In what he hopes a beeline" (49). The analogies fuse 
as Company draws to a close. Segal (forthcoming) convincingly 
shows that, in the final section, the you mode modulates from ad­
dressing the subject on his back in the dark to addressing his fa­
bling creator. As Segal points out, the creator's physical position 
gradually merges with that of his creature. After his fall, the 
crawling creator lies prone, flat on his face. The final section, 
however, traces his gradual transition from a prone to a supine 
position: "Supine now you resume your fable where the act of ly­
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ing cut it short. And persist till the converse operation cuts it short 
again. . . . Till from the occasional relief it was supineness be­
comes habitual and finally the rule" (62). The uncanny process of 
fusion culminates in the concluding statement: "Till finally you 
hear how words are coming to an end. With every inane word a 
little nearer to the last. And how the fable too. The fable of one 
with you in the dark. The fable of one fabling with you in the 
dark. And how better in the end labour lost and silence. And you 
as you always were. Alone" (62-63). It now seems that the devis­
ing deviser is the creature, who is also the hearer and the one on 
his back in the dark. It is he who has invented the creator (the can­
kerous other) as a devised deviser, as well as the voice and him­
self. If so, narrator, narrated, and narratee are the same, and we 
are back with the "one" of the opening sentence. The text be­
comes a fictional autobiography that carefully avoids the first 
person. Why is the "I" eschewed, and why does the narrator 
speak "of himself as of another" ? 
As we have seen, narration in Company alternates between 
sections in the third person and sections in the second. The sec-
ond-person sections are spoken by a voice and concern partly the 
present situation of the solitary subject ("You are on your back in 
the dark") and partly memories, which the voice wishes to con­
vince the one are his (annoying his mother by a comment about 
the distance of the sky, being encouraged by his father to jump 
into the water, unwittingly causing the death of a hedgehog, hav­
ing an ambivalent relationship with a woman). The third-person 
sections are partly about the one on his back in the dark and 
partly about an amazingly cerebral creative process—with its hy­
potheses, hesitations, and reservations—of someone who 
"devise[s] it all for company" (8). The sections with "you" have 
an immediate, straightforward, sometimes lyrical effect, whereas 
those with "he" operate as a skeptical questioning of the author­
ity of the other voice's presentation of experience (Jewinski 1990, 
147). The logic behind these shifts, as well as the omission they 
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signal, are a performance, not only a reflection of/upon the con­
junction between a "subject without self"3 and the subjecting as­
pect of language. The absence of self is explicitly stated in a 
fleeting paragraph very early in Company: "Use of the second 
person marks the voice. That of the third that cankerous other. 
Could he speak to and of whom the voice speaks there would be a 
first. But he cannot. He shall not. You cannot. You shall not" (8). 
The subject, it transpires, cannot speak in the first person because 
the first person would be taken as a sign (or illusion?) of self, 
which is precisely what this subject does not have—he is, one 
might say, anetre manque. As later, in Beloved, the non-crystalli-
zation of identity is manifested in a fragmentation of the subject, 
whose objective correlatives are a dismembering of the body, a 
dissociation from memories, and a fragmentation of the text. In 
Company, the subject is split into different ways of relating to 
himself. The body is reduced to a back, a hand, an eye, a knee, 
feet—all disconnected from each other—and the text is frag­
mented by the alternating pronominal sections. 
Fragmentation also takes the form of a discontinuity between 
the subject's present and his past. On this reading, which is not 
the only possible interpretation, the achievement of the subject's 
personal integration is the aim of the deviser: "To have the hearer 
have a past and acknowledge it. You were born on an Easter Fri­
day after long labour. Yes I remember" (34). By owning one's 
memories and establishing continuity with the past, one can gain 
access to a voice and an I: "Another trait its repetitiousness. Re­
peatedly with only minor variants the same bygone. As if willing 
him by this dint to make it his. To confess, Yes I remember. Per­
haps even to have a voice. To murmur, Yes I remember" (16). But 
the subject is incapable, or unwilling, to own his memories, hence 
disclaiming the right to an I as well as to a voice that would speak 
instead of passively being spoken to and about by other voices. 
The activity of remembering is not only an act of integration, but 
also a creation of discontinuity: "Remembering is not simply re­
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cuperative. It involves processes of cutting and editing. To re­
member is also to dismember" (Arthur 1987,142). 
The incapacity, or refusal, to claim ownership of himself may 
also explain the use of the third person as a dissociative evasion of 
responsibility: "He speaks of himself as of another. He says 
speaking of himself, He speaks of himself as of another" (26). In 
a similar rejection of the I, the "Unnamable" paradoxically says: 
"I shall not say I again, ever again, it's too farcical. I shall put in 
its place, whenever I hear it, the third person, if I think of it. Any­
thing to please them. It will make no difference. Where I am there 
is no one but me, who am not" (355).4 This passage suggests that 
being a subject without self is not only an existential predicament 
but also a consequence of language. "It's the fault of the pro­
nouns," says the Unnamable (404), and indeed how can personal 
pronouns designate specific individuals when, by definition, they 
are applicable to all individuals (see also Thiher 1984, 132)? In 
Company, such an uncomfortable insight affects not only the use 
of "I," but also that of "you" and "he," shifters whose reference 
to the subject cannot be guaranteed: "He cannot but sometimes 
wonder if it is indeed to and of him the voice is speaking. May not 
there be another with him in the dark to and of whom the voice is 
speaking? Is he not perhaps overhearing a communication not in­
tended for him?" (8-9). In more general terms, self-alienation is a 
necessary result of the subject's entry into language, where "I" is 
always translated by something other than itself. "If the voice is 
not speaking to him it must be speaking to another. So with what 
reason remains he reasons. To another of that other. Or of him. 
Or of another still. To another of that other or of him or of an­
other still" (11). 
The splitting of the subject, enacted by the interplay of pro­
nouns, is doubled, perhaps even parodied, by the use of initials, 
another substitute for naming. Evoking the divine fiat, the creator 
muses: "Let the hearer be named H. Aspirate. Haitch. You Haitch 
are on your back in the dark. And let him know his name" (31). 
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An initial, of course, is not exactly a name, but—in addition to 
evoking the sound of breathing, often referred to in the text—H is 
the first letter of both hearer and he, thus gaining a certain degree 
of substantiality. But this is only to be immediately dispelled: "Is 
it desirable? No. Would he gain thereby in companionability? 
No. Then let him not be named H. Let him be again as he was. 
The hearer. Unnamable. You" (32). But the game of letters does 
not stop here. A few pages later, "Feeling the need for company 
again he tells himself to call the hearer M at least. For readier ref­
erence. Himself some other character. W" (42-43). This time the 
initial confers an even greater substantiality (M = AM), but it also 
hints at the interchangeability of the two subjects, both by calling 
the other "AM" and by using two letters that visually mirror each 
other (M and W). Moreover, W = "double you" (and the hearer 
was constantly addressed as "you"), thus reinforcing the 
doppelganger motif.5 And M brings to mind Malone and Molloy 
of the trilogy, intertextual references within the Beckett corpus, 
which—together with "the Unnamable" and the crawling crea­
ture of How It Is—may suggest an autobiographical dimension 
that is not confined to the fictional. In a similar vein, Booth says: 
"The masterstroke here, for me, is Beckett's reiterated invitation 
to think about a struggling and suffering someone beyond or be­
hind the three 'characters,' not just the 'cankerous other' who 
uses the third-person but the implied author himself or even the 
career-author: Samuel Beckett, telling us once again 'how it is'" 
(1983, 453). In typical fashion, however, all this is soon undone: 
"Is there anything to add to this esquisse? His unnamability. Even 
M must go. So W reminds himself of his creature as so far created. 
W? But W too is creature. Figment" (45). 
My intuition that the use of initials may be parodying the use 
of pronouns is based on the initials' relatively exaggerated, 
cruder, less sophisticated nature. The game of initials lays bare 
the interplay of pronouns, with a characteristically double-edged 
effect, simultaneously undermining the seriousness of the latter 
and arming it against irony by dint of an inbuilt parody. 
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Up to now I have stressed the reductive, dehumanizing effect of 
the undoing of the traditional self. Company, however, is more 
complex. Even within the deconstructionist framework, this un­
doing can be seen as a celebration of plurality and freedom. What 
Carla Locatelli describes as the lack of coincidence of the self with 
himself gives rise to the plurality of the subject: "In this way, the 
narrative reflects a conception of the subject that is essentially 
'plural' and not immediate, while narration also conveys the no­
tion that this phenomenological 'plurality' would be obliterated 
in the figure of a singular pronoun" (1990,160). One can see the 
lack of unity that defines the traditional self as a multiplicity of 
roles, characterizing a subject free from the traps of rigidifying 
conceptualizations in both language and philosophy. And the 
discontinuity between present and past can be interpreted as a lib­
eration from a pseudo-sameness. Thus, what was earlier inter­
preted as the subject's disowning of his past memories can be 
reconceived as an emphasis on the independence of separate peri­
ods or moments. When the subject is imagined as acknowledging 
his memories, he also insists on the pastness of the past, on its 
non-unity with the present: "One day! In the end. In the end you 
will utter again. Yes I remember. That was I. That was I then" 
(21; emphasis mine).6 
In this light, my earlier stress on the subject's disowning of his 
past memories is open to question. What if these are not his 
memories at all, but stories the deviser invents and imposes on the 
subject? After all, the opening page of Company says: "To one on 
his back in the dark a voice tells of a past," not specifying whose 
past. The deviser's desire that the subject acknowledge the 
memory of his own birth (34) reinforces such a suspicion. How 
can anyone remember his or her own birth? Do not such memo­
ries always come from the other? Are they not—in fact—memo-
ries of the other? 
Just as liberation from the chains of time may come at the ex­
pense of discontinuity, so can company become the other side of 
fragmentation. As long as there is unity, there is no company. 
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Otherness is a necessary condition for company, and when "one" 
is alone, otherness takes the form of otherness-to-self, namely, 
split, fragmentation, turning parts or aspects of the subject into 
separate entities. For example, "Little by little as he lies the crav­
ing for company revives. . . . The need to hear that voice again" 
(55), or "Might not the voice be improved? Made more compan­
ionable?" (34), or yet again: "If he were to utter after all? How­
ever feebly. What an addition to company that would be!" (21). 
Similar questions are asked about the hearer—"Might not the 
hearer be improved? Made more companionable if not downright 
human"—and, as we have already seen, about the initials consid­
ered as possible substitutes for both hearer and subject (32, 42). 
In the same half-serious, half-ironic tone, parts of the body (e.g., 
the ear [34]) as well as physical postures (being prone or supine 
[26-27, 56]) and sensations (an "unscratchable itch" [55]; the 
smell of the creator [52]; or the sound of the crawl [50]) are said 
to be an addition to company. Emotional states, such as confu­
sion (26), sickness of the heart (ibid.), and "a movement of sus­
tained sorrow or desire or remorse" (45), also become sociable 
entities, as do the darkness (26-27) and some hypothetical crea­
tures that would have been welcome in the empty room (a dead 
rat [27]; a fly [28]). Although not explicitly designated as com­
pany, intertextuality clearly functions as such, the voices of 
Dante, Shakespeare, Milton, and other past authors populating 
the text through many direct and indirect allusions (Brater 1983, 
157-71; Pilling 1982,127-31). 
"In order to be company," says Beckett's text about the one on 
his back in the dark, "he must display a certain mental activity" 
(9), and the main activity displayed is—circularly—one of "devis­
ing it all for company" (8, 24,26,27, 33, 43,46, 60). The act of 
devising or creating others for the sake of company is reminiscent 
of Genesis 2:18: "It is not good that man should be alone; I will 
make him a helpmeet for him" (King James Version). The biblical 
"helpmeet" can be reformulated as "companion," and the nam­
 103 Samuel Beckett, Company
ing of figment-companions by Beckett's character recalls Adam's 
naming of the creatures. In association with the intertextual-au-
tobiographical allusions mentioned earlier, a possible analogy 
emerges between artistic creation and the creation of the world. 
Yet Company is not only a self-reflexive text about fiction 
writing. It is also about Everyman, imagining a world, devising 
company, narrating his own story to himself by inventing others 
who both are and are not himself. This indirect way of gaining ac­
cess to oneself is reminiscent of the acts of narration in both 
Absalom, Absalom! and The Real Life of Sebastian Knight. In 
Absalom, Absalom! the construction of subjectivity passes 
through the other in two complementary ways, which I have al­
ready formulated semi-epigrammatically: You are what others 
say about you, and conversely, you are what you say 
(performatively) about others. In The Real Life of Sebastian 
Knight, whether taken as V's narration or as Sebastian's, the sub­
ject gains access to his own story through another's. In Company 
too, it is by telling about "others" that the subject gains access to 
his own story and his own subjectivity. Otherness is necessary not 
only for the constitution of subjectivity through narration but for 
the very existence of a narrative situation. Narration is impossible 
without a narratee (a "hearer"), and when one is alone, as in 
Company, it is the self-as-other that one addresses. Without com­
pany, even the company of projected figments, there is no narra­
tion. Therefore the realization that "you [are] as you always were 
/ Alone" ends the text and ends the narration. But the converse is 
also true: without narration there is no company. In the fashion of 
A Thousand and One Nights, as long as there is storytelling, life 
and others exist. Once "you hear how the words are coming to an 
end. . . . And how the fable too," company is over, and you are 
alone and expiring. 
Toni Morrison, Beloved 
"It was not a story to pass on" 
Beloved is no less obsessed with narratives and 
narration than are the other novels analyzed in my study. It 
poignantly dramatizes a tension between the blocking of story­
telling and its eruption, exploring the access potential of narra­
tion in recovering the repressed past, retrieving memory, and 
fighting the suppression of individual and communal voice. 
Nor is Beloved naive about the possibility of representation. 
On the contrary, it is as fully aware as the other novels of the 
problematic nature of stories based on previous stories, them­
selves deriving from still earlier stories, as well as of the elements 
of creation and fictionality which necessarily characterize any at­
tempt to recover a past.1 Similarly, the novel is painfully con­
scious that subjectivity is fragile in general and becomes even 
more so under the cruel conditions of slavery. Out of this predica­
ment (and because of it?), however, Beloved attempts a hesitant 
rehabilitation of representation and subjectivity via narration. In­
deed, it does not try only to rehabilitate subjectivity, but to go be­
yond it. From the position of subjects, in the ruthless and racial. 
sense of being "in subjection," the characters yearn for what the 
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novel—in a deliberate approximation to the humanist view— 
calls a "self." Whereas Thru and Company, each in its own way, 
moved from self to subject, Beloved dramatizes subjects in search 
of selves.2 
In this complex attempt at a retrieval that incorporates desta­
bilizing insights, Beloved employs many modernist and postmod­
ernist techniques of narration for purposes different from theirs.3 
As we have seen, the multiplication of narrative levels often en­
acts a doubt about the possibility of reaching reality and consti­
tuting a self. But in Beloved the multiplication of levels (and near 
levels) operates instead as an access to self.4 Similarly, ambiguity, 
the genre of the fantastic, and magical realism are often employed 
in modernist and postmodernist novels for nonrepresentational, 
self-reflexive purposes. By contrast, in Beloved these strategies 
are subordinate to the attempt (and the difficulty) of making be­
lievable the unbelievable horrors of slavery, of trying to represent 
an unbearable reality. 
The endeavor to regain previously dismantled possibilities is 
not a return to a position before doubt but rather an inclusion of 
the destabilization and an attempt to transcend it. To support this 
claim, let me begin by showing how the use of narrative levels 
both subverts a certain relationship between narrating voice and 
person, and very subtly suggests that narration may become a ba­
sis for a birth into self. 
Beloved is related by an extradiegetic narrator who, on the 
whole, delegates the role of focalizers—and sometimes also of 
second-degree narrators—to various characters in the novel. 
Characters seem to become first-degree narrators only in the 
three interior monologues that follow the discovery of Beloved's 
identity and culminate in a kind of chorus, fusing Sethe's, 
Denver's, and Beloved's voices in a ritual-like unification (200­
217). These four chapters can support the interpretation that it is 
the discovery of the other—as well as the experience of loving the 
other—that endows Sethe, Denver, and Beloved with a voice (I) 
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and a self. But the monologues often convey experiences denying 
the self (e.g., Beloved's incapacity to dissociate herself from Sethe) 
or undermining the love (e.g., Denver's suspicion that Sethe might 
kill her the way she killed Beloved). And the fusion anticipated by 
the chorus of the three voices turns out to be a debilitating folie a 
trois from which only Denver successfully extricates herself. 
Moreover, the possibility of an affinity between saying "I" and 
having an I is probably illusory, even on the grounds of narrative 
strategies. Bearing in mind the end of the preceding chapter of the 
novel, one realizes that the monologues may be conceived of as 
quotations by the extradiegetic narrator, rather than autonomous 
as they seem to be.5 True, there are no quotation marks, which is 
misleading at first—but the last sentence before the monologues 
is: "Mixed in with the voices surrounding the house, recognizable 
but undecipherable to Stamp Paid, were the thoughts of the 
women of 124, unspeakable thoughts, unspoken" (199; end of 
chapter). The monologues, we now realize, can be seen as the 
narrator's verbalization of the characters' unspeakable and un­
spoken thoughts. Thus there is no easy and direct connection be­
tween narration and originating self in Beloved. 
Despite the lack of a direct connection, however, the novel 
does assign narration a crucial role in the constitution of self—but 
indirectly, through a network of narrative levels. Within this net­
work, I shall focus on a few scenes whose subject is birth and re­
birth, because the association between access to self and birth 
clearly suggests a stance that goes beyond the problem of subjec­
tivity. Furthermore, the conjunction between birth and rebirth 
metaphors and the presence or absence of narrative levels gives 
rise to a differentiation between characters who gain access to a 
self and those who do not, a differentiation that—not surprisingly 
at this point—hinges on the role of storytelling. 
There is an intriguing chiasmus between the narration of birth 
and of rebirth in Beloved. The birth is Denver's; the rebirth,. 
Beloved's. Contrary to expectation, birth, a primary, originary 
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event, is rendered through layers of storytelling, while rebirth, a 
second coming, is accorded primary narration. By pursuing the 
unfolding of this paradox and trying to interpret it, we may, I 
hope, glimpse the relation suggested between narration and self. 
Denver's birth is told twice, and it is a highly dramatic event. 
Sethe is all alone in the woods, running away from Sweet Home, 
where her back was cruelly pulped and her milk taken away from 
her in a rapelike scene performed by two whiteboys. Her legs are 
swollen, she can hardly walk, and she is terrified by a premonition 
that either she or the baby or both are about to die. Then, with the 
help of a whitegirl, she reaches a lean-to and later a boat on the 
river, where her water breaks—as if to join the water of the river. 
Denver is born there and is named after the whitegirl. This dra­
matic event also seems to take the dramatic form of a scene. It is 
presented in great detail, with many dialogues between Sethe and 
the whitegirl, creating an effect of vividness and immediacy.6 So 
strong is the sense of immediacy that the reader often experiences 
the scenes as a "first narrative"7 told directly by the extradiegetic 
narrator, who seems to be quoting the dialogues. The reader thus 
forgets the multilayered distancing through which the scenes 
reach him or her. But distancing is prevalent both in the temporal 
organization and in the handling of narration and focalization in 
the two renderings of Denver's birth. 
The first birth chapter (28-42), although seemingly part of the 
narrative present, is in fact doubly analeptic. It starts as a flash­
back, an iterative summary of Denver's secret feasts in her se­
cluded bower in the woods. The iterative gives way to the 
singulative, and one intimate scene in the boxwood is narrated in 
which Denver finds herself in snow and then returns home to ex­
perience a vision of her mother praying while a white dress kneels 
next to her in a gesture of tender embrace. Both the snow and the 
kneeling dress evoke memories in Denver: "And it was the tender 
embrace of the dress sleeve that made Denver remember the de­
tails of her birth—that and the thin, whipping snow she was 
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standing in, like the fruit of common flowers" (29). The birth 
event, then, is an analepsis within an analepsis, doubly distanced 
from the narrative present, which deals with the union between 
Sethe and Paul D. 
A similar distancing occurs in the handling of narration and fo­
calization. Although the chapter is told by the extradiegetic nar­
rator, the narration of Denver's birth is filtered through Denver. 
It is Denver who remembers the scene, and through her memories 
(verbalized by the narrator) the reader experiences it. But what 
Denver remembers is not the event itself but stories Sethe used to 
tell her about her birth: "a thin and whipping snow very like the 
picture her mother had painted as she described the circumstances 
of Denver's birth in a canoe straddled by a whitegirl for whom she 
was named" (29; emphasis mine). The birth scene is a memory of 
a story, and the narrator often reminds us of this by using such ex­
pressions as "Sethe told Denver" or by referring to Denver in the 
third person: "And now the part that Denver loved the best."8 
The first birth chapter is told by the extradiegetic narrator, al­
though the narration is filtered through Denver's memories of 
stories she has heard. In the second chapter (74-85), however, 
even the narration is not primary. The birth events are told (and 
focalized) by Denver, an intradiegetic narrator whose narrative 
becomes metadiegetic. "'Tell me,' Beloved said. 'Tell me how 
Sethe made you in the boat'" (76), and Denver tells. Her narrative 
is further distanced by being constructed "out of the strings she 
had heard all her life" (ibid.). Denver constantly reminds us of 
this by acknowledging Sethe as her source: "The whitegirl, she 
said, had thin little arms but good hands. She saw that right away, 
she said" (76); "she cried, she said, from how it hurt" (77). The 
similarity between this technique and the attribution of stories to 
their original tellers in Faulkner's Absalom, Absalom! is striking. 
Let me recall only two examples out of many. Mr. Compson tells 
Quentin: "I have this from something your grandfather let drop 
one day and which he doubtless had from Sutpen himself in the 
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same accidental fashion" (49). Shreve, who hears the story only 
from Quentin, constructs parts of it with him and says: "And yet, 
this old gal, this Aunt Rosa, told you that someone was hiding 
there" (216). 
The birth chapters seem like scenes because of the abundance 
of detail and dialogue, producing an effect of vividness and imme­
diacy, but they are distanced in time, narration, and focalization. 
Strangely enough, however, the distancing does not make the 
scenes lose their scenic character, but transposes the scenic qual­
ity from the birth event itself to its reliving in the present. In the 
first birth chapter Denver not only remembers stories she heard 
about her birth, but "easily she stepped into the told story that lay 
before her eyes on the path she followed away from the window" 
(29; emphasis mine). Here Denver "sees" her pregnant mother 
"walking on two feet meant for standing still" (ibid.), just as in 
the second birth chapter "Denver began to see what she was say­
ing and not just to hear it: there is this nineteen-year-old slave 
girl—a year older than herself" (77).9 Like Quentin and Shreve in 
Absalom, Absalom! reenacting the Sutpen saga in the present of 
their own lives, Denver relives her birth as an event in the present: 
"Denver was seeing it now and feeling it—through Beloved. Feel­
ing how it must have felt to her mother. Seeing how it must have 
looked" (78). 
The complex oscillation between immediacy and distancing is 
very different from the effect produced by Beloved's reappear­
ance, an uncanny event cast in terms of a rebirth and inviting 
comparison with Denver's birth. Denver's birth is rendered in 
great detail, but nothing is said about Beloved's. It is Beloved's re­
turn, not her original coming, that the novel dramatizes. This 
"miraculous resurrection" (105) is associated at the time with 
Sethe's full bladder: "And, for some reason she could not immedi­
ately account for, the moment she got close enough to see the 
face, Sethe's bladder filled to capacity" (51). At first this may 
seem only an indication of excitement (or perhaps even a vague 
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recognition of Beloved), but the association with birth-giving be­
comes gradually stronger as the text unfolds: "The water she 
voided was endless," and "there was no stopping water breaking 
from a breaking womb and there was no stopping now" (ibid.). 
The association between voiding water and giving birth becomes 
even more specific as Sethe compares her reaction to the un-
known/half-known figure of Beloved with her experience of giv­
ing birth to Denver: "But as it went on and on she thought, No, 
more like flooding the boat when Denver was born" (ibid.), an 
analogy reinforced by Sethe's recollection at this point of a brief 
exchange between her and Amy, the whitegirl, during the deliv­
ery. In both scenes, water is not only evacuated but also imbibed 
in great quantities. Beloved drinks cup after cup (ibid.), and Sethe 
drinks and asks for more following Denver's birth (90).10 The re­
turning Beloved has soft, smooth skin, like a newborn baby (50, 
52). In a further analogy between the scenes, Beloved's return be­
comes a realization of a figurative expression used by Amy. While 
massaging Sethe's swollen feet, Amy warns her: "It's gonna hurt, 
now. .  . . Anything dead coming back to life hurts" (35; see also 
77,78). Denver, remembering this part of the story, silently com­
ments: "A truth for all times" (35). What is Beloved's return if not 
a "living" example of something dead coming back to life? And 
isn't "hurt" both an intransitive and a transitive verb, just as the 
returning Beloved hurts both herself and others?11 
The analogy with Denver's birth suggests that Beloved's return 
is indeed a rebirth. This return "in the flesh," however, is itself a 
repetition of Beloved's earlier haunting of 124 as a ghost, so that 
her second coming becomes a third coming. Note how this 
nonprimary event is narrated: "A fully dressed woman walked 
out of the water. She barely gained the dry bank of the stream be­
fore she sat down and leaned against a mulberry tree.... Nobody 
saw her emerge or came accidentally by" (51). If nobody saw her 
emerge, the only possible focalizer and narrator of her return is 
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the extradiegetic narrator, and this remains the telling voice 
throughout the chapter, although focalization is sometimes del­
egated to characters. 
This brings me back to my original perplexity concerning the 
birth and rebirth scenes: Why is a nonprimary event accorded pri­
mary narration, whereas the originary event of Denver's birth is 
rendered through layers of storytelling? The narrator makes this 
statement about Sethe's awareness of the meaning of freedom: 
"Freeing yourself was one thing; claiming ownership of that freed 
self was another" (95). By analogy, one might say that being born 
is one thing; claiming ownership of one's birth is another. It is 
through memory (as focalizer) and storytelling (as narrator) that 
Denver claims ownership of her own birth and gains access to a 
self. The reawakening of memory is particularly important in the 
light of its repression in Denver's childhood. Early in her life, one 
of the boys at Lady Jones's asks Denver a question about Sethe's 
murder of Beloved. This question puts an end to Denver's social 
life, to her reading lessons, to her capacity to hear. Deafness is 
Denver's defense against unacceptable knowledge. But knowl­
edge, and memory, are necessary for the constitution of personal 
history, and Denver gradually begins to show an interest in the 
past, at least in that portion which relates to her own origin. Since 
she cannot remember her own birth, Denver must cease to be deaf 
and begin to listen, as she constructs her own history through sto­
ries she hears from Sethe: "Denver hated the stories her mother 
told that did not concern herself, which is why Amy was all she 
ever asked about" (62).12 Denver rehearses the memories in her 
mind as she constructs, rather than reconstructs, a coherent pat­
tern out of "the strings she had heard all her life" (176). However, 
to be fully creative, narration to the self has to be complemented 
by narration to the other. When telling the story of her birth to 
Beloved, Denver gives "blood to the scraps her mother and grand­
mother had told her—and a heartbeat" (78). Thus, narration 
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becomes most strongly a creation, and most strongly a way of 
claiming ownership of the self, when the construction is shared: 
"The monologue became, in fact, a duet as they lay down to­
gether, Denver nursing Beloved's interest like a lover whose plea­
sure was to overfeed the loved . . . and the two did the best they 
could to create what really happened, how it really was, some­
thing only Sethe knew because she alone had the mind for it and 
the time afterward to shape it" (ibid.).13 
The layering of focalization and narration in the birth scenes is 
necessary because it is through memory and storytelling that the 
fact of birth is transformed into a claiming of ownership and a 
birth into a self. Toward the end of the novel, Denver's accession 
to a self is explicitly formulated: "It was a new thought, having a 
self to look out for and preserve" (252). 
Recast in the negative, the foregoing statements can also ex­
plain the primary narration of Beloved's return. Beloved's rebirth 
is not rendered through her memories (as focalizer) or her retro­
spective telling (as second-degree narrator), because these would 
have constituted her self, and Beloved does not have a self. But as 
psychoanalysis has taught us, her incapacity to remember the 
event causes her to reenact it unconsciously, to return to the 
world from which she was expelled as a baby. 
Let us examine these hypotheses a little further. Although Be­
loved enjoys listening to stories, much more so than does Denver 
(see, e.g., 58), she cannot use them to construct a personal history 
because she has no memory. Indeed, Sethe believes that "Beloved 
had been locked up by some whiteman for his own purposes, and 
never let out the door. That she must have escaped to a bridge or 
someplace and rinsed the rest out of her mind" (119). To be sure, 
not everything is rinsed out of Beloved's mind: Sethe, and her ear­
rings, are very much there, as is the scene of separation, and the 
boat full of half dead, half dying slaves, from which her mother 
escaped into the water. If I may phrase the point somewhat para­
doxically, the problem is not that Beloved does not remember the 
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past, but that she does not remember it as a past: "it is always 
now there will never be a time when I am not crouching and 
watching others who are crouching too I am always crouching 
. .  . it is the crouching that is now always now" (210-11). Such an 
obliteration of temporality negates (personal) history and mem­
ory as memory.14 "Those who cannot remember their past," says 
Santayana, "are condemned to re-live it." And Beloved relives her 
past by returning, by being reborn into the world, but not into a 
substantial self. 
Beloved's lack of self has an objective correlative in physical 
fragmentation. On losing a tooth, she thinks: 
This is it. Next would be her arm, her hand, a toe. Pieces of her 
would drop maybe one at a time, maybe all at once. Or one of 
those mornings before Denver woke and after Sethe left she 
would fly apart. It is difficult keeping her head on her neck, 
her legs attached to her hips when she is by herself. Among the 
things she could not remember was when she first knew that 
she could wake up one day and find herself in pieces. She had 
two dreams: exploding and being swallowed. When her tooth 
came out—an odd fragment, last in the row—she thought it 
was starting. (133)15 
This experience of the "body in pieces"16 is the inverse of the asso­
ciation established elsewhere in the novel between an integration 
of parts and a claiming of the self. When Baby Suggs discovers her 
freedom, for example, she also discovers that parts of her body 
cohere into a whole—the whole being her newborn free self: "But 
suddenly she saw her hands and thought with a clarity as simple 
as it was dazzling, 'These hands belong to me. These my hands.' 
Next she felt a knocking in her chest and discovered something 
else new: her own heartbeat. Had it been there all along? This 
pounding thing" (141). Sethe similarly links the stirring of 
memory (in spite of its painful aspects) with a regaining of the 
body: "Paul D dug it up, gave her back her body, kissed her 
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divided back, stirred her rememory, and brought her more news" 
(189). And the connection between such integration and love is 
also emphasized by Paul's memory of Sixo's attitude toward the 
Thirty-Mile Woman: "She is a friend of my mind. She gather me, 
man, the pieces I am, she gather them and give them back to me in 
all the right order. It's good, you know, when you got a woman 
who is a friend of your mind" (272-73).17 While remembering the 
past is associated with re-membering the body, its disremem­
bering is mirrored by physical dismembering.18 
An additional aspect of an unintegrated self is the lack of disso­
ciation between it and an other.19 Beloved experiences herself as 
indistinct from Sethe: "I am not separate from her there is no 
place where I stop her face is my own and I want to be there in 
the place where her face is and to be looking at it too" (210). The 
fusion is often reenacted by the pronouns "my" and "mine" in ex­
pressions like "my face" or "the face which is mine," which in the 
context can mean at least three things: her face, which resembles 
mine; her face, which belongs to me, since she is my mother; 
my face, which is on her shoulders. The following is one example 
of many: 
I drop the food and break into pieces she took my face away 
there is no one to want me to say my name . .  . 
. .  . I see her face which is mine . . . I have to have my face. . . 
I follow her we are in the diamonds which are her earrings 
now my face is coming I have to have it I am looking for 
the jo in . . . now I am her face my own face has left m e . .  . I 
want to be the two of us . .  . I want the join. (212-13)20 
Note the association between fusion and fragmentation. Since for 
Beloved, she and Sethe are one, her mother's disappearance leaves 
her without her own face. Looking for the join is therefore both a 
desire to integrate fragmented parts of herself and a longing to re­
unite with Sethe, a reunion that culminates in expressions like 
"You are my face, you are me" (216); "Why did you leave me 
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who am you" (ibid.); or "Will we smile at me?" (ibid.). A self that 
is totally dependent on fusion with another is neither a distinct 
unit (a self of one's own) nor a unified whole (an unfragmented 
self, or in-dividuum). In short, it is not really a self. 
At the end of the novel, Beloved, who could not remember, is 
disremembered by others (as well as dismembered); she who had 
a claim, but could not claim herself, is unclaimed by anyone, and 
all traces of her disappear into the weather: "Everybody knew 
what she was called, but nobody anywhere knew her name. 
Disremembered and unaccounted for, she cannot be lost because 
no one is looking for her, and even if they were, how can they call 
her if they don't know her name? Although she has a claim, she is 
not claimed. In the place where long grass opens, the girl who 
waited to be loved and cry shame erupts into her separate parts, 
to make it easy for the chewing laughter to swallow her all away" 
(274). Beloved is swallowed away. And her story? Her own story 
she could not narrate, but even stories made up about her cease 
after a while. A story of one who is reborn without ever being 
born into a self is as insubstantial as the creature who "wander[s] 
out of the yard just the way she wandered in" {67). 
Some might object that I make too much of Beloved's insub­
stantiality, which could be seen as part and parcel of her super­
natural mode of existence instead of as an indication of her 
incapacity to gain access to a self. Indeed, my whole comparison 
between Denver and Beloved might be questioned on the grounds 
of the difference in their ontological status. However, I would ar­
gue that Beloved is not unambiguously supernatural. There are 
enough clues in the novel for a "natural" reading and hence for a 
"legitimate" comparison between her and Denver. The ambiguity 
of Beloved's mode of existence, however, goes far beyond legiti­
mating the comparison between Denver's success and Beloved's 
failure in crystallizing a self. This ambiguity is crucial both for the 
novel's problematization of the possibility of gaining access to re­
ality and for its tentative retrieval of representation. Here again, 
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as in the case of narrative levels, Beloved uses destabilizing mod­
ernist and postmodernist strategies to re-engage with reality. 
Since 1990, when the first version of this chapter was written, 
numerous critics have explored Beloved's identity in ways that 
partly overlap with mine. I will therefore start by outlining the 
main directions of the later studies, subsequently sharpening my 
own emphases within this context. Many studies discuss the enig­
matic title character as a double symbol, operating simulta­
neously on a personal (or psychological) and a collective level. On 
the personal level, Beloved is variously seen as a condensation of 
Sethe's daughter and her African mother (Horvitz 1989, 158); a 
projection of the needs and desires of the other characters (Wilt 
1989,161-62); the return of the repressed (Ferguson 1991,113); 
"the incarnated memory of Sethe's guilt" (Rushdy 1992, 578); 
the pre-Oedipal child who desires a merger with her mother 
(Wyatt 1993, 480); and "all the babies in the womb" (Homans 
1994, 10-11). On the collective level, most critics—with differ­
ences in nuance—interpret her as symbolic of "a whole lineage of 
people obliterated by slavery, beginning with the Africans who 
died on the Middle Passage" (Wyatt 1993, 474; see also Horvitz 
1989, 157; Ferguson 1991, 115; Rushdy 1992, 571; Homans 
1994,10-11). 
My own concern is much more elementary. I am puzzled by 
who Beloved is at the level of the events. An attempt to figure out 
the story seems to me logically and narratologically prior to sym­
bolic interpretations, though it often invites these interpretations 
by the difficulties it presents. Is Beloved the flesh-and-blood rein­
carnation of Sethe's dead baby, the ghost returning as a person (a 
supernatural being), or a stranger who comes to 124 after horren­
dous tribulations, mistaking Sethe for her lost mother (a natural 
being)? Most critics explicitly or implicitly opt for one of the pos­
sibilities. Initially, reviewers conceived of Beloved as univocally 
supernatural (see Crouch 1987, Edwards 1987, Rumens 1987, 
and Thurman 1987). Many of the symbolic interpretations men­
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tioned above take a similar view: Deborah Horvitz talks about 
"the powerful corporeal ghost" (1989, 157); Rebecca Ferguson, 
about "the supernatural at work in the 'world of common real­
ity'" (1991,113);and Ashraf Rushdy, about a "ghost" anda "re­
incarnation" (1992,571). Elizabeth House flies in the face of this 
consensus by developing an equally univocal but opposed inter­
pretation. She sees the novel as "a story of two probable instances 
of mistaken identity" (1990,22). Beloved, according to her, is not 
a supernatural being but a young woman who herself suffered the 
horrors of slavery (ibid., 17) and who, haunted by the loss of her 
dead parents, comes to believe that Sethe is her mother. Analo­
gously, Sethe's longing for her dead daughter makes her rather 
easily convinced that Beloved is the child she has lost (ibid., 22). 
The conflict between supernatural and natural interpretations 
seems to call for choice, but the novel renders choice impossible, 
offering supporting clues for both alternatives and maintaining 
an ambiguity that some critics recognize (e.g., Wilt 1990; 
FitzGerald 1993; Phelan 1993; Homans 1994) and which I would 
like to describe in detail now. 
Many details dispersed throughout the novel support 
Beloved's identity as a supernatural, flesh-and-blood reincarna­
tion of Sethe's dead baby. Most prominent perhaps is her name, 
which is not even a proper name. In the rebirth scene, it is Beloved 
who says her name, and Sethe's reaction is unnerving: "Sethe was 
deeply touched by her sweet name; the remembrance of glittering 
headstone made her feel especially kindly toward her" (53). This 
somewhat cryptic remark becomes clearer at other points in the 
novel where we learn that "Beloved" was the one word Sethe had 
engraved on the tombstone of her dead baby (5,184), a word for 
which she had to pay by yielding her body to the engraver.21 An­
other link between the returning Beloved and the dead baby is the 
"three vertical scratches on her forehead" (51), which Sethe later 
identifies as "my fingernail prints right there on your forehead for 
all the world to see. From when I held your head up, out in the 
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shed" (202-3). An even stronger connection is the scar on 
Beloved's neck, identical to the cut caused by the handsaw in the 
murder scene. The scar constitutes an indissoluble bond between 
Sethe and Beloved, a bond Denver experiences as exclusion: "But 
once Sethe had seen the scar, the tip of which Denver had been 
looking at whenever Beloved undressed... once Sethe saw it, fin­
gered it and closed her eyes for a long time, the two of them cut 
Denver out of the games" (239; see also 120,176). Similarly bind­
ing are the earrings, about which Beloved inquires very soon after 
her return: "Where your diamonds?" (58); and "Tell me your ear­
rings" (63). "How did she know?" (ibid.) is both Sethe's and the 
reader's question, for Beloved's insistent interest in the earrings 
clearly suggests that she knew Sethe earlier. The earrings, we 
learn—crystal, not diamonds—were given to Sethe by her Ken­
tucky lady as a wedding present (58), and she kept them through 
all her suffering. When she came to 124, Baby Suggs found them 
(94), and "Sethe jingled the earrings for the pleasure of the crawl­
ing already? girl, who reached for them over and over again" 
(ibid.). "Crawling already?" is an expression recurrently associ­
ated with the baby whom Sethe later murders, and Beloved's 
questions about the earrings may therefore be interpreted as 
memories of a far past to which she has now returned. She keeps 
emphasizing that she has come back in order to see Sethe's face 
(e.g., 75). (Incidentally, the earrings are no longer with Sethe, as 
the jailer has taken them to prevent her from harming herself 
[183].) The name, the scratches, the scar, and the earrings all lead 
up to the final click of recognition, which comes when Sethe hears 
Beloved softly humming a song Sethe herself had made up for her 
children (176). Beloved's acquaintance with a song that "nobody 
knows . .  . but me and my children" (175) becomes for Sethe the 
final confirmation of Beloved's identity as the dead baby come 
back to life. 
That the dead baby who first returned as a ghost has now come 
back in the flesh is unquestioningly accepted—though often re­
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sented—by various characters in the novel, as is the supernatural 
character of her return. For example, Denver "was certain that 
Beloved was the white dress that had knelt with her mother in the 
keeping room, the true-to-life presence of the baby that had kept 
her company most of her life" (119); Paul D thinks, "But what if 
the girl was not a girl, but something in disguise?" (127); and Ella, 
who explicitly associates Beloved with the devil, "didn't mind a 
little communication between the two worlds [as in the case of 
ghosts] but this [a return in the flesh] was an invasion" (257). 
The invasion, I am afraid, cannot be so unquestioningly ac­
cepted by the reader, not because of a modern skepticism about 
supernatural events but because of conflicting evidence within the 
novel. Contradictions focus on two details: the separation be­
tween Beloved and Sethe, and the presence (or absence) of an iron 
circle around Sethe's neck. Both in her monologue and elsewhere, 
Beloved remembers with acute pain how her mother jumped 
alone off a boat of dead and dying slaves on which they were 
crouching together: "they do not push her she goes in" (212; see 
also 75, 211-13). Sethe, on the other hand, has very different 
memories of the way she parted from her daughter (and sons) 
during the escape from Sweet Home: "When the signal for the 
train came, you all was the only ones ready. I couldn't find Halle 
or nobody... So I sent you all to the wagon with the woman who 
waited in the corn" (197-98; see also 9-10,159,191). And when 
Sethe reaches Baby Suggs and 124, her "crawling already? girl" is 
there, having been rescued as planned. The two versions of this 
crucial event also involve Sethe's earrings: According to Beloved, 
the earrings—the diamonds—were in the water Sethe jumped 
into (75, 211); according to Sethe—and it may be significant in 
this connection that she speaks of crystal rather than diamonds— 
they were with her until she reached 124.22 
The second contradiction concerns the presence or absence of 
an iron circle around Sethe's neck.23 Thus, Beloved: "The woman 
is there with the face I want the face that is mine . .  . if I had the 
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teeth of the man who died on my face I would bite the circle 
around her neck" (211). In retrospect, this can illuminate her 
strange behavior and enigmatic explanation in the scene in the 
Clearing where Denver accuses her of having tried to strangle 
Sethe: "I kissed her neck. I didn't choke it. The circle of iron 
choked it" (101). Confusingly, however, at no other point in the 
novel is there any mention of an iron circle around Sethe's neck, 
and it is hard to imagine that such a humiliating and painful expe­
rience would not have come up in Sethe's own memories. 
These contradictions support a reading that may explain 
Beloved's identity in a natural, rather than a supernatural, way. Is 
it possible to imagine that Beloved is not Sethe's dead baby, not 
Sethe's daughter at all, but the daughter of some other slave who 
had an iron circle round her neck and who jumped off the slave 
boat into the water, leaving her daughter behind, with an un­
quenchable yearning for her smile and her earrings? Is it then pos­
sible to imagine that the abandoned Beloved was taken over by 
some white man for his own purposes, as Sethe believes (119), 
and as Stamp Paid later suggests to Paul D: "Was a girl locked up 
in the house with a whiteman over by Deer Creek. Found dead 
last summer and the girl gone. Maybe that's her. Folks say he had 
her in there since she was a pup" (235; see also 215,241). Could it 
be then that after the man's death Beloved ran away, and, remem­
bering something her mother had whispered about a house (213), 
she identifies it with 124, certain that she has come home to the 
woman who had left her? If this is a possible story, how do we ex­
plain Sethe's, Denver's, and Beloved's conviction that the return­
ing creature is Sethe's dead baby? It seems to me—and I am glad 
to find a similar interpretation in House's essay—that the convic­
tion can be explained by the overwhelming emotional hunger all 
three share: Beloved's hunger for her mother, for love, for "the 
join"; Sethe's hunger for her daughter, for expiation; Denver's 
hunger for company, for love, for someone who will help her wait 
for her daddy (208). This would be a non-supernatural version of 
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Beloved's story. And it is perhaps to leave room for such a reading 
that in the rebirth scene the extradiegetic narrator does not desig­
nate the returning creature as "Beloved," only as "the woman," 
thereby leaving her identity unverified. 
Unlike House, I have no desire to suggest that the natural ex­
planation is preferable to the supernatural one. On the contrary, I 
believe that the novel oscillates between these two alternatives in 
an insoluble ambiguity. In generic terms, and in Todorovian par­
lance, I am suggesting that the novel is neither Marvellous (as it 
would be in the supernatural reading) nor Strange (as it would be 
in the natural interpretation), but Fantastic (Todorov 1970).24 In 
the language of James Phelan's rhetorical reader-response orien­
tation, the phenomenon can be described as "the stubborn." As 
distinct from the difficult, which is "recalcitrance that yields to 
our explanatory efforts," the stubborn is "recalcitrance that will 
not yield" (1993, 714). Beloved is, according to him, "a para­
digm case of the stubborn" (ibid.). The distinction, as well as the 
characterization of Beloved as "stubborn," makes experiential 
sense, but (as Phelan knows) it is also open to criticism on account 
of its relativism: What is stubborn for one reader may be only dif­
ficult for another. A description of structures like ambiguity, 
paradox, and the Fantastic may be one way of grounding the 
stubborn in the text, although from Phelan's point of view, this 
may be too objective-sounding, too grounded in the text and not 
sufficiently attuned to the experience of reading. Whether we re­
main with "the stubborn" or prefer "ambiguity," Phelan is quite 
right that an encounter with the phenomenon shifts the interpre­
tive task "from explicating it to explaining the purpose of its re­
calcitrance" (ibid., 715). 
What, then, are the purposes of the ambiguity (or stubborn­
ness) surrounding Beloved's mode of existence? One of Phelan's 
hypotheses is that the stubborn forces us to renounce a feeling of 
mastering the experience. "Us," in his essay, stands for "white 
male," and from this position he modestly says: "To presume 
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mastery here would be to flaunt my hubris" (721). It seems to me 
that the impossibility of mastering such an emotionally wrench­
ing experience is not confined to white male readers. For similar 
or different reasons, African American readers probably find Be­
loved just as stubborn as white readers do, and the horrors of sla­
very just as ungraspable or unmasterable. 
This leads me to speculate that one purpose of the ambiguity of 
Beloved is to dramatize the difficulty of gaining access to and 
making accessible an unbearable reality. After listening to a pre­
sentation of an earlier version of this chapter at Princeton (in 
1990), Morrison suggested that the Fantastic status of the title 
character may be a displacement of what seems to Morrison 
much more central and much more unbelievable (fantastic in a 
nontechnical sense), namely "the slavery stuff" (her own 
words).25 Reformulated in my terms, the ambiguity can be said 
to enact both the representational impetus and the obstacles it 
encounters. 
That the obstacle in this case is at least partly psychological is 
hinted at by the notion of displacement. Elaborating on this, I 
would claim that the oscillation between the sensation of unreal­
ity (Beloved is not a "real" person) and the insistence of the trau­
matic events in the present (she has, nevertheless, returned as a 
flesh-and-blood creature) is a performative representation of the 
response to trauma on the part of the characters, the overall nar­
rator, the author, and the reader. From this perspective, the 
unbelievability can be seen as a manifestation of denial, a charac­
teristic defense mechanism against trauma. The intrusion of the 
horror, its lifelike return, enacts the obsession that is the obverse 
of the self-defensive response. The possibility of representation is 
thus riddled with ambivalence. 
A similar ambivalence emerges in relation to narration. Its 
strongest manifestation, perhaps, is the "contradiction" between 
the recurrent assertion in the novel's last chapter, "It was not a 
story to pass on" (274-75), and the fact that this is precisely the 
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story the novel has passed on. Many critics have noticed not only 
the contradiction but also the ambiguity of the recurrent sen­
tence. "Pass on" can mean both transmit and ignore (pass over). 
It combines acceptance and rejection, an injunction to remember 
and a recommendation to forget (see Henderson 1990, 83; 
Ferguson 1991, 123-24; Wyatt 1993, 484; Perez-Torres 1993, 
691; Homans 1994, 11). Phelan suggests that the two meanings 
of "it was not a story to pass on" not only contrast with each 
other, but together they form a contrast between stories and real­
ity. Thus, it was not a story to pass on, (my emphasis) "but it was 
something else, a reality to be confronted" (1993, 720; Phelan's 
emphasis). Like the implied opposition between story and reality, 
Beloved's stubbornness is seen by Phelan as (among other things) 
a challenge on Morrison's part to treat the narrative as a species 
of history: "not a story to pass on, but a person whose multiplicity 
transcends any story that can be told about her. And here the im­
portance of the fiction comes back: her story stands in for the mil­
lions and millions of other slaves, whose lives and deaths, though 
not passed on in story, are just as deep, just as emotionally 
wrenching, just as important—as hers" (ibid., 723). This reading 
illuminates a double ambiguity, that of the recurrent sentence and 
that of the title character, relating both to the larger historical di­
mension. At the same time, it creates a polarity between story and 
reality, opposites that, in my opinion, the novel renders equiva­
lent and subjects to the same ambivalence. Like the extradiegetic 
narrator, the characters are conflicted about the possibility and 
desirability of narration. Paul D's locked tobacco tin, Denver's 
self-defensive deafness, and Sethe's and Baby Suggs's tacit verdict 
that the past is unspeakable are only a few examples of the inca­
pacity to tell (and hear) that characterizes repression. Counter­
balancing this, however, are the need and the desire to tell, often 
equating life and (life) story. Sethe muses: "Her story was bear­
able because it was his as well—to tell, to refine and tell again" 
(99), and Paul D finally returns to Sethe because "He wants to put 
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his story next to hers" (273). The capacity to narrate against all 
odds is seen in this novel as a therapeutic—even if tentative—ac-
cess to both self and reality. 
No less important than the therapeutic need to narrate is the 
moral duty to tell, as the epigraph clearly implies: 
I will call them my people 
which were not my people; 
and her beloved, 
which was not beloved. 
(Romans 9:25)26 
Without diminishing the difficulties attending the enterprise, Be­
loved ultimately affirms narration as both a therapeutic necessity 
and a moral imperative, a way of constituting a self and protect­
ing a cruel reality against a comfortable amnesia. The novel 
becomes a complex re-engagement with representation and sub­
jectivity, a claiming of the unclaimed, which, according to 
Ricoeur, is the raison d'etre of all storytelling: "We tell stories be­
cause in the last analysis human lives need to and merit being nar­
rated. This remark takes on its full force when we refer to the 
necessity to save the history of the defeated and the lost. The 
whole history of suffering cries out for vengeance and calls for 
narrative" (1985,62). 
Conclusion 
Through an analysis of five twentieth-century 
novels, I have suggested a new approach to representation and 
subjectivity and have outlined a map of changing attitudes to­
ward these concepts in our time. The attempt to theorize via lit­
erature is, at least partly, a reaction against impositions of 
theoretical models on literary texts or reductions of literary texts 
to the status of examples. Such tendencies, which had their ratio­
nale (theory, it was believed, should be concerned with the gen­
eral rather than the specific), were particularly pronounced in 
structuralist narratology (including my own past work) and have 
often led to an unfortunate severing of any living contact between 
poetics and literature. The proposed return to the texts is also mo­
tivated by a belief that literature is a mode of knowledge different 
from (but in no way inferior to) theory and philosophy. For this 
reason, a study of theoretical problems through an analysis of lit­
erary texts can yield insights impossible for a purely conceptual 
inquiry. Just as the approach treats philosophical problems from 
a defamiliarizing (hence refreshing) narratological angle, so does 
it open up narratology to questions generally considered outside 
its purview. 
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I wish to acknowledge openly, however, both the burden that 
this approach puts on the textual readings—the proof of that bur­
den is in the reading—and the circularity involved in the proce­
dure. While deriving my theoretical claims from the novels 
themselves, I have not come to the texts as a tabula rasa, and a 
reading of literature with certain conceptual concerns in mind 
necessarily implies some theoretical orientation. Theorizing 
through a limited number of novels also raises the question: Is the 
emergent theory valid only for these novels, or others similar to 
them, or is it more generally applicable? The question becomes 
doubly acute because the novels I discuss share a foregrounding 
of the problems with which my book is concerned and may there­
fore be said to be both too easily amenable to this kind of analysis 
and not typical enough of the novel genre. I counter this hypo­
thetical objection by pointing out a potential virtue in what seems 
like a limitation. Rather than militating against their use for my 
purposes, the foregrounding of the conceptual problems by the 
texts I choose may bring what usually lies underneath to the sur­
face. This argument could be taken a step further with the help of 
de Man's rebuttal of the category of "self-conscious literature" 
(on the grounds that all literature is). I believe, however, that 
there are degrees of self-consciousness and degrees of foreground­
ing, and that the approach I suggest may look more "spectacular" 
in relation to some texts than in relation to others. This brings me 
to the earlier question of applicability. To my mind, if the theory 
is valid, it is valid for all fictional narratives, though it may have 
different shapes, nuances, and degrees in different texts. While an 
empirical demonstration of such a claim is impracticable, given 
the infinite number of available narratives, future studies may 
usefully take up novels that do not foreground the issues, but also 
do not prevent them from emerging. A study focusing on the real­
ist tradition of the nineteenth century may be of special interest in 
this context, both because this tradition tends to shun self-con-
scious display and because it often uses external (omniscient) nar­
rators, who are less easily conceived of as subjects. 
Conclusion 127 
Because my theory emerges largely from within the novels, but 
can also reach beyond these five texts, a delicate balance is needed 
not only between textual and conceptual analysis, but also be­
tween theoretical and historical poetics. The desire to rehabilitate 
representation and rehumanize subjectivity has motivated my 
project as a whole. However, the diachronic study locates the 
novels at different points along the continuum: Absalomy Absal­
om! and The Real Life of Sebastian Knight are conflicted, in vary­
ing degrees, about both representation and subjectivity; Thru 
dismantles both; Company dismantles them but also tentatively 
regains them on a different level; and Beloved integrates the de­
stabilization and yet glances beyond doubt to a new affirmation. 
The need to find the correct balance between my general argu­
ment and the location of each text on the historical map is a chal­
lenge I hope I have met. 
I was attracted to twentieth-century novels both because the is­
sues at stake have become particularly acute in our period 
(though they are by no means exclusive to it) and because of the 
analogy (as well as the mutual influence) between the transition 
punctuated by the novels and the conceptual trajectory of literary 
theory. I have attributed this homology to the cultural landscape 
of our period, but I am also aware of the shadow of circularity. 
Can the shift be located in the sequence of novels, or does it result 
from the changing theoretical orientations I bring to bear upon 
them? Unfortunately, the question seems to me unanswerable. 
Indeed, it is a variation on the age-old crux: Is x in the text, or in 
our reading of (or approach to) the text? That both questions can­
not be answered definitively does not, however, render the asking 
futile. Among other things, it alerts us to the possibility that ours 
is a profession where one finds what one is looking for. 
My book attempts to break away both from traditional views 
of representation and subjectivity and from their poststructuralist 
dismantling, whether in deconstruction or in Althusser- and Fou-
cault-inspired theories of ideology. The project of rehabilitation is 
not meant as a regression to earlier positions but as a spiraling 
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movement that integrates skepticism and yet glances beyond it. 
The glance beyond is effected by shifting the ground from refer­
ence and specularity to access achieved through narration. I play 
with various connotations of access so as to go through destabili­
zation and entrapment within discursive constructs, but empha­
size the final act of substitution as a reaching gesture that involves 
a convention-governed trust or faith. 
The mobile stance informing my concept of an access-function 
is reinforced by the stress on narration, highlighting the act or 
process of production rather than the final product. This dynamic 
grasp of the issue has the advantage of going beyond most struc­
turalist narratology. A question that immediately arises, however, 
is: Whose act of production? This book is concerned with narra­
tors, though it does insert occasional references to authors when 
the texts foreground them. It seems to me, however, that a theory 
that attempts to go beyond a view of the narrator as a structural 
position to a consideration of his/her subjectivity should be able 
to open itself up to a similar treatment of authors. Whether ap­
proached as one of the voices in a Bakhtinian polyphony or as the 
agent whose act of production is responsible for the various fic­
tional narrations, the reborn author will not be the same as the 
one whose death was so definitively announced. But it is clear to 
me that some rebirth is called for by a theory that spotlights narra­
tion. The distinction between the real and the implied author may 
be less radical than it seemed in the days of New Criticism and 
structuralism, since the real author is also in some sense implied. 
What we know about the author is drawn mainly from discourses 
by and about him or her (literary texts, letters, notes, memoirs 
by friends, etc.).1 This is rather similar to the way the character-
narrators in Absalom, Absalom! and The Real Life of Sebastian 
Knight try to interpret "reality" and the subjects inhabiting it: 
they read documents, listen to stories, infer, and create. 
The narrators' transference-like repetition of the events they 
narrate confers further dynamism on the act of narration. The 
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performative dimension that is explicitly dramatized in Quentin's 
and Shreve's reliving of Henry and Bon, as well as in V's transfor­
mation into Sebastian Knight (or vice versa), exists, I suggest, in 
every act of narration. 
And in every act of reading. In Absalom, Absalom! the readers 
find themselves in a position analogous to Sutpen's victims', con­
fronted with gaps, absences, and obscurities that impede the de­
sire for intelligibility. Their attempts to figure out the story often 
involve imaginative invention, like the creation of a hypothetical 
scene between Quentin and Henry in which the principal secret is 
supposedly divulged. In Beloved, the readers' oscillation between 
a supernatural and a natural interpretation of the title character's 
identity is a performative repetition of the response to trauma by 
the characters and the overall narrator. What these texts drama­
tize explicitly may be implicitly true of narrators and readers in all 
texts: processing the text in the act of reading, the readers also 
"perform" it, experientially repeating the narrators' acts of pro­
duction. My description of the access function of narration also 
applies to readers, as they gain access through a performative rep­
etition of the processes of the text. They too operate a metaphoric 
credit card, with its institutionalized conventions and its trust-
governed gesture of substitution. 
"The reader is the writer and the writer the reader," says Thru 
(30) in an extreme formulation of what many theoreticians prefer 
to see as equivalence or complementarity. The centrality of listen­
ing or reading to the functioning of narration is obvious in the 
novels I discuss. The Quentin-Shreve collaboration in Absalom, 
Absalom! is a "happy marriage of speaking and hearing" (316) in 
which the narratee is just as active as the narrator. In Beloved, 
narration becomes most strongly creative, and most strongly a 
way of claiming ownership of the self, when it is shared with an­
other (Denver with Beloved, Paul D with Sethe, on so on). And 
the lonely creature in Company devises a hearer to make both 
narration and company possible. 
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Equally kinetic are the transformations disrupting the stratifi­
cation of narrative levels: subversion, interpenetration, reversi­
bility, interchangeability, and mutual cancellations.2 The same 
strategies, differently used, serve both the destabilization of repre­
sentation and subjectivity and their rehabilitation. Thus, whereas 
the multiplication of narrative levels in Absalom, Absalom! and 
The Real Life of Sebastian Knight enacts a doubt about the possi­
bility of reaching reality and constituting a self, in Beloved it op­
erates as an access to both. 
My analysis of representation and subjectivity through the 
concept of narration can be fruitfully linked to the current narra­
tive turn in a variety of disciplines—historiography, psycho­
analysis, sociology, communication studies, and jurisprudence. 
Although my book is concerned with fictional narration, it clearly 
stands to gain from the perceived continuity with extraliterary 
practices. I venture to say, however, that my perspective can also 
enrich these new orientations in at least two respects. The concept 
of narrative is often used in these disciplines to counter the notion 
of truth-claims or factuality. In I, Pierre Riviere (1978), Foucault 
tells the main event—the multiple murder—from various points 
of view and through various narrators, none of whom is more au­
thoritative than the others. The result is, in many ways, similar to 
the novels I analyze here: a demystification of truth, a destabiliza­
tion of reality, a questioning of event. Hay den White (1978) sees 
history as a species of narrative and classifies it under various 
tropes, using the concept of plot. Donald Spence (1982) speaks 
about "narrative truth" rather than "historical truth" in psycho­
analysis. Difficulties with knowledge, reality, and the like have 
often led to an emphasis on the fictional status of (or fictional di­
mension in) historiography, psychoanalysis, and other disci-
plines.3 Within these developments, narrative is also part of a 
reaction against theory, at least in its traditional acceptation as 
objective, verifiable, universal. Paradoxically, narrative theory is 
often used today in order to dislodge theory. 
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Obviously, I cannot do justice to these fascinating approaches 
here, nor can I broach a serious discussion of my agreements and 
disagreements with their assumptions and procedures. All I can 
do is suggest that the interface between them and the theory I 
have developed may give rise to a use of narrative (and even 
more, narration) that does not substitute for reality but offers a 
complex access to it. It may also help reestablish a contact be­
tween narrative and theory, where theory will be enriched by the 
specificity of narratives, while narratives will open up to a form of 
theorizing that grows out of them, integrates both destabilization 
and a dynamics of "visions and revisions," and yet gestures to­
ward some kind of re-affirmation. 

Appendix 
The narratological terms used in this study are all 
borrowed from Gerard Genette's Figures III, and I will define them 
briefly for the sake of readers who may not be familiar with Genette's 
seminal book.1 Narrative levels are a phenomenon of embedding, subor­
dination, relations of containing/contained, or outside/inside, between 
the act of narration and the events narrated, as well as between various 
stories told in one text. The highest, or outermost, level is the one con­
cerned with the narration of the events (or diegesis) and is therefore 
called extradiegetic. Immediately subordinate to the extradiegetic level is 
the diegetic level it narrates, that is, the events themselves. Events may 
include speech acts of narration, whether oral or written. Stories told 
by characters belonging to the diegetic level constitute a second-degree 
narrative, a metadiegetic level. Within this level additional stories may 
create a meta-metadiegetic level, and so on ad infinitum (at least in 
principle). 
Sometimes the relations between narrative levels are those of analogy, 
that is, similarity and contrast. An analogy that verges on identity, mak­
ing one level a kind of mirror or reduplication of another, is known by 
the term mise en abyme. The transition from one narrative level to an­
other is in principle effected by the act of narration, which draws the 
reader's attention to the shift. Sometimes, however, the transition is not 
marked, and the discreteness of levels is transgressed. Characters from 
an inner story may, for example, address their narrator, or the "dear 
reader" may be asked to help a character accomplish a difficult task. The 
transgression of levels is known as metalepsis. In extreme cases it col­
lapses completely the distinction between outside and inside, container 
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and contained, narrating subject and narrated object, often resulting in a 
radical problematization of the border between reality and fiction. 
Narration is by definition at a higher narrative level than the story it 
narrates. One classification of narrators therefore depends on the typol­
ogy of narrative levels. The diegetic level is narrated by an extradiegetic 
narrator, the metadiegetic level by a diegetic (or intradiegetic) narrator, 
and the meta-metadiegetic level by a metadiegetic one. 
Genette distinguishes between narration and focalization (formerly 
known as point of view). Succinctly put, his distinction is between 
speaking and seeing (where seeing is—at least in my interpretation—not 
restricted to the visual; cf. Rimmon-Kenan 1983, 71-85). A person, and 
by analogy, a narrative agent, is capable of both speaking and seeing, 
and even of doing both things at the same time—a state of affairs that fa­
cilitates the widespread confusion between the two activities. Moreover, 
it is almost impossible to speak without betraying some personal point 
of view, if only through the language used. But a person or a narrative 
agent is also capable of undertaking to tell what another person sees or 
has seen. Thus speaking and seeing, narration and focalization, may, but 
need not, be attributed to the same agent. 
Notes 
A Note on Terminology 
1. See Cadava, Connor, and Nancy 1991 for the non-uniformity of 
various uses of subject. My account here and in the book itself may well 
be contested by other theoreticians. 
Introduction 
1. See "A Note on Terminology," above. 
2. On the mutual generation of opposites in a different conceptual 
framework, see McCanles, 1975,258. 
3. Prendergast stresses both the connection between reference and a 
truth-claim and the problematic status of such a claim: "One can only 
refer to something that is held to exist in the world (or, in Frege's terms, 
something in the world about which statements possessing truth-value 
can be made)" (1986:62-3). 
Chapter I 
1. Ricoeur has argued that mimesis in Aristotle does not mean an imi­
tation of reality but an imitation of plot, an "articulated signification of 
action" (1983, 88). 
2. Traditional here refers to a humanistic cast of mind, not a historical 
period. 
3. One should note that Smith rejects the two-level model of narrative 
(fabula/sjuzet), explicitly arguing against a chronological or logical pri­
ority of the events. But her "transactional" model implies a view that, in 
this respect, resembles the view she rejects. 
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4. For a similar description, see Bal 1984,343-44. 
5. Indeed, Representations is the name of a distinguished New His­
toricist periodical. 
6. For a brief review of such tendencies, see Gagnier 1991. See also 
Derrida's present concern with agency, choice, and responsibility 
(1991). 
7. As I have already suggested in the introduction, there are affinities 
between the question of representation in fiction and historiographical 
attempts to reconstruct a past—in spite of crucial distinctions between 
these discursive modes from other points of view (on some of the differ­
ences, see Cohn 1990, 775-804.) 
8. De Lauretis makes a similar point about discourses on sexuality, 
emphasizing that the choice manifests an "investment," "something be­
tween an emotional commitment and a vested interest in the relative 
power (satisfaction, reward, payoff) which that position promises (but 
does not necessarily fulfill)" (1987,6). 
9.1 transform what Bakhtin says in the negative about authoritative 
discourse into positive statements about its opposite, i.e. the internally 
persuasive discourse. 
10. De Lauretis makes a similar claim for a view of the subject, which 
emerges from current debates within feminism (1987,10). 
11. Nor is Genette unaware of the possibility of problematization. His 
model describes various techniques that subvert neat categories. 
Chapter 2 
1. All references are to the Vintage edition of 1972. 
2.1 say "predominantly" because the narrator sometimes changes 
within a single chapter and is sometimes unclear or ambiguous. I take up 
some problematic examples below. 
3. On narrative perspective or point of view in Absalom, Absalom! 
see Waggoner 1966,175-85; Levins 1970, 35-47; Lind 1973, 272-97; 
Brooks 1984,286-312; Kauffman 1986, 241-77; Toker 1993,152-84. 
4. See also pages 178,181,311,326,327. 
5. See also pages 27-28,147. 
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6. See also pages 27,140,145. 
7. See also pages 296-99, 300, 310-11, 314-15, 316-18, 319-20, 
337-38, and 342-45 for scenes Shreve has probably not heard from 
Quentin. 
8. Note that the few occasions on which Shreve does agree with Mr. 
Compson only emphasize the overall disagreement. For example, "And 
maybe this was one place where your old man was right" (342; see also 
343, 374). 
9. For a more detailed analysis of conflicting views of the possible 
motives for the murder see Rimmon-Kenan 1978, flO-fl2. 
10. Felman's by now classical analysis of James's The Turn of the 
Screw (1977, 94-207) dwells on the reader's repetition of the mistakes 
of the characters. 
11. For an emphasis on a literal reading of this statement as a hint that 
Bon is indeed Sutpen's son, see Toker 1993,159-60. 
12. For an interesting interpretation of Rosa as the lover in Absalom, 
Absalom! see Kauffman 1986,241-77. 
13. See Irwin 1975,113-20, and McPherson 1987, 432-33, 438, for 
a view of narration as a power struggle. 
14. Rosa is an exception, but she is more peripheral to the events than 
Sutpen, Henry, Bon, and Judith. Kauffman's emphasis on Rosa's values 
as those affirmed by the novel may partly explain why she is made a nar­
rator. 
15. See 353 of the novel for a similar statement about the mysterious 
workings of the "rapport of blood" between Sutpen, Henry, and Bon. 
Kauffman 1986 and McPherson 1987 offer detailed analyses of the 
"touch of flesh with flesh." 
16. Note that this is a different way of looking at the issue of nonver­
bal communication discussed earlier. 
17. See Irwin 1975, 28, 78, and elsewhere for an explanation of the 
Henry and Bon that Quentin creates. Irwin relies for his explanation on 
The Sound and the Fury. Not all critics would agree with such a 
conflation of two novels. 
18. For analysis of additional examples, see Brodsky 1978. 
19. For additional comments on this italicized segment see Brodsky 
1978,252 and Toker 1993,153-54. 
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20. Barthes (1970) sees this as part of the bourgeois emphasis on pri­
vate property. 
21. To support her hypothesis, Toker also adduces the occurrence of 
paralepses (the imparting of information that the character-narrator 
could not have) and of insights that are improbable from the point of 
view of the character concerned. I find Toker's view difficult to accept, 
since Rosa, Mr. Compson, Quentin, and Shreve do tell their versions of 
the story, often in the first person, and always to a narratee. By defini­
tion, the one who tells is a narrator, whereas the focalizer is the one who 
perceives the events or through whose eyes we perceive them (cf. Genette 
1972,203). The combination of an extradiegetic narrator with a charac-
ter-focalizer would take the form of third-person narration through the 
prism (but not the voice) of a character, as, for example, in James's The 
Ambassadors. This is clearly not the case in Absalom, Absalom! 
22. While Waggoner's view can be supported by the initial image of 
the two Quentins (9), as well as by the snow on Shreve's overcoat sleeve 
(173), it remains inconclusive, somewhat undermined by various 
shifters indicating the here and now of the first five chapters (e.g., 14). 
23. See also page 367. 
24. See also pages 335, 345, 346, 351. 
25. This is said about Rosa, but it can, I think, also apply to the narra­
tive efforts of the other characters. Kauffman takes the position that 
Rosa's female discourse succeeds where the male discourses fail. 
26. Other analogies, e.g., the parallelism between Bon's status as a 
phantom in the lives of the various characters and the shadow realities 
created by narration were discussed above in a different context. 
27. My emphasis on the success of the Quentin-Shreve creation re­
quires some reservation, since at the end of the novel Quentin is close to 
a nervous breakdown. 
Chapter 3 
1. All references are to the Penguin edition of 1971. 
2. See Rimmon-Kenan, 1976, 506-11 for an attempt to show how 
the novel blocks the possibility of choosing between the hypotheses. 
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3. This is the beginning from the point of view of the chronology of 
the story, not from that of the disposition of events in the text. 
4. Note the difference between a literal identification (Abeson and 
Nosebag) and a figurative one (V and Sebastian). 
5. The expression "false scent" is used in connection both with Suc­
cess (80) and with V's meeting with Goodman (50). 
6. Uncle Black, named after the black chess figure, could write his 
name upside down, and the expression "upside down" recurs, albeit in a 
completely different context, in The Doubtful Asphodel: "physical 
growth considered upside down" (148). 
7. Note the phonetic similarity of "Nussbaum" and "Nosebag." 
8. For more analogies see Fromberg 1967,434-36; Nicol 1967, 87­
93; Bader 1972,17-24; Rimmon-Kenan 1976,497-501. 
9. Cf. Stuart 1968,325. 
10. Note the repetition of v in "velvet." 
11. Note how the use of aural or visual alliteration, e.g., "sibilant 
slope" and "winding"—"writing," enacts what it talks about. 
12. In some sense it really does, since it is the author who decides to 
"kill" the character, but this causal relationship is denied in the quoted 
passage by the impression of unwittingness: the pause was fatal; it acci­
dentally caused the man's death. 
Chapter 4 
1. All references are to the Hamish Hamilton edition of 1975. 
2. Larissa is listed in the schedule as teaching "The Novel as Inten­
tional Object" (21), and her views are stated in the minutes of the staff 
meeting (96). Armel writes a letter to Larissa during another staff meet­
ing (26); his comments appear on students' compositions (48, 73, 74); 
and one of his courses, "The Beginnings of Narrative," is listed in the file 
of a student named Saroja (34). 
3. Note the ambiguity here: (a) she was producing Armel; (b) Armel 
was producing the text. 
4. "Textasy" is the title of the first article published on Thru (Kaf­
alenos 1980,43-46). 
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5. Note also the repetition of the title word, though spelled conven­
tionally, in this sentence. 
6. Birch (1994) gives an excellent analysis of the intertextual play with 
Greimas and Lacan. 
7. In an interview, Brooke-Rose said that, for her, the real theme of 
Thru is castration (1976, 11), but she went on immediately to refer to 
the "decoupage of reality" by "the very act of using language" (11-12), 
i.e., castration in a figurative, metalinguistic sense. 
8. For a Lacanian interpretation of the shattering of the narrative 
voice into a multitude of surrogate "bearers of the tale," see Birch 
(1994). 
Chapter 5 
1. All references are to the Grove Press edition of 1980. 
2. Here and elsewhere, Booth also wonders about the identity of the 
various addressers and addressees, but he does not analyse it in terms of 
narrative levels (1983,445,447). 
3.1 borrow this felicitous expression from the title of a 1994 book by 
Schwab. 
4. Quotations from this text here and elsewhere in the chapter are 
from Beckett's Molloy, Malone Dies, The Unnamable (New York: 
Grove Weidenfeld, 1965). The French original was published in 1952. 
5. A similar fusion of two characters (if they are two) is dramatized in 
Nabokov's The Real Life of Sebastian Knight. There too the merging is 
reinforced by a game of letters. This happens, we remember, when V, the 
narrator's initial, is inserted into Sebastian's name in Dr. Starov's tele­
gram. 
6. See also Locatelli's analysis, 1990:182 and elsewhere. 
Chapter 6 
1. See, for example, the near oxymoron in "the two did the best they 
could to create what really happened" (78). All references are to the Sig­
net New American Library edition of 1987. 
2. For this reason I use "self" (rather than "subject") in my analysis of 
Beloved. 
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3. For a different discussion of the place of Beloved in postmod­
ernism see Perez-Torres 1993,659-707. 
4. By near levels I mean phenomena that do not constitute narrative 
levels in the strict sense (i.e., when an object of narration becomes the 
narrating subject of a second-degree narrative) but are close to it in ef­
fect. An example is the embedding of second-degree focalization in a 
narrative whose narrator does not change. 
5. On the difference between quoted and autonomous interior 
monologues see Cohn 1978,14-15. 
6. For a definition of scene both as detailed narration and as dia­
logue, see Rimmon-Kenan 1983, 54-55. 
7. "First narrative" is Genette's term for the level narrated by the 
extradiegetic narrator (1972, 239). Most readers, of course, do not for­
mulate their experience in these narratological terms. 
8. The passage that follows this sentence is indeterminate as to voice 
and perspective. Is it told and focalized by the narrator, by Denver, by 
Sethe? Even tags like "said Sethe," while making it seem like her narra­
tion, can be construed as Denver's memories of her words or as the 
extradiegetic narrator's quotation of what Sethe said. 
9. The near-identity between Sethe's age when giving birth to Denver 
and Denver's age when narrating her birth also diminishes the sense of 
distance. 
10. Much later, after discovering Beloved's identity, Sethe associates 
the drinking of water with Beloved's behavior as a baby: "I would have 
known who you were right away because the cup after cup of water you 
drank proved and connected to the fact that you dribbled clear spit on 
my face the day I got to 124" (200). 
In addition to the parallels, there is also a local contrast in the resur­
rection scene between Sethe's voiding and Beloved's drinking of water. 
11. Beloved's return is not the only example in the novel of dead 
things coming back to life. Sethe returns to (sexual) life thanks to Paul D, 
while Paul D himself is reawakened by Beloved ("She moved him"). In 
both cases the return hurts. 
12. Although this is narrated before the traumatic question, it follows 
it in the chronology of the story. 
13. Even Sethe is said to have shaped the story, so there is creation in 
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every re-creation. There is a similarity between this view of narration as 
creation and, more important, creation by two, and the Quentin-Shreve 
narration in Absalom, Absalom! 
14. The nonexistence of time for Beloved can also explain the diffi­
culty of locating her two monologues in the temporal scheme of the 
novel: Do they occur in the narrative present? At the time of the separa­
tion from Sethe? Or at the time of their re-union? There are clues to sup­
port each possibility, and no decisive way of choosing among them. 
15. Cf. "I am going to be in pieces" (212) and "after the bottoms of 
my feet swim away from me" (213). For a discussion of fragmentation 
see Ferguson 1991,115. 
16. "The body in pieces" (le corps morcele) is a Lacanian expression 
(1966, 94) that I borrow without dwelling on all its implications for Be­
loved. The implications are highly interesting, but they lead in a direc­
tion that would blur the focus of this discussion. 
17. Without love, there is a threat of disintegration. Therefore, when 
Paul D returns to Sethe after having left her, and wants to rub her feet, 
she thinks about the possibility of his washing her: "Will he do it in sec­
tions? . .  . And if he bathes her in sections, will the parts hold?" (272). 
18. Henderson uses the same pun in a slightly different context (1990, 
71, 72). 
19. For analyses of this lack of dissociation in terms of object-rela-
tions psychoanalysis, see Schapiro 1991 and FitzGerald 1993. See also 
Wyatt 1993 for a Kristevan analysis of this phenomenon and a coining 
of the notion of a maternal symbolic. 
20. Her need to have someone who would want her and would say 
her name is dramatized in the love scene with Paul D, where she asks him 
to touch her "on the inside part" and call her name (116). Note also that 
Beloved's making love to her mother's lover and later becoming preg­
nant (presumably) by him is one more manifestation of Sethe and Be­
loved as, in some sense, doubles. Interestingly, in order to break the spell 
Beloved has on him, Paul D says to Sethe that he would like to have a 
baby with her. 
21. The word Beloved is half of the preacher's speech in the funeral 
("Dearly Beloved"), and Beloved's name thus comes from the discourse 
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of the other. Names in this novel are an interesting subject in their own 
right, deserving a separate analysis. 
22. House interprets the diamonds in the water as reflections of the 
sun (1990,21). 
23. Rather than conflicting evidence, House sees the differences con­
cerning the iron collar as changes in Beloved's perception of her mother 
during the sea voyage (1990,19). 
24. See McHale 1987, 74-76, for a distinction between the epistemo­
logical fantastic that characterizes modernism and the ontological fan­
tastic operative in postmodernism. 
25. In earlier interviews Morrison had said that she meant Beloved to 
be credible as a flesh-and-blood reincarnation of the dead baby. I am 
flattered that she agreed in retrospect that both readings are possible. 
26. According to House, the epigraph is a hint that the returning 
young woman is not the baby called Beloved (1990,22). 
Conclusion 
1.1 am grateful to Moshe Ron for many discussions of this subject. 
2. Such dynamic transformations are already implicit in Genette 
1972. 
3. For a vehement resistance to such stretching of boundaries, see 
Cohn 1990, 775-804. 
Appendix 
1. For convenience, I rely on my own explanations of Genette's 
terms in Rimmon-Kenan 1983. 
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